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ABSTRACT
In the period covered by the thesis (1945-87), 
teachers' salaries were negotiated between 
representatives of the local authorities and the 
teachers' associations in the Burnham Committees. 
This study explores how far the results of those 
negotiations, the Burnham Reports, have shaped 16-f 
education provision by reference to the 1950-51 
Further Education negotiations on the one hand and 
the 1979-80 Macfarlane Review of 16-19 provision on 
the other. A contribution is made to the debate on 
the theory of policy-making, based on the observed 
influence of the values of policy-makers on the 
final outcomes within those two studies.
The thesis is organised into four main parts. Part 
I introduces the work as a whole; Parts II and III 
present and analyse original empirical data; Part 
IV provides the theoretical underpinning.
First, the context for the research is outlined.
The methodology is described at the outset, since 
it explains why the two major studies were selected 
as providing the best sources for the work. The 
major developments affecting 16-f provision since 
1945 are then summarised.
The second part sets out the detail of the 
negotiations leading to the 1951 Burnham (FE) 
Report, the source of the current FE salary 
structure, and gives a commentary on their 
implications. Part III explores the issues raised 
in the Macfarlane Review.
The theoretical section of the study is developed 
in Part IV, where the new, distinctive contribution 
of this study to the theory of policy-making is 
presented.
The thesis provides new data on two areas of 
policy-making of great interest to contemporary 
education policy-makers. Additionally, in its 
conclusion it makes a contribution to the theory of 
policy-making, suggesting that the values of 
individual policy-makers and contingent factors - 
including, particularly and principally, the 
dimension of time - have the greatest impact on 
policy outcomes.
(iii)
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PABT I - TUB CONTEVr OF THE RESEARCH 
CHAPTER li INTRODOCTION
The issues explored in this research are central to the 
debate on the policy and values of 16-19 provision that 
has extended over the last two decades. Indeed, the 
character of 16-19 provision has been a major public 
issue since this study commenced in 1979. Policy cannot 
be explained without reference to the values of the 
policy-makers and the culture they inhabit. Only by 
examining the ideas and factors that influence people 
when they are deciding the framework and shape of 
provision do the policies become explicable.
Fundamental to the debates on where the 16-19 year old 
should study - in a sixth form at school or in FE, sixth 
form or tertiary college - is an 'academic skew': by this 
term I mean the tendency to promote full-time, academic 
and advanced courses rather than part-time, vocational 
and non-advanced courses.
Academic-Skew and the Burnham Reports
The phrases used to describe 'academic-skew' come from 
the FE culture, the starting point for the research. The 
late 1970s saw a dramatic rise in unemployment, 
particularly marked for adolescents. Why did so many 
young people seem to prefer the dole to further 
education? Why was the FE system not making more 
suitable provision? The conventional answer was that 
the Incentives of the FE system - described later in this
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Introduction - encouraged those working in FE to 
concentrate on increasing the provision of the more 
academic, advanced courses. If that were true, what was 
the source of those incentives? The answer lay in the FE 
teachers' salary structure, essentially conceived in the 
1950-51 Burnham negotiations. Part II of the thesis 
describes how - and why - the current FE salary structure 
came to contain the academically-skewing incentives.
Similarly, the 1970s agenda for 16-19 provision led 
directly to the decision to launch a detailed 
investigation culminating in the Macfarlane Report. By 
the late 1970s, there was a general recognition that the 
numbers of 16+ students in full-time education increased 
wherever either a sixth form college or, even more 
markedly, a tertiary college was established in place of 
school sixth forms. The tertiary college could provide 
courses that Schools Regulations prevented sixth forms or 
sixth form colleges from offering.
Since the concentration of post-16 education in 
institutions with no 'lower school' increased the 'age 
participation rate', and since tertiary colleges could 
also offer vocational studies in addition to all those 
available in sixth form colleges, the relative scarcity 
of sixth form and tertiary colleges, particularly the 
latter, was intriguing.
The conventional explanation, again, was that the
incentives of the Schoolteachers' salary structure, as 
determined by the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) Report, 
reinforced a presumption that school pupils should be 
encouraged to pursue post-16 studies in school sixth 
forms.
The logic was that since heads and deputies of 11-18 
schools gained higher salaries, and teaching staff had 
better chances of promotion, on the basis of the numbers 
of older pupils, there was an inbuilt incentive within 
the Burnham (PSS) Report for secondary schools to resist 
any proposals for sixth form or tertiary college 
reorganisations.
The research into the sources of the academic-skew within 
the Burnham Reports does not, however, explain its 
durability. The implicit values of negotiators of the 
1950s were still reflected in the Burnham Reports of the 
late 1970s. Those values appeared stronger than the 
changes in actual and potential clientele that had 
occurred over the intervening quarter century.
Academic-Skew 2uid Cultural Values
The Crowther Report (1959) had warmly endorsed John 
Dewey's observation that:
"V/hat the best and wisest parent wants for his own 
child, the community must want for all its 
children". (1)
16-19 provision has been significantly affected by the 
perception of a substantial proportion of parents that
the best course for their children would be the 
opportunity to join the professional classes, the route 
to which lay through academic study. Thus 16+ 
reorganisations that might endanger the sixth form of the 
11-18 school, the time-honoured route to the professions, 
have not been immediately acceptable.
A proposal in the late 1960s for a tertiary, rather than 
sixth form, college re-organisation in Surrey led to 
strong, and successful, opposition. Much of the 
opposition stemmed from a presumption that the education 
of the academic student would have been adversely 
affected by social contact - note, not educational 
contact on the same courses - in the same college as 
those students following non-academic courses such as 
builders, carpenters, plumbers, etc. (2)
There was no more logic in this view than in the 
alternative one which claimed that the social contact 
would have inestimable value. At the same time, the 
strength of the view, and its effects on 16-19 provision, 
were sufficient to invite examination. As the research 
progressed, it became increasingly important to explore 
the values and expectations of the system.
The Macfarlane Report made explicit a good proportion of 
the cultural Issues and values that were present in 
individual LEA 16+ reorganisations - the paternalism, the 
issue of the community-of-scholars v the technical
association (3) and, most critically, the priority always 
afforded the academic - the academic skew - in all parts 
of the education service as well as between the different 
competing sectors.
The study demonstrates that the education system has been 
in receipt of two separate messages from successive 
governments - on the one hand, that 'academic standards' 
must be maintained and, on the other, that education 
provision must be extended beyond the academic to include 
a pre-vocational orientation. It is worth noting at this 
point that the values that are implicit in the English 
education system, whether through the Burnham Reports or 
specific Government policies, support the first message 
and are antipathetic to the second.
The first principle of post-war education provision was 
the retention of 'academic standards', giving a priority 
to the needs of the traditional elite, and the second was 
a pressure for more vocationally-orientated educational 
provision which might be offered to all abilities. Where 
there were tensions between these two separate 
policies - and 16-19 education provides a clear arena for 
this - then, in practice, the weight of resources went 
towards the support of the first.
There are many explanations. The argument that 
policy-makers intend to be or are 'elitist' is too 
simplistic. Rather, those policy-makers who are
interested in making provision open to a 'mass' clientele 
have felt themselves required to demonstrate their 
credentials by demonstrating how their proposals will not 
endanger the education of the elite. Consequently, the 
provision for the 'mass' clientele has been adversely 
affected.
The above represents a very condensed summary of the 
values operating upon the post-war education system. 
However, they have been and remain potent in their 
implications.
Incentives Within the Buriihan (FB) Report
The Burnham (FE) Report governs the salaries of teachers 
in further education establishments through a complex 
network of factors involving categories or levels of work 
and student hours which 'earn' a department and its 
college a number of units. Appendix I sets out in full 
the factors involved: what follows is a brief and 
selective description to highlight the ways in which the 
Burnham (FE) Report reinforces academic skew.
Each course is classified as belonging to one of the four 
'categories of work', I, Il/III, IV and V (where I covers 
post-graduate work and V, GCSE level and below). The 
total number of student hours in each category is 
calculated for college and department according to a 
sliding scale where 100 student hours of Category I work, 
300 student hours of Category II/III, and 600 student
hours of Category V all count for the same number of 
Burnham units.
The unit total count also contains a weighting towards 
full-time, as opposed to part-time work, as the former 
is credited on notional hours, 30 per week, and the 
latter on actual registered hours. Very few groups of 
students are taught for 30 hours in any week. Those 
colleges with high proportions of full-time students thus 
earn disproportionately higher unit counts than do those 
colleges with higher proportions of part-time students.
A high proportion of part-time work is directly 
vocational, and a high proportion of full-time work is 
general education, of a more indirect vocational 
relevance.
The unit totals of the college and department are 
translated into 'groups' and 'grades' which determine the 
scale and range of salary of principals and heads of 
department. Since the full range of salaries for 
principals and heads of departments is such that the top 
of each is virtually double the bottom, the effect of the 
unit total on the salaries of individual principals, vice 
principals and heads of department is not insignificant.
As far as salaries of staff below the level of head of 
department are concerned, the weighting towards both 
advanced and full-time work is compounded by the table 
which Burnham prescribes "to secure an appropriate
relativity between the standards of work and the posts of 
the various categories of staff in the establishment of 
the college". (4) The Proportions of Posts/Categories of 
Work (POP/COW) table provides for a higher proportion of 
Senior and Principal Lectureships according to the 
proportion of advanced, ie degree equivalent-work, within 
the college. The number and proportion of promoted posts 
depends on the proportion of AFE work. Appendix I 
provides worked examples. It is therefore very difficult 
to devise a reasonable promotion structure for the staff 
of a college which does not offer a significant 
proportion of AFE.
John Sevan, then neputy Education Officer for FE and HE
in ILEA and thereby responsible for the largest
concentration of FE work in any LEA in the country,
illustrated the issue of minimal opportunities for
promotion for those staff teaching in mainstream further
education in a 1978 address to an FE Staff College
Conference. He noted iLEA's decision to establish Senior
Lecturer (SL) posts beyond the Burnham and statutory-
minimum for college work for the less able, the socially
disadvantaged, and the under-achievers;
"... for what is in almost all cases. Category V 
work. That had a great deal to do with a change in 
perception about the importance the colleges placed 
on this work ... In retrospect, I would add that 
the change in perception brought about by the 
appointment of SLs was far more significant than we 
realised at the time. We were appointing only one 
SL to a college, but we didn't realise then just how 
significant this was to people engaged in this kind 
of work. It was certainly significant beyond the 
cost". (5)
A year later, when NPER published a comprehensive review 
of FE teachers’ opinions about of careers in FE teaching 
(6), ILEA might have been more appreciative of the 
significance to teachers of non-advanced work: the NFER 
Study accurately reflected the view of the FE teacher 
that, to gain promotion, one must [normally] engage in 
advanced level work.
The Burnham (FE) Reports following the 1951 settlement 
always acknowledged that 'level of work' was not the sole 
criterion for higher graded salaries, that the Reports 
described the minimum statutory requirement for promoted 
posts,and that LEAs were free to exceed that statutory 
minimum: what is salutary, however, is that Bevan, who 
had also been national president of the ATTI, should have 
been so surprised at the significance for teacher 
perceptions of an Authority positively exceeding the 
statutory minimum for promoted p>osts for Category V 
work. It suggests that the national negotiators on both 
management and teacher sides may have been somewhat 
remote from the realities of the incentives of the salary 
systems they were negotiating.
The foregoing paragraphs deal with the proportion of 
graded posts available for the college establishment as a 
whole: they do not relate to the salary of the individual 
lecturer. Lord Alexander went to some lengths to 
emphasise in successive Commentaries (7) that the fact 
that an individual was teaching a high proportion of
advanced level courses did not, of itself, mean that that 
individual had any right to one of the college's promoted 
posts which were earned for the college by those same 
courses.
However, since the Houghton Report's recommendations were 
implemented in 1975, a Lecturer Grade II who is 
responsible for a significant amount of Category I or 
II/III work can be transferred to the Senior Lecturer 
scale by automatic progression. This single modification 
to the general principle - that the level of the 
teacher's work does not determine his own grade or salary 
- has added yet another incentive in the FE system to 
increase the volume of advanced level work. The above 
provision, the 'Houghton SL', reduced the likelihood that 
other LEAs would follow ILEA in exceeding the Burnham 
statutory minimum requirements by creating SLs for 
non-advanced work: the additional salary bill for 
'Houghton SLs' reduced the scope for this type of 
additional expenditure.
Part II describes how the Proportion of Posts/Categories
of Work mechanism was introduced into the FE teachers'
salary reports. As Kogan notes in his review of Dr
Saran's work on the Burnham negotiations:
"... salaries entail valuations of the social worth 
according to different educational activities: 
infant against sixth form teaching or running a vast 
polytechnic compared with working as a very top 
person. Money not only buys goods but also 
reinforces status". (8)
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Values are made explicit only when questioned. Why did 
the Burnham negotiators, employers and employees, opt for 
an academically-sicewing salary structure? Was that their 
intention, or a by-product of other aims? The research 
into the Burnham negotiations provides some answers.
Structure of Thesis
This introductory chapter demonstrates the importance of 
the initial intentions of the research - to test the 
assumptions that the Burnham (FE) Report skewed the FE 
provision and that the Burnham Reports, (PStS) and (FE), 
skewed 16-19 provision. The remainder of Part I deals 
with methodology and how it was developed (Chapter 2) and 
provides a summary of the major developments in 16-f 
provision since the war as a context for the research 
(Chapter 3). Parts II and III explore the eraoirical 
evidence of the two case studies, and Part IV provides 
the theoretical underpinning of the thesis. Part IV 
includes a discussion of established models for 
educational policy-making, and offers a model which 
provides a new theoretical perspective for governmental 
and LEA policy-making.
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CHAPTBR 2 > MBTHODOIiOGY
The thesis explores the values expressed In the education 
system by reference to the negotiations that created the 
FE salary structure with Its Incentives and by reference 
to the Issues raised by LEA reviews of their 16-19 
provision.
By the early 1970s It was generally believed that the 
Burnham (FE) Report positively Inhibited the responsive­
ness of the education service In two ways. First, within 
FE colleges the Incentives of the Burnham (FE) Report on 
the salaries of FE teachers were perceived as distorting 
FE course provision In favour of advanced work. Second, 
within the Local Education Authority (LEA) the separate 
provisions of the Primary fc Secondary and FE Salary 
Reports under the Burnham statutory settlements were 
considered to hinder LEA attempts to review their 16-19 
provision as between 11-18 schools and sixth ^orm, 
tertiary and FE Colleges.
I was stimulated to investigate the validity of the two 
assumptions by a wish to understand why, and how, the FE 
system had come to express the values of 'academic 
skew'. Did the Burnham Reports actively and positively 
promote academic skew? Did the Burnham negotiators 
consciously Intend to create academically-skewed 
incentives? What were their values?
As the research progressed the significance of the
12
Implicit values of Burnham negotiators, and other 
policy-makers, for the shape of the post-16 educational 
provision became increasingly clear. The many tensions 
between explicit policy and explicit practice could be 
comprehended only through an awareness of the implicit 
values of the policy-makers and of the education service.
It is acknowledged that identifying policy-makers' 
underlying values and perceptions does not of itself 
answer the question, 'why?'. Why did the Burnham 
negotiators settle on such an academically-skewed salary 
structure for FE teachers? lihy did the members of the 
Macfarlane Review, themselves involved in Burnham 
negotiations, not exercise more influence in seeking to 
neutralise, if not counter-weight, the existing 
incentives of the Burnham Reports? Such questions remain 
even when their root, the values of the policy-makers, is 
fairly identified. (9)
To some extent the questions become circular and the 
answers beg new questions of the same order. 'Why have 
the Burnham negotiators continued to reinforce the 
'academic-skew' of the F.ngllsh educational system?' 
'Because they felt, or perceived their constituents as 
feeling, that the existing weights/incentives were 
appropriate'. 'But why?' 'Because those were the values 
...' And so it goes on. (10)
There is a genuine epistemological problem. There is.
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however, a pragnatlc solution. Mo one would question the 
statement that pollcy-malcers are affected by the personal 
values that they bring to their activities. This thesis 
does not attempt to untie the methodological Gordian 
Knot. Rather, It should be noted that the Intention has 
been to research the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and 
Macfarlane Review of 16-19 provision and that, for each 
of these policy-making scenarios, the values of the 
Individual policy-makers were stronger than the evidence 
available to them.
Since both the Primary and Secondary (PfcS) and Further 
Education (FE) Reports were to be reviewed, the 
underlying values of the current systems were of 
particular Interest. At the time of registration I was 
employed at the Association of County Councils (ACC), the 
LEA organisation representing the majority of employers 
on the Management Panel of the Burnham Committees. I was 
also aware of Dr Saran's work on the Burnham (Primary and 
Secondary) Reports.
In the light of the strength and unanimity of the views 
of current practitioners on the assumptions - that the 
Burnham (FE) Report Inhibited FE provision and that that 
Report and the Burnham (PS.S) Report Inhibited 16-19 
review - It seemed that a classic hypothetlco-deductlve 
(H-D) methodology (11) should release evidence to clearly 
demonstrate the validity or Invalidity of the 
assumptions. If the Incentives of the Burnham Reports
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were as powerful as assumed by the professionals) It 
should be comparatively easy to demonstrate their 
influence! if not, then alternative sources for the 
academic skew should be pursued.
The plan of work, therefore, included proposals for case 
studies of comparable FE Colleges on the management and 
direction of individual colleges and of comparable LEAs 
on 16-19 reviews. The original research proposal 
Included the recognition that the totality of research 
activities was, if anything, too inclusive, but noted the 
likelihood that the activities of the Secretariat of 
Burnham FK would either pre-empt or prohibit one or more 
of the areas of investigation. A report on the progress 
of the research, and the methodological Issues involved, 
was given at the 1981 SSRC/BEflAS Research Conference (see 
Appendix II).
Initial analysis had concentrated on two related 
activities - the perusal of the Burnham archives, mainly 
from the Employers' Panel, and interviews with current 
and recent leading members of both Panels, concentrating 
here on members of the Teachers' Panel to counteract a 
potential employer bias.
I had also explored the perspectives of practitioners - 
principally LEA FE officers, principals of colleges and 
leading NATFHE members - through interviews and published 
material (see Appendix III).
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The criteria in choosing interviewees was to identify, 
first, leading members of both current Negotiating Panels 
and, then, to interview those they recommended. 
Additionally, I interviewed some of the leading 
negotiators active in the 1950s and 1960s. I then 
invited comments on early drafts of the chapters of the 
thesis. In this way the composite conclusions being 
developed were tested against some of the original 
sources of those tentative conclusions.
I was concerned to test the hypothesis that the Burnham 
Reports affected 16-19 provision. As the work 
progressed, it became clear that evidence for the 
disproof, as for the classical H-D methodology, was not 
available. Indeed, the methodology proved inappropriate.
Why was this the case? The point at which clear and 
explicit evidence for academic-skew - in Burnham 
Committee negotiations, in FE college development, or LEA 
16-19 reorganisations - would have been found was not 
reproduced within archival material. By definition it 
resided in the pre-archival stage of any policy-making, 
as King has noted;
"... but there is no record of telephone calls and 
talks at the golf club or over drinks at the 
pub".(12)
The quotation refers equally well to the pre-archival 
stages of college academic board, LEA Committee and 
Cabinet-level consideration of a political issue. By 
definition, such evidence does not appear in archives.
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Further, it became clear that the academic-skewing 
features of the Burnham Reports were constituents of a 
whole cluster of skewing inputs - eg mandatory grants for 
students on degrees, discretionary ones for those on NAFE 
courses - into the education system. The impossibility 
of disentangling the effects of the Burnham Reports from 
those other constituents of the cluster argued against an 
H-D methodology.
In the above circumstances, the criterion of 'soundness' 
(13) became relevant. A wide spectrum of the 'elite' of 
current and previous Burnham Panel members had endorsed 
the accuracy and appropriateness of the 'academic-skew' 
hypothesis, and had advised against the viability of the 
H-D methodology. Further, the 1981 SSRC/BEMAS seminar 
had been sceptical of the suitability of the H-D 
methodology. Since a significant proportion of those 
consulted had first-hand knowledge of the Burnham (FE) 
incentives, the advice appeared well-founded.
The research then became firmly based upon a variety of 
methodologies. These were, first, the primary sources of 
the Burnham Committee archives, interviews with Burnham 
and Macfarlane participants, LEA working papers and 
Committee agenda; the secondary sources of others' 
perspectives in academic papers and contemporary 
(educational) journalism; and, third, the 'participant 
observation' of a researcher who had worked on Burnham 
negotiations and continued to work on LEAs' 16-19 
reviews.
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The academic-skew within the FK system originated with 
the 1951 Burnham (PR) Report. Research concentrated here 
on the Burnham archives and the perspectives of some of 
those active in the further education system. Their 
feedback proved invaluable.
The research into the inhibitions of the Burnham Reports 
on 16-19 provision focussed upon the 1979-80 Macfarlane 
Review. Access to the Macfarlane working papers provided 
one source of data which was amplified by the access 
afforded, as a fellow LEA officer, to the working papers 
of other LEAs. While fascinating in themselves, the LEA 
papers did not provide any data to support - or counter - 
the hypothesis that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19 
provision. Indeed, they provided much evidence of the 
creative use of the flexibility that the Reports permit. 
The Macfarlane papers, on the other hand, proved a highly 
relevant resource since the process of the Review 
entailed that officers - and, in the event. Ministers - 
made explicit their assumptions, and values, on 16-19 
provision.
The research was intended to be limited to the inhibiting 
features of the Burnham Reports as far as 16-19 provision 
was concerned. However, as Parts III and IV of the 
thesis indicate, the nature of 16-19 education provision 
has been settled in a wider context than the Burnham 
Reports. The Reports echo a wider, cultural, impetus.
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In hindsight, the research would have been seriously 
deficient had I not had access to the perspectives of 
current practitioners. The vexed methodological issues 
of 'participant observation' - its benefits and its 
drawbacks - are recognised. Being a participant affects 
one's perspective. At the same time, the status of 
participant provided a privileged access, almost on a 
dally basis, to other participant perspectives that would 
not be available to the ordinary researcher.
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CHAPTER 31 MAJOR POST-WAR DRVKLOPMKIITS AFFECTIMG POST-16 PROVISION
This Chapter will not provide a comprehensive survey of 
the changes in educational policy and provision since the 
1944 Act: such a survey would be a major work in itself. 
The purpose of this Chapter is limited to setting the 
context for the research and concentrating only on those 
issues which have impinged on the shape of post-16 
provision. The major developments affecting schools, 
universities and further education over the first 
post-war decades will be described. The issues of the 
mid-1970s are then noted.
Maclure's Learning Beyond Our Means? provides a 
comprehensive analysis of changes in education provision 
from 1945 to the late 1960s. He notes that, between 
1947-48 and 1966-67 spending on education as a whole had 
increased in real terms to about four and a half times 
the 1938-39 level.
The net effect of the various post-war policies on the 
explosion of pupil and student numbers in schools, FE 
colleges and universities is set out in the table (15) 
overleaf:
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Students Over Compulaorv Leaving Age (OOOs)
1948-9 1951-2 1954-5 1957-8 1960-1 1963-4 1966-7
194.9 200.5 288.6 290.3 379.0 635.3 653.1
n M 46.6 55.2 79.] 117.5 175.6 202.4
n /a N/A 9.7 16.28 26.8 44.8 54.5
n /a 848.4 937.3 1070.1 1200.9 1392.4 1514.4
N/A n /a N/A n /a 77.5 95.6 107.9
N/A - Not available
(1) Schools - pupils over compulsory school leaving age.
(2) FE full-time (FT) and sandwich students [including
(3) until separately identified].
(3) FE - advanced FT and sandwich students [included in 
(2) until separately identified].
(4) FE - part-time (PT) day and evening students 
[including (5) until separately identified].
(5) FE - advanced part-time and evening students 
[included in (4) until separately identified].
This research has led to the hypothesis that, at least
within Britain, policy-making is more a composite of
discrete strands than an integrated whole: the hypothesis
will be developed in Part IV below. Given that
perspective, it is worth noting at this point that it has
proved impossible to provide a chronological summary of
post-16 developments. What follows has been, perforce,
gupjoct to a 'schools', 'universities , and further
education' categorisation because a simple chronological
summary would have rendered the account, devised for ease
of background context, incoherent. Many initiatives,
quite simply, contradicted each other.
It is worth noting, too, at this point that the 'discrete 
strands' facet of educational policy-making cannot 
necessarily be attributed to a particular civil service 
philosophy or to the possibility of competition between
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branches of the Department of Education and Science or 
its predecessors. It would require a further academic 
study to investigate how far Government Ministers 
received, and if so, ignored, advice from their senior 
civil servants as to the compatibility of their several 
political imperatives.
Schools - The First Decades
The 1944 Act made secondary education, as a separate 
sector of education, free for all. Before the 1939/45 
war, maintained schools were either 'elementary', 
providing for the whole of the age group to be 
compulsorily educated, or 'secondary'. Secondary schools 
were fee-paying, though with an increasing proportion of 
free, local authority supported places for pupils who 
were successful in entrance examinations.
The first major point of note for this study is that the 
1944 Act did not, as popularly believed, create secondary 
education's tripartite structure of grammar, technical 
and secondary modern schools. Butler's Act simply 
inherited the selective and differentiated prescriptions 
of the pre-war years. In this respect, most significant 
were the recommendations of the 1926 Hadow Report that 
secondary education should take place in one of three 
discrete groups of secondary school.
)
The Spens Report of 193S reinforced Hadow's 
recommendation for a differentiated system of secondary
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education. Since Spens had the brief to consider 
particularly those secondary pupils who did not remain at 
school after 16, it is not surprising that the Spens 
Report recommended an expansion in the number of 
technical secondary schools.
Raising the School Leaving Age
Successive post-war Reports stressed the inappropriate­
ness of an academic curriculum for those who were not 
academically-orientated, but there was also a consistent 
rejection of narrowly-vocational courses. (14) 
Furthermore, for the first two decades following the 1944 
Act the educational consensus favoured Increased years of 
compulsory, general education rather than an extension of 
part-time education.
A decade after the 1944 Act, there was concern at the 
high proportion of those leaving school as soon as 
legally possible. The 1954 Gurney-Dixon Report Included 
recommendations for better grants for post-compulsory 
pupils, for family allowances for all school children and 
for an Increase in the proportion of grammar school 
places. Thus the Gurney-Dixon Report tackled the 
practical barriers to a high 'age participation rate' 
following statutory compulsion.
The Crowther Report of 1959, however, attempted to 
counter what were perceived as the intrinsic reasons why 
a large percentage of 15 year olds chose to leave
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full-time education at the earliest opportunity. On the 
basis of an impressive litany of factual and statistical 
evidence, the report concluded that the raising of the 
school leaving age to 16 should take priority over the 
implementation of the 1944 Act's requirements for County 
Colleges (para 222). Notwithstanding the acknowledgement 
that the current voluntary post-compulsory attendance 
level was too low (para 466), the fact that a high 
proportion of those with the highest ability left at the 
earliest opportunity (para 182), and the fact that school 
was not considered appropriate by some 15+ (para 620), 
the Report rejected the option of part-time compulsory 
education (paras 184-5) for 15+ in favour of a year's 
additional full-time attendance in school.
It should be noted that the Crowther recommendations were 
deliberately their best prescription for the 15-18s. The 
Report had argued that the implementation of the County 
Colleges should be delayed to the early 1970s to ensure 
that they would make good provision - that the staff 
would be well prepared and that the accommodation was of 
a high standard. The fact that the County Colleges were 
never implemented provides an example of the best being 
the enemy of the good.
The 1963 Newsom Report, Half Our Future, considered the 
education of 13-16 year olds of less than average ability 
and recommended an additional compulsory year. It 
explicitly rejected the alternative of part-time, or
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full-time attendance at PE colleges.
Selectl<Mi
An issue that dominated post-war secondary schooling was 
the 11+ selection necessitated by the tripartite system. 
It became discredited since the route to professional 
employment lay through the grammar schools, and the 
number of children whose parents believed that they would 
benefit from such an education exceeded the number of 
selective grammar school places. The demand always 
exceeded the available places.
The Labour Government of the 1960s was committed to 
ending selection in secondary education and Crosland, 
then Secretary of State for Education, issued Circular 
10/65 which invited Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to 
submit proposals for non-selective secondary 
reorganisation according to one of six patterns. Since 
approval of capital building programmes depended upon 
Secretary of State approval of the reorganisation 
proposals, the vast majority of LEAs concurred. The 
earliest tertiary colleges of Devon, Hampshire and 
Lancashire were a direct result of those LEAs' secondary 
reorganisations.
Higher Education - The First Decades
Major developments have Included the rapid expansion of 
student numbers and the creation of the 'binary' system 
of higher education.
25
The 1945 Percy Report recommended the designation of 
Colleges of Advanced Technology, and the establishment of 
Regional Advisory Councils to co-ordinate the provision 
of full-time technical courses of degree standard. The 
Barlow Report of 1946 recommended that universities be 
expanded to increase, in particular, the numbers of 
graduate scientists: there were 50,000 university 
students in 1938-39 and 100,000 by 1958-59. By the early 
1960s, that increase was considered insufficient. The 
1963 review of full-time higher education in Great 
Britain, the Robbins Report, pressed for a further 
expansion from the 216,000 students of 1962-63 to 560,000 
by 1980-81 and for the Colleges of Advanced Technology to 
receive full university status.
The Robbins principle - that courses of higher education 
should be available for all those who were qualified by 
ability and attainment to pursue them and wished to do so 
- was made achievable by the earlier (1962) enactment of 
the 1960 Anderson Report which had recommended mandatory 
awards for those granted a place on a first degree course 
at a university.
The 1966 White Paper, A Plan for Polytechnics and Other 
Colleges, established the 'binary policy'. The thirty 
polytechnics were to provide a clear alternative to the 
university route to higher education. The Intention was 
to concentrate full-time advanced courses offered outside 
the universities into a limited number of more
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vocationally-orientated institutions.
Further Education - The First Decades
The 1956 White Paper, Technical Education, demonstrated 
the case for expanding opportunities for technical 
education. The 20,000 full-time student load of 1937-38 
had risen to 45,000 in 1946-47 and 64,000 in 1954-55. 
Similarly, part-time day enrolments had moved from 89,000 
to 200,000 to 402,000, and evening only from 1,094,000 to 
1,166,000 to 1,575,000 for those same three years.
The 1959 Crowther Report had recommended an expansion of 
the further eduation service to complement grammar 
schools and higher education provision for young people 
over the age of compulsory schooling.
The 1961 White Paper, Better Opportunities in Technical 
Education, recommended the creation of courses for junior 
technicians, craftsmen and operatives, and the 1964 
Henniker-Heaton Report, Day Release, recommended a 
doubling of the number of young employees released to 
attend day release classes by 1969. The 1964 Industrial 
Training Act reiterated the LRAs' duties to provide 
vocational and industrial training, and required 
employers to ensure that their employees received 
adequate training.
Agenda for the 1970s and 1980s
The most critical factor for education provision in the
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1970s lay within the overall context of public sector 
spending. Real reductions in the Rate Support Grant, the 
central government contribution to local authority 
expenditure, have significantly reversed the trend of 
ever-rising public spending on education. Within that 
general trend, there have been priorities.
Another major concern of the 1970s was the dramatic 
increase in youth unemployment. The 1977 Holland Report 
recommended an immediate programme of work experience and 
related education and training, the Youth Opportunity 
Programme, with a guaranteed place for all unemployed 
16-18 year olds. That young people were choosing 
unemployment rather than either of the Crowther choices 
of school or college added weight to the arguments of 
those who believed that the curriculum needed to be made 
more relevant. In the late 1970s, the instinct to review 
the nature of the provision was reinforced by, on the one 
hand, the Prime Minister's Ruskin speech and, on the 
other, the Royal Society of Arts 'Education for 
Capability' movement.
The Government, having established the Manpower Services 
Commission (MSC) under the 1973 Employment and Training 
Act, chose to spend an increasing proportion of the 
public money allocated to vocational training through a 
body reporting to the Department of Employment, rather 
than through the LEAs who have statutory duties to make 
that provision. At the same time.
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"The advent of the MSC hae ensured that a 
substantial amount of national resources have been 
devoted to the 16-19 age group, which would not have 
accrued to this group had provision been left to the 
DES [Department of Education and Science] - whose 
Vihite Paper, Education - A FrameworV for Expansion 
(1972), proposed the major features of the next 
decade's education service without reference to 
non-advanced PE. Thus MSC resources have benefited 
the PE service in ways that the DES has been neither 
willing nor able to do". (16)
The above reference to the 1972 White Paper's priorities
is, perhaps unintentionally, ironic: those parts of the
education service given attention in A Framework for
Expansion considered the title a misnomer? the White
Paper argued for a ccntractlon. PE arguably gained from
that policy neglect, gaining resources diverted to the
MSC.
In very many respects the 16-19 landscape of the 1970s 
reflected the fulfilment of Crowther's post-compulsory 
schooling ideal - the good school sixth form complemented 
by the good County College whose characteristics were 
expressed by the PE or tertiary college. But there was 
concern that the pattern was not attracting a sufficient 
proportion of 16+ students. Too many of the age cohort 
were rejecting the differentiated provision.
Furthermore, the size of the 16—19 age cohort was due to 
start to reduce in the early 1980s. The size of a number 
of sixth forms, and their teaching groups, was already 
too small - for educational and economic viability - by 
the mid-1970s. (17). Professor Fowler, then 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Higher 
Education, advised the 1976 Summer Conference of the
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Society of Education Officers that the Government 
Intended to take action. In the event, it was not until 
1979 that successive governments issued three 
Consultative Papers on the education and training of 
young people, and the Council of Local Education 
Authorities (CLEA) issued its Invitation to Government 
for a joint study of the issues of 16-19 provision. That 
joint study culminated in the Hacfarlane Report, explored 
in detail in Part III.
Finally, the issue of differentiation in provision has a 
peculiarly topical flavour. The Government has 
introduced into the 1987 Education Reform Bill - at a 
very late stage - a clause whose effect would be that of 
preventing sixth form colleges from developing a tertiary 
dimension. (18) The conflict demonstrated by the late 
stages of the Macfarlane proceedings, between those 
favouring a differentiated provision and those favouring 
comprehensive provision in tertiary colleges, has 
re-appeared at the point of drafting amendments to the 
1987 Bill in the spring of 1988.
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PAST II - THB MAKIK OF THE FE TEACHERS' 
SALARIES STRDCTORE
CHAPTER 4I BACKGROOHD TO THE 1950-51 NB6OTIATI0HS
There are three substantial reasons for concentrating 
upon the 1951 Burnham negotiations. First, it was the 
1951 Burnham (Technical) Report that set the salary 
structure that still obtains today. The current 
structure is essentially the same as that of 1951. By 
contrast the Burnham Report governing school teachers' 
salaries has undergone major changes, significantly on at 
least two occasions within the same period. (1)
Second, and most fundamental to the thesis of this study, 
the process of negotiating a new salary structure for 
1951 provides an illuminating expression of the values of 
post-war society (2) which, to a certain extent, both 
Teachers and Management Panels shared. The negotiations 
highlight the normative values of 1951 and their 
implications for the incentives and the priorities of 
schools and FE colleges. Certainly the incentives of the 
education service support an 'academic skew'; there is a 
Burnham weighting favouring 'academic' as opposed to 
'vocational', full-time study as opposed to part-time 
study, and advanced work as opposed to non-advanced. It 
is clear that vocational education that is not related to 
the professions has suffered by the academic orientation 
of LEAS, successive Ministers and Secretaries of State 
and, apparently, of the teachers themselves. The 
processes leading to the 1951 FE teachers' Burnham Report 
demonstrate quite vividly the considerations which
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operate to produce academic skew.
Third, the 1951 settlement and the processes that led to 
its achievement illuminate the relationships between the 
groups within the Management Panel (called "Authorities 
Panel" until the mid-1960s) and the influence of 
particular individuals within those groups. For example, 
the 1951 salary settlement exemplifies both the movement 
between initial management offer or teachers' claim and 
the final settlement, and the way in which the intentions 
underlying the initial offer or claim can be 
significantly modified by the process of negotiation, (3)
Part II will amplify these judgments through evidence 
from the negotiations and the eventual 1951 Burnham 
Report settlement for FE teachers. However, before 
moving to the detail of the 1950-51 negotiations, it is 
necessary to understand the membership of the Burnham 
Committees.
Before the 1965 Remuneration of Teachers' Act gave 
central government direct representation, the Burnham 
(FE) Committee consisted of the Management Panel, 
composed of representatives drawn from the employers' 
associations, the Teachers' Panel, composed of 
representatives of the employees' associations, and an 
Independent Chairman appointed by the Secretary of 
State. The Secretary of State controlled the number of 
members permitted each constituent but the constituents 
appointed their own representatives.
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At the time of the 1950-51 negotiations the Management 
Panel were drawn from representatives of the County 
Councils Association (CCA), the Association of Municipal 
Corporations (AMC), the Welsh Joint Education Committee 
(WJEC), London County Council (LCC) and the Association 
of Education Committees (AEC).
The inclusion of the last group was contentious. AEC 
after all, represented the Education Committees of 
Councils, and two other constituents of the Management 
Panel, the CCA and AMC, represented the County and 
Metropolitan Councils. Since teachers were employed by 
Councils, not Committees of those Councils, the CCA and 
AMC had good constitutional grounds for preferring that 
AEC be not included within the employers' body. The fact 
that, for a long period of post-war Burnham negotiations, 
the Secretary of the AEC was also the Secretary of the 
Management Panel compounded the constitutional issue (4).
To appreciate the significance of certain events within
the 1950-51 salary negotiations it is necessary to know
the normal Burnham practice. Dr Saran's comprehensive
study provides a synopsis!
"The normal sequence of activities is as follows! 
teachers formulate a salaries claim through their 
own organisations and the Teachers' Panel; the claim 
is then presented to the employers at a Burnham 
Committee meeting. The employers respond, usually 
after meetings in private of the Management Panel - 
ie at withdrawal meetings. Discussions may continue 
over a period, at the Burnham Committee and at 
withdrawal meetings, as and when either or both
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sides wish to hold these. Eventually a provisional 
agreement emerges, which both Panels accept for 
submission to their own constituent organisations 
for ratification. At that stage each individual 
organisation will give consideration to the 
provisional agreement. Eventually the Burnham 
Committee is reconvened, and representatives Inform 
their own Panel whether their organisation is 
willing to ratify? if there is disagreement within 
a Panel, ratification is by majority vote. The 
Leader of each Panel then informs the Burnham 
Committee as to whether their Panel is ratifying the 
agreement". (5)
Only one other point is worth emphasising in this 
context-setting section. Whenever a major change in the 
salary structure was envisaged by the employers it was 
normal practice for the Burnham Committee to establish a 
working group of officers to 'work up' the structure to 
be proposed: that process could take months or, even, 
years.
Such a group had met for two years to provide the 
Authorities' proposals for the post-war unification of 
primary and secondary scales within a new schoolteachers' 
structure. (6) First hand experience in the late 1970s 
demonstrated the continuation of that convention. The 
Management Panel consulted its leading members, and drew 
on the advice of senior Chief Education Officers even 
when but minor changes were to be proposed. The 1950-51 
FE teachers' negotiations were unusual in that no 
archival evidence of such consultation is available.
1945 Salary Report for School Teachers
In 1944 the energies of the Local Education Authorities' 
representatives on salary negotiations had been taken up 
with, not to say exhausted by, the tortuous business of
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ensuring that the schoolteachers' salary structure 
reflected the provisions of the 1944 Education Act: the 
scales for the pre-war 'elementary' and 'secondary' 
(grammar) schools were Integrated in a new, single salary 
structure for primary and secondary school teachers.
Since the Authorities' Panel Initially approached the 
1945 Technical Report negotiations through the 
perspective of the Main Report governing school teacher 
salaries, a brief description of the latter's provisions 
follows.
The 1944 Act, providing for "secondary education for 
all", required an amalgamation of the hitherto separate 
salary reports for teachers in secondary (ie grammar) and 
elementary schools. It was significant for the later 
development - or, rather, lack of development - of the 
tripartite system of grammar, technical and secondary 
modern schools that the Authorities' Panel conceded an 
additional allowance for assistants (ie all school 
teachers who were not heads) who possessed a good Honours 
degree. The differential for graduates and the widened 
gap between the salaries of qualified and unqualified 
teachers, many of whom taught the technical subjects, 
inhibited the development of technical schools. (7) There 
was a steep reduction in the salaries of the unqualified 
(as teachers) instructors - £290 per annum pre-war to 
£180 per annum post-1945.
Correspondence within the Burnham archives (8) Indicates
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that within the Authorities' Panel both elected members 
and CEOs attempted to resist a lifetime payment for a 
one-off graduate qualification, and were happier that any 
continuing additional payment should derive from 
qualification as a teacher that would at least have the 
merit of being related to the teachers' job. On 7 
September 1944 the Authorities' Panel provided Sir 
Maurice Holmes, Permanent Secretary at the Board of 
Education, with a clear statement of their views which, 
in the light of the final settlement, is worth quoting 
fully.
"We do not desire to establish a separate class of 
teacher - the graduate teacher - distinguished from 
his fellow teachers only by the fact of graduation. 
We desire that promotion to the higher and indeed to 
the highest posts shall be open to all teachers of 
merit. We feel that the quality of the teacher is 
often more important than what is described as his 
paper qualifications, and therefore we deprecate and 
do not agree to the establishment of a privileged 
class of teacher - privileged only by the possession 
of a particular type of qualification". (9).
By the end of October 1944, Brocklngton, Secretary to the
Authorities' Panel, reported that the long struggle with
the teachers was not yet over:
"There are levelling influences at work, and a great 
suspicion of the Authorities ... that kissing goes 
by favour. These two forces have knocked our 
Original Plan to pieces, and we are busily engaged 
in patching it together again so far as we may".
( 10 )
That 'Original Plan' had expressed the philosophy quoted 
above, and it is interesting that it was the teachers' 
suspicion of employer partiality that created the 
straitjacket of graduate differential that itself 
undermined the craft teachers' salaries. It is also
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significant that the LRAs had attempted to place their 
highest priority on skilled teaching and not on academic 
qualifications.
The final 1945 settlement for schools included allowances 
for graduates, teacher training qualifications, and a 
provision that 15% of (full-time) teachers should hold 
posts of special responsibility (PSRs) for which they 
were to receive an allowance of £50-£100 per annum over 
and above the basic scale.
As Saran (1985) has shown, the 'Joint Four', a grouping 
of school teachers' unions which Included the head­
teachers of grammar schools, had opposed many parts of 
the 'Original Plan' during negotiations, and had tried to 
retain the privileged salary levels of pre-war grammar 
schoolteachers. The outcome was the 'age-weighting' 
whereby each pupil of post-compulsory age counted towards 
higher salaries for the head teachers: they were to be 
paid an allowance of £30 per annum for each group of 100 
pupils under 15, and £50 per annum for each group of 30 
pupils over 15. Burnham archives Include some protests 
from CEOs that the weighting could act as an incentive to 
heads to persuade their pupils to stay on at school when 
the advice might run counter to the pupils' own best 
Interests. (11)
1945 Salary Report for FB Teachers
For the 1945 Burnham (FE) Report (12) negotiations.
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Brocklngton proposed that the same level of posts of 
special responsibility (PSRs) should obtain in technical 
education since he believed that much of the provision 
was similar to that in schools. The FE Teachers' Panel 
pressed for two Improvements on the Main (ie 
Schoolteachers) Settlement:
(a) that the high proportion of part-time staff in 
technical colleges and institutes, by 
comparison with schools’ staff, meant that the 
lower proportion of full-time staff in FE had 
wider responsibilities than their colleagues in 
schools, and that technical institutions had 
greater need of a higher proportion of PSRs; 
and
(b) that the high proportion of university-level 
work in the larger technical colleges meant 
that university-level salaries were more 
appropriate than those of school teachers for 
technical college staff, and that salaries for 
technical teachers should be higher than those 
for school teachers.
A survey of 250 colleges ("a laborious investigation of 
technical colleges from Lands End to Berwick on Tweed" 
(13)), was undertaken in December 1944 to test the 
validity of the Teachers' Panel's claims. The result was 
that the LEAs proposed a 20% proportion of full-time 
technical staff as holders of PSRs. They also proposed 
that 10% of all full-time (FT) teaching staff should be 
'Senior Assistants' (SAs) and recipients of salaries
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virtually double those of the Assistant for teaching 
advanced level work. The survey had demonstrated that 
the proportion of advanced level work, and the incidence 
of employment of part-time (PT) staff, was higher than 
the Authorities' Panel, or the Ministry, had 
anticipated. The 1945 Burnham (Technical) Report 
contained provisions for both Senior Asslstantships and 
special responsibility allowances.
This double advantage was gained for FE teachers as a 
consequence of two different factors within the 
negotiations. The Authorities' Panel (AP) regarded the 
majority of technical institution work as of school 
level, and wished to reward accordingly (and certainly 
not at a higher level than the latter). In challenging 
the applicability of the Main Report to FE Institutions, 
the Teachers' Panel had tapped two, separate, AP 
instinctss that those doing university-equivalent work 
should not lose because they were working in the 
maintained, as opposed to the university, sector; and 
that, notwithstanding additions related to university- 
equivalent work, FT staff in technical institutions 
should be fairly compensated for administrative loads and 
responsibilities which were heavier than those of school 
teachers.
The final 1945 agreement contained within it the seeds of 
the 1951 system in that it attempted to give extra salary 
for extra responsibility (as in schools) and to give
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extra salary for university-equivalent work, both through 
the same 1951 mechanism of the 'proportion of posts' 
table. Both the 1945 Main and Technical Reports included 
weightings towards academic work, the former covertly 
through the differential for heads of schools with 
post-compulsory pupils, the latter explicitly through the 
Senior ^ssistantshlps. Both Reports also Included 
provision for 'above scale' allowances for special 
responsibility.
The 'Dog That Didn't Bark' ...
As in 1945, successive Burnham FE salary negotiations 
have been liberally laced with references to the salaries 
of the university and schools sectors< that, of itself, 
is unexceptional. More curious, however, is the relative 
paucity of references to employment in Industry and 
commerce. For further education faces in two directions 
- not to universities and to schools exclusively, but 
rather to the more diverse worlds of education on the one 
hand and of general employment on the other.
In 1944, the Secretary of the Authorities' Panel had 
advised its Leader that heads of departments in technical 
colleges should be considered to have similar roles and 
responsibilities to those of the heads of grammar 
schools. While members of the Authorities' Panel were 
thoroughly conversant with grammar schools, heads of 
departments were part of a 'technical jungle' (14) whose 
bearings were certainly not clear to all the LEA
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negotiators. Fairly or not, PE staff, teachers and 
principals alike, have considered that the lack of 
familiarity with FE continues to this day.
Later again (17 November 1944) Brocklngton, the AP 
Secretary, had expressed strong exasperation at the 
extent to which Teachers' Panel's claims were based on 
the parallelism between large technical colleges and 
universities (presumably, rather than with grammar 
schools). It was the Ministry of Education's spokesman, 
Elphlck, who had then suggested the survey of technical 
colleges (referred to above) to establish the true extent 
of higher level work to the satisfaction of teachers, 
local authorities and Ministry.
What should be noted, however. Is that the comparators 
for FE teachers used by both Panels were educational 
ones. Negotiations over the following 30 years have 
continued to be marked by the attempts of the LEAs to 
relate technical college work to that In schools, and by 
the FE teachers to use the university sector as the 
relevant model. The contrasting choice of models, 
however, may represent no more than negotiators' 
stances. Most university teachers are paid more, and 
most schoolteachers less, than most FE teachers. Both 
Panels could find evidence. In 1945 and In succeeding 
years, for their perspectives! Indeed, the explicit case 
for the new salary structure of 1951 was to provide a 
continuum that stretched from the 'school level' work of
43
the local Technical Institute to the Higher Diploma and 
degree equivalent work of the larger technical colleges.
The use of the salaries paid in those areas of employment 
that FE lecturers taught about might have liberated the 
FE system from the over-academic criteria that have 
limited the development of the service since 1945. The 
categorisation of FE work has been in terms of 'school- 
equivalent' or 'university-equivalent' courses (15). The 
issue of 'level of work' as a basis for Individual 
teacher's salaries is described briefly below.
1948 Salary Reports - FB Teachers
Chief Education Officers reported difficulties in the 
implementation of both schoolteachers and FE teachers 
Reports. Both were modified in 1948 so that the 
proportions of PSR appointments in schools were revised 
from 15% to a range of 12%-17%, and in technical 
institutions they were extended from the 20% level to a 
range of 20-27*s%.
At least part of the justification for the wider PSR 
range in FE was active encouragement by Ministry of 
Education staff and HMI to concentrate advanced technical 
work into a limited number of 'regional' colleges. Thus 
the potential for PSRs or SAs became highly variable as 
between colleges even within the same LEA. As a 
consequence, even the 1948 increase in permitted PSRs for 
technical institutions did not solve the problems of the
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lacic of 'match' between course work and permitted 
'above-scale' posts.
Both Authorities' and Teachers' Panels reported in the 
early 1950s that a sizeable proportion of LEAs had found 
that the Burnham Reports required them to bestow more 
PSRs and SAs than their total number of full-time 
technical teacher employees. Conversely, there were 
often areas within LEAs where the nationally-prescribed 
proportions of Senior Asslstantships were too few for the 
number of full-time employees engaged locally in teaching 
advanced, degree-level work. (16)
The lack of 'fit' of the modified school teachers' 
salaries Report for the Technical Colleges was described 
in the October 1950 statement of the Ixjndon and Home 
Counties' Regional Advisory Council (RAC). There were 
acute shortages of teachers capable of teaching technical 
work, and the RAC argued that the shortage was a 
consequence of the low level of salary of technical 
staff. The RAC noted that governors were often faced by 
the dilemma of either leaving a post unfilled or 
appointing
"... an inadequately qualified or even entirely 
unsuitable person [and/or] offering the position in 
the form of a senior assistantship or post with 
special allowances in the hope that the higher 
salary may attract applicants. This procedure ... 
may be most unfair to existing members of staff 
whose chances of advancement are thereby prejudiced 
and who, in consequence, naturally tend to seek 
positions elsewhere. The result is unsettling of 
college staffs and an instability which is bound to 
be reflected in the general standard of work". (17)
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As noted in Chapter 1 above, the promotion prospects for 
staff not teaching on advanced courses have been blighted 
by the PE salary structure. The issue has remained, 
unresolved, on the agenda of Burnham negotiations until 
this day.
Problems Arising from the Post-War FE Salary Settlements
The previous section has referred to a range of 
difficulties that came into sharp focus through the 
implementation of the 1945 and 1948 Reports. There were 
two main problems. First, there was the inappropriate­
ness of using the features of the schools’ Burnham 
Report. This difficulty was accentuated by the very 
varied range of work described below. Second, there was 
a critical lack of promotion opportunities for 
non-advanced work.
Since the following sections draw heavily upon the work
of the Authorities' Panel (18), it is interesting to
note that H S Barlow's summary, in his 1 June 1952
Presidential address to the Association of Teachers in
Technical Institutions, highlights the same problems:
"The previous Reports of 1945 and 1948 had produced 
many complaints because of their rigidity in 
specifying formulae to determine the number of 
special allowances and senior asslstantshlps. In 
some cases, the number of senior asslstantshlps 
exceeded the number of full-time staff engaged by 
the Institution, and in others, the number of such 
posts was obviously Inadequate for the needs of the 
institution". (19)
Clearly, there was a consensus between Authorities' and 
Teachers' Panels as to the Issues to be addressed.
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In schools, where the vast majority of staff and students 
were full-time, and the vast majority the work was 
similar or at least comparable, a national prescription 
of proportions of additional allowances based on the 
numbers of full-time staff employed was likely to prove 
reasonably equitable as between schools and between 
LEAS. However, the average FE establishment included a 
variable proportion of part-time staff and neighbouring 
colleges, as a direct result of the need to specialise, 
were providing significantly different courses, 
particularly at the advanced level. Some LEAs offered 
little advanced course provision while others, 
particularly those covering large towns or cities, had a 
high level of provision of degree and degree-equivalent 
work.
Technical education has always employed part-timers. The 
various examining boards and validating bodies have 
consistently required that students be educated by staff 
who should include current practitioners. These, by 
definition, constitute the part-time staff in technical 
colleges. Thus, whatever the ease or difficulty in 
appointing sufficient full-time staff for specific 
courses, there would always be a significant proportion 
of part-time staff in any well-staffed technical college 
to provide Inputs from experts currently employed in the 
area being taught.
The specified percentages of PSRs under the 1945 and 1948
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Burnham Reports, 20% and 20-27)$% respectively, set out 
nationally prescribed minima and maxima £or colleges. 
Since the available PSRs could be given only to full-time 
staff, Procrustean strains on the post-war provision of 
technical education were created.
The Presidential Address to the 1952 Annual ATTI
Conference highlighted a further problem - that of
"catering for small Institutions doing very 
elementary work, and on the large technical colleges 
undertaking a high proportion of work of university 
character and requiring a teaching staff of the 
highest possible calibre, both In training and 
experience". (20)
Thus the problem of matching proportions of promoted 
posts to a variable proportion of full-time staff was 
compounded by the fact that the FE system contained very 
variable ranges of work.
The evidence submitted by the FE Teachers' Panel to the 
1974 Houghton Committee of Inquiry Into Teachers' pay 
describes the range of the further education service of 
the early 1970s; only the numbers of students and 
Institutions would need to be amended for a fair picture 
of the service In the 1940s and 1950s as well as the
1980s.
"The variety of work In colleges of further and 
higher education can only be described as vast. In 
1971, there were over 3H million students In all 
establishments, of whom 288,800 were full-time, 
718,022 were part-time day, and 2\ million evening 
only. It ranges from remedial work for seml- 
llterates through courses for general education, 
vocational work at all levels - craft, technician 
and professional - to first degrees and higher 
degrees. The work overlaps that done In schools and
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that carried out In universities ... The majority 
of full-time or part-time courses are for those 
between 16 and 24, but there are also many 
retraining courses for older workers ... The mode 
of attending is also very variable. Full-time 
students may be attending GCE 'O' or 'A' level 
courses. Ordinary National Diplomas in anything 
from Engineering to Catering or Cartography, 
Secretarial courses. Higher National Diplomas, 
degree courses across the board, teacher education, 
or post-graduate studies. Many of the advanced 
courses are paralleled by sandwich courses, block 
release (common for Craft and Technical Courses), 
day release courses in a wide va’'iaty of National 
Certificates, City and Guilds of London Institute 
Certificates, Royal Society of Arts qualifications 
and other examination courses. There are also 
evening classes, either short courses or, for the 
full year, sometimes short courses on specialist 
topics, or courses leading to one of the recognised 
qualifications ... ". (21)
So if the first problem of the 1945 and 1948 Reports was 
the lack of 'fit' of the national proportion of PSRs and 
SAs to the majority of local provision, the second was 
the range of work and varied student mix of institutions 
within the ambit of the Technical Report.
The second problem of the 1945 and 1948 salary Reports 
for teachers in technical institutions was that, as the 
above quotation from the RAC stated, the Special 
Allowances were often used to attract new staff rather 
than to reward those existing staff undertaking the 
various additional responsibilities that arose from the 
needs for the efficient management of the college.
The national rates of pay were too low to attract 
sufficient new technical and craft staff, the only way to 
appoint new staff was to add the special allowances that 
ought to have been paid to existing full-time staff on 
the basic scale. Thus the problem of recruiting new
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CHAPTER 5I FE SALARY NEGOTIATIONS 1950-51 
Proposals froH the Authorities' Panel
The Authorities' Panel (AP) had been involved in
negotiations leading to the 1951 schoolteachers'
settlemei.t from May to October 1950. However, there had
been no formal AP discussion of any radical proposals to
reform the PR salary structure. Less than a month before
the first meeting with the FE Teachers' panel, Alderman
Jackson, the new AP Leader, wrote to Dr Alexander, the AP
Secretary on 16 October 1950:
"I have no previous experience at all with regard to 
the technical machinery and I should,therefore, be 
glad if you would let me know on what lines the 
negotiations are to be conducted. I have been 
having a look at the present Report. I think I 
remember your saying that suggestions are to be made 
for a complete revision of this Report and for the 
scales to be altered. Is it possible for you to let 
me have a memorandum in due course as to the 
position, and to give me some appointment 
immediately prior to 3 November so that I can 
discuss the matter with you". (22)
Dr Alexander replied to Alderman Jackson on the next day
promising a memorandum in a few days. However, the
promised memorandum was not despatched until 26 October
1950 which, given Alexander's deserved reputation for
'by-return-of-post' responses to even the most abstruse
queries, was an interesting delay. The lack of any
archival reference, (23) other than that of the London
and Home Counties RAC, (24), suggests that no Technical
Report memorandum existed until 26 October.
On the same day that Jackson despatched his letter. Dr 
Alexander had informed Dacey, the Secretary of the County 
Councils Association, that the Technical Committee
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meetings of the Burnham Committee would take place on 3 
and 8 November. This appears to indicate that the AP 
Secretary believed that the 'complete revision' of the 
Technical scales would be completed in two sessions.
The 26 October 1950 memorandum (25) that Dr Alexander 
despatched to the Authorities' Panel first noted that the 
Teachers' Panel would make a case for the Technical 
Report being disassociated from the Main Report in terms 
of the basic grades under each Reporti however, in the AP 
Secretary's view, there was a sufficient body of work 
essentially of 'school standard' in technical 
institutions to make it imperative that amongst the 
scales of salary Included in the Technical Report the 
basic scale of the Main Report must find a place. (26)
Alexander then addressed the substantive point of the AP 
memorandum - the proposed solution to the problems of the 
1945 and 1948 Burnham Reports. The variability of FE 
institutions meant that the nationally prescribed 
proportions of PSRs and SAs did not operate well in the 
FE context. Alexander proposed an alternative salary 
structure.
The AP Secretary noted that the staff of FE Institutions 
could be divided into four broad categories:
"(i) staff engaged almost wholly on work of school 
character;
(11) staff who, while engaged to a considerable 
extent on work of school character, make a
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material contribution to work of a more 
advanced character;
(ill) staff largely engaged with work of an advanced 
character;
(iv) staff essentially employed on courses of 
university standard and from whom it Is 
reasonable to expect a contribution to 
research". (27)
Dr Alexander proposed that there should be four grades of 
staff t
(1) Assistant Lecturers
Scale (a) £375x£18 - £630 (ie Main Report 
basic)
Scale (b) £500x£25 - £750
(2) Lecturers £900x£25 - £1,000
(3) Senior Lecturers £l,000x£25 - £1,150
It was proposed that the above four grades should be 
applied to the (i)-(iv) groups of technical teaching 
staff and that "These four scales would, it is suggested, 
cover the needs of the staff in institutes of Further 
Education".
The 26 October 1950 memorandum is significant for a 
number of reasons. Neither the Authorities' Panel nor 
the Teachers' Panel appeared to have any earlier warning 
of radical proposals, timetabled to be proposed on 3 
November and accepted by the end of 8 November.
The proposals would have addressed the problem of 
nationally-prescribed ranges of above-scale posts 
differing from the reality of the local workload by 
clearly identifying level of teaching with salary. 
However, the assumption that the proposals would cover 
all FE needs ignored the implicit disappearance of the 
PSRs whereby, under the 1948 Report, nearly one-third of
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full-time FE teachers could earn above-scale salaries 
for the performance of additional responsibilities.
Finally, the proposals represent the first appearance of 
the 'level of work' criterion as a factor in FE teachers' 
salaries.
Later in the negotiations. Dr Alexander was to state that 
a Senior Lecturer would be graded as a Senior Lecturer 
rather than as a Lecturer, "because of having had regard 
to the additional duties which he has to carry out ... he 
has been paid a sufficiently high salary and one would 
expect him to be carrying a responsibility". (28) In the 
context of the proposed new structure of the 26 October 
memorandum, that expectation became critical: certainly 
the original proposals do not make that expectation 
explicit.
Dr Alexander's October 1950 proposals would have removed 
the scope for promotion for additional responsibilities 
for mainstream staff and, instead, paid differential 
salaries according to levels of work alone. Under the 
proposed structure, promotion could have been earned only 
through teaching on advanced courses. With little 
advanced work, the local FE college would not have had 
sufficient senior posts for its management needs.
In the 26 October 1950 memorandum, Alexander conceded 
that the Teachers' Panel might not be prepared to accept
54
"the absolute decision" of the LEA as to the salary scale 
applicable to any individual. Consequently,the 1951 
Technical Report should include "appropriate machinery" 
which "would enable a member of college staff who felt he 
was placed on an inappropriate scale ... to refer the 
matter to the Reference Committee whose ruling would be 
binding on both parties". The 'appeal machinery’ 
proposal became a critical factor governing the 
acceptability of the total package of proposals to the 
Authorities' Panel.
The 1950 Burnham Committee Meetings
The above section describes the Authorities' Panel’s 
original proposals. However, the final settlement did 
not Include the proposed rigid identification of the 
individual teacher’s grade - and salary - according to 
the level of work taught. The 1951 Report did retain 
the relationship of gradings and promoted posts for the 
establishment of the college as a whole. That was the 
precursor of the proportions of posts/categories of work 
(POP/COW) table that still forms part of the FE salary 
structure and which contributes towards the academic skew 
of post-16 education provision.
Why had the Authorities' Panel moved from its initial 
proposals? To answer that question it was necessary to 
examine the detail of the Burnham exchanges. This 
section provides a reconstruction of the negotiations.
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In the event, there were six meetings of the Committee, 
not the two that Dr Alexander had predicted, on 3 and 8 
November and 8 December 1950, and 16 January and 8 and 14 
February 1951.
3 November 1950 Heeting
The Teachers' Panel (TP) presented a closely-argued case 
for higher salaries and documented (a) the extent of 
degree studies undertaken in technical colleges (eg 
Northampton Polytechnic in London had 'more students in 
engineering than any constituent college of the 
University' (of London) but 44.3% of its staff were on 
the basic scale); (b) a comparison of Burnham (Technical) 
Report salaries with those currently operative for staffs 
of universities, teacher training colleges and civil 
servants; and (c) detailed evidence compiled by the 
Association of Principals regarding the difficulties in 
recruiting suitable staff.
Wickham Murray, the TP spokesman, went on to note that 
the conditions of service for teachers in technical 
Institutions were more onerous than for their school 
colleagues: in a three session day of morning, afternoon 
and evening, FE teachers could be required to teach any 
ten within the week. Further, in comparison with the 
schoolteacher, the qualifications and experience required 
for teaching in FE necessitated later entry to the 
profession and a consequent reduction - of £39 per annum 
- on annual pension. (29)
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Alderman Jackson for the Authorities' Panel then 
presented the 26 October proposals - wi .hout the figures 
Dr Alexander had proposed for actual salary.
The Teachers' Panel withdrew to consider this completely 
novel approach to FE Teachers' salaries. Wickham Murray 
returned to report that "My Panel is not at all opposed 
to the suggestions”, and to ask for clarification.
First, what constituted 'school work'? Was it to extend 
to Higher School Certificate work? Only 6% of the age 
cohort sat Higher Certificate examinations, yet 36% of 
grammar school staff held PSRs. (This was a reference to 
the fact that the age-weighting element of the schools' 
Burnham Report gave school teachers much higher relative 
rewards for teaching 15-18 year olds than were enjoyed by 
the FE teachers.)
Second, was it proposed that a technical teacher's salary 
would "go up and down according to how he moved about on 
the timetable of the college?" Wickham Murray had 
already referred to the Association of Principals' 
special survey that demonstrated that 70.4% of staff were 
engaged in teaching advanced work at some time in the 
academic year. The logical conclusion of the AP 
proposals entailed either that individual's salaries 
would oscillate, or that the FE teachers' salaries report 
would straltjacket the normal teaching conventions of the 
FE service.
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Third, he ashed what was meant by "elementary craft 
work", a phrase used by Alderman Jackson as an example of 
school work. The AP statement had already presumed that 
it would count as 'schools work* while Wickham Murray had 
quoted in aid a recent Parliamentary Scientific Committee 
Report which had "specifically asked for higher salaries 
to be offered to people doing craft work, as they could 
not get them into the schools because of the competition 
of industry".
The fourth and fifth issues for clarification - whether 
research activity was to act as a precondition for the 
Senior Lectureship and the future position of the 
graduate and training allowances - were answered easily 
by the AP spokesman: research was not to be a pre­
requisite for a Senior Lectureship, and the graduate and 
training allowances would continue to apply to Assistants 
(a) and (b).
It is significant that Alderman Jackson chose, 
additionally, to comment on the issue of promotion 
prospects for mainstream staff, an area that Wickham 
Murray had not queried:
"On the question of the special posts, .. one of the 
objects behind the proposals to be put to the 
Teachers' Panel is the abolition of this particular 
scheme ...".
Thus, the AP spokesman attempted to ensure that the 
Teachers' Panel understood that the additional 
remuneration hitherto afforded by additional 
responsibilities, either for staff or for a body of work.
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would henceforth be open only to those staff teaching a 
certain proportion of advanced level work, and that PSRs 
would be abolished.
Alderman Jachson then answered the first three questions: 
'School worV - "... It Is not a matter of age, rather It 
Is a question of the standard of worh'... [and] ... on 
the variations In the timetable, we should not want 
salaries to move about [and, finally on 'elementary 
craft work'] not, for example, printing In a school of 
printing, or things of that kind".
Jackson continued, with a general plea:
"Frankly, I hope you will not press us at this stage 
on close definitions, because one of the purposes 
behind this Is to avoid definitions that are so 
rigorous that you can neither go outside them nor do 
anything about them".
These answers were hardly precise: Indeed, they suggested 
that the Authorities' Panel had no clear answers to the 
questions. This was hardly surprising, given the novelty 
of the proposals for them as well as for the Teachers' 
Panel. Both Panels then withdrew.
On return, Wickham Murray pointed out that the Teachers' 
Panel had had great difficulty In grasping the new 
concepts without any Information as to the proposed 
salaries to be paid In the proposed new scales. Alderman 
Jackson then released the salary ranges that had been 
proposed In the 26 October memorandum, with a modified 
Assistant Lecturer (b) of £450 to £700 (£50 less than the
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26 October 1950 nemorandum figures at minimum and 
maximum). Wickham Murray then requested that the 
Committee adjourn until the following week since the TP 
could not give any answer that afternoon.
However, before adjourning the TP spokesman fulfilled Dr 
Alexander's 26 October expectations by highlighting some 
of the problems consequent upon the proposed Appeals 
body. He warned that between 10% and 17% of the FE 
teaching force might appeal against the LEA proposed 
gradings, a reference to the volume of appeals of 
individual principals against their LEAs’ determination 
of their salaries.
Later events demonstrated that the TP's reservations were 
shared by members of the employers' Panel and that this 
issue reduced the acceptability of the AP's modified 
December package to their own constituents, the LEAs. It 
is Important to note, too, that at the 3 November meeting 
both Panels understood that the AP's proposals assumed 
that the appeal would be brought by an individual against 
the grading proposed for him by his employing LEA. Later 
in the negotiations there was a change of appellantt only 
the staff as a whole could appeal.
The reduction of £50 in the proposals for Assistant scale 
(b) as between 26 October and 3 November may have arisen 
from the following note of concern. On 3 November Sir 
Graham Savage, Education Officer of the London County 
Council, had written to Jackson:
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"1 think It would be very unwlee for our Panel to 
table any figures today. I have again looked at the 
cost to London and I still believe it will add 50% 
to our Technical Salary bill. We may be able to 
persuade our authority to face this but I feel very 
sure they will not accept it if rushed.
"I suggest that we invite the teachers to suggest 
their figures and consider them. I am sorry about 
this but we have had but a copy apiece of the 
document and there has been no chance to discuss the 
proposals with our Finance people. It 1s imperative 
that we carry them with us". (30)
The message is interesting because, first, the advice of
the Education Officer of the LCC was not taken - the
figures were tabled - and, second, because it is clear
that an experienced member of the Burnham Committee, and
one whose own Authority would be the most affected by the
proposed scheme, had clearly little advance warning of
Alexander's thinking. It is unlikely that Sir Graham
Savage would have been excluded from any officer-level
consideration of any proposals for a new salary structure
for Technical Teachers: that, and the lack of any
archival evidence (31) to the contrary, suggests that
there had been no such consideration of the 26 October
proposals even in the most rudimentary sense.
8 Noved>er 1950 Meeting
The verbatim record of the proceedings of 8 November 
suggests that the Authorities' Panel were clearly not of 
a united and considered mind.
Wickham Murray as TP spokesman opened by asking for 
protection for those staff holding PSRs and for more 
information regarding the administration of the appeals
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machinery. Alderman Jackson responded by asking for an 
AP withdrawal!
"I should hope that if I may be allowed to withdraw 
the Panel I may be able to come back and present or 
table a set of proposals with regard to 
administration". (32)
On return, he asked for an adjournment: "The Panel wants 
more time in order that we may bring before you a careful 
scheme". Dr Alexander rejected the following week as too 
early for the Authorities' Panel, and 8 December was 
agreed as the date for the next meeting. Meanwhile, the 
Authorities' Panel's confusion must have been clear to 
the Teachers.
The AP had withdrawn to consider a memorandum by 
Alexander dated 7 November on "Appeal Machinery", and 
were clearly very divided about its proposals. The 
archives are silent on what views might have been 
exchanged between AP members. Prom Burnham practice it 
is likely that the AP Secretary was asked to prepare a 
memorandum that dealt with the questions raised on 3 
November. The need for an AP withdrawal to consider any 
memorandum and agree an AP line would have been 
unexceptionable. The need for a month's adjournment 
suggests some more fundamental difference of opinion.
The 7 November memorandum contained, first, the clear 
statement that:
"The ... present Report does not deal with 
individuals but with establishments ... The new 
Report equally, I suggest, is not concerned to
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determine if a particular teacher is paid on the 
appropriate scale ••. What the new Report is 
concerned to do is to give a guarantee to the 
teachers as a whole" (author's emphasis) "that the 
proportion of any staff paid on the different scales 
of salary are reasonable having regard to the work 
done in the particular institution. This need would 
be met if each LE^ was required to fix an 
establishment for each college or institution of FE 
under which the numbers to be paid as Senior 
Lecturers, Lecturers, Assistant scale (a) and 
Assistants scale (b) were set out". (33)
The above runs directly counter to the assumptions of
both Panels at the 3 November meeting, and marks the
first breach in the memorandum of 26 October whose
principles had formed a coherent, albeit unrealistic,
package.
As opposed to a new structure whereby individual FE 
teachers would be paid according to the academic level of 
the classes they taught, the 7 November memorandum 
described the college, not the teacher, as beneficiary of 
the number of above scale posts 'earned' by the 
proportions of advanced level work. By this change the 
revised proposals now accommodated the working needs of 
the FE college. However, the 7 November memorandum made 
the relationship between the level of salary for the 
individual FE teacher and his work less direct.
The 7 November memorandum recognised the need for the 
1951 Report to contain guidance to LEAs about the new 
salary structure: at the same time, it argued that any 
rigid definitions of the three levels of work that were 
to govern that new structure would "defeat the principle 
of flexibility". (34)
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On the machinery to govern any appeals under the 
LER-determined establishments for their PE institutions, 
Alexander simply proposed that the Appeal Panel should 
comprise the leaders and honorary secretaries of the two 
negotiating panels, plus three members from each panel, 
under an (Independent) chairman.
Clearly the Authorities' Panel faced internal 
disagreements over their own proposals for a new FE 
salaries structure.
8 December 1950 Meeting
A later private briefing note, of 1 January 1951, (35) 
from Alexander to the AP Leader provides the explanation 
for the request for an adjournment of one month. The 
Authorities' Panel had used the 8 November withdrawal to 
establish a small Sub-Committee to make recommendations 
on the administration of the new Report with a view to 
clear proposals being submitted to the Teachers' Panel on 
8 December.
It is not possible from available evidence to reconstruct
what exactly occurred within the Authorities' Panel
during that month. The AP Sub-Committee met twice and
Alexander reported to Jackson:
"It was rather hard going, but we finally hammered 
out a memorandum which was circulated to the 
[Authorities'] Panel on 28 November in preparation 
for the 8 December meeting". (36)
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The 28 November memorandum from the AP Sub-Committee to 
the full Panel contained a number of refinements of its 7 
November predecessor, principally in emphasising the role 
of the LEA. Its most significant feature, however, was 
the inclusion of new considerations as to which of the 
proposed four scales should apply to individual technical 
teachers t
"... In fact, however, it is clear from our further 
discussions that the salary to be paid to an 
individual will not necessarily depend on the 
teaching work he is undertaking. It may depend 
additionally on other matters, such as supervisory 
responsibility, and the actual distribution of the 
various levels of work over full-time and part-time 
members of staff arranged by the principal". (37)
This was the second break with the initial proposals.
The 26 October scheme would have entailed that the 
mainstream technical teacher, unlike his colleague in 
schools, would have started and necessarily ended his 
teaching career on the basic scale. The 26 October 
proposals would have replaced the proportional formula 
for above-scale payments, the PSRs, by a demoralising and 
rigid straitjacket of a salary structure whereby no 
promotion was possible for the FE teacher not teaching 
advanced level classes. At least the 28 November 
memorandum from the Sub-Committee ensured that promotion 
would not be closed to the technical teacher teaching 
little or no advanced work after the proposed abolition 
of the Posts of Special Responsibility.
Finally, the 28 November memorandum advised the AP
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members that the new proposals would lead to an increase 
of 20-28% on the technical salary bill of the country as 
a whole,
"although in particular institutions where a high 
proportion of work of university standard is carried 
on the increase may be 30-35%". (38)
The 28 November memorandum had at least one
administrative virtue by comparison with its 26 October
and 7 November predecessors: its financial implications
were estimated.
In preparation for the following day's negotiations, the
Authorities' Panel considered the revised proposals on 7
December 1950. Vihen the Chairman of the Burnham
Committee asked Wickham Murray whether he had seen the
memorandum tabled by Sir Wilfred Martineau, acting AP
Leader, at the meeting. Dr Alexander explained:
"... We are sorry we could not let you have the 
memorandum in advance. It was, in fact, finished 
last night quite late". (39)
Even a month's adjournment and the work of the AP's
Sub-Committee, had evidently not created wholehearted
support within AP for proposals they tabled on 8
December. Since members of the Sub-Committee would have
been able to test out the implications of the proposed PE
salary structure for their own authorities, that lack of
consensus should, perhaps, have given the AP grounds for
reconsidering the acceptability of the package to their
own constituents.
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The official minutes of the 8 December meeting record 
that
"The Committee agreed, subject to certain 
amendments, that the principles outlined in the 
memorandum of Administration tabled by the 
Authorities' Panel should serve as a basis for the 
Drafting Committee in the preparation of the full 
Report so as to give effect to the Committee's 
Intentions relating to the standards of work, 
determination of establishments, grading of 
departments and appeal machinery". (40)
The minutes imply that the two Panels were of one mind on
major principle, and the Draft Report was to be
considered on Tuesday, 16 January 1951. However, the
Verbatim Record notes some very detailed exchanges which
indicate more of an exploration of ideas than would be
expected at the penultimate stage of negotiations for a
major restructuring of salaries.
Two of the facets of the proposed structure were still 
subject to clarification - the definition of levels of 
work, on which the colleges' establishments were to be 
based, and the issue of payment for undertaking 
additional responsibilities.
In spite of the fact that the AP's initial proposals of 
26 October would have meant that the FK teacher's salary 
would be determined by and, under the 7 November 
memorandum, significantly affected by the levels of work 
he taught, the memorandum tabled on 8 December by the 
Authorities' Panel had not given any clearer definition 
of the three levels of work that were proposed to 
determine college establishments than at the first
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meeting on 3 November. All that Sir Wilfred Hartineau 
would say was that:
"... if we are going bach to detailed definition, 
then I do not thinh we need waste time over appeal 
machinery ... but just get down to considering how 
we can deal with the existing Report and bring that 
up to date". (41)
Dr Alexander added that it was the detailed definition as 
to which courses constituted advanced and university- 
level work that had "resulted in an establishment of 
senior assistants greater than the number of staff in the 
college". (42)
The AP Secretary's statement is curious. As shown 
earlier, it was the nationally-fixed proportions of 
full-time staff who were to receive SAs and PSRs, rather 
than any definitions - rigid or otherwise - of advanced 
work, that had led in some cases to the excess of 
permitted posts above individual college's establish­
ments. The available evidence fails to explain the AP's 
clear aversion to definition of FE courses within the 
AP's own three categories. The statements of the Acting 
Leader and the Secretary of the Authorities' Panel may 
indicate merely lack of clarity in the thinking within 
the Authorities' Panel.
The Teachers' Panel withdrew to take their first 
opportunity to read the AP's proposals. On return to the 
formal Rurnhara Committee proceedings, Wickham Hurray 
noted that 'responsibility' was referred to, but not laid 
down as a factor in fixing colleges' establishments. The
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formal acknowledgement of the need for some remuneration
for additional responsibility had finally been
Included In the employers' proposals; however. If the
Issue of non-payment for responsibility could not
constitute grounds for appeal against a salary/
establishment, that acknowledgement was - virtually -
hollow. Dr Alexander acknowledged that It would not
constitute grounds for an appeal. Then, pressed by
Wickham Murray, Alexander stated:
"There Is no question of an authority not being able 
to go above the minimum limits which the proportions 
of higher work would carry In staffing. There Is 
nothing In the world to stop them In this Report 
from making the entire staffs senior lecturers In 
every Institution If they so desired, but they 
should not go below these proportions since they are 
necessary If the work Is to be maintained". (43)
As with the earlier exchange on the definition of levels
of work. Dr Alexander's statement did not deal with the
Teachers' Panel's question. Of course LEAs could exceed
the statutory Burnham minimum. However, the Burnham
Committee was assembled to agree definition of that
statutory minimum.
The reactions of the Teachers' Panel will be considered 
In Chapter 6 below.
The 1951 Burnham (FB) Report
While the official record of the 8 December meeting had 
Indicated an Immediate settlement, there were three 
further meetings of the Committee In 1951. The first, on 
16 January, was significant only In continuing to
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denonstrate quite fundamental misgivings within the 
Authorities' Panel about their own proposals, and in 
Imposing upon their Secretary a longer period between the 
date that LEAs would receive the proposals and that of 
their publication than had obtained for the Main Report. 
(44)
Then, on 8 February, the Teachers' Panel were informed
that the local authorities' Associations had rejected the
proposed Appeal Machinery. Dr Alexander's alternative
of grading each post in strict relation to the standard
of work involved (ie the original 26 October proposals),
re-introduced in the light of the Associations' rejection
of the Appeal Machinery, was in turn rejected by Wickham
Hurray on behalf of the Teachers' Panel:
“First of all, because it was completely rigid and 
secondly ... it would have produced one of the 
greatest anomalies the Burnham Committeee could ever 
have produced - namely, it would have a rigid 
application of a percentage applied to the work of a 
particular grade". (45)
Finally, on 14 February the Technical Committee adopted 
the salary structure which meshed together the structures 
of the 7 and 28 November memoranda, without an appeals 
machinery. Thus, the principles of proportions of 
promoted posts for colleges, rather than of individual 
entitlement to promotion, were an agreed recommendation 
of the whole Committee.
Dr Alexander, as Secretary of the Authorities' Panel, 
Issued a personal Commentary on the significant features 
of each Burnham Report after each round of salary
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negotiations. Dr Alexander's Commentary on the 1951 
Technical Report highlighted both the lack of strict 
relation between grade of work taught and the salary of 
the Individual teacher, and the Burnham Committee's 
expectation that
"... the proportions of higher work virtually 
constitute the basis for determining the minimum 
proportion of higher posts which the college must 
offer". (46)
To this day these two statements have been quoted by both 
Management and Teachers' Panels: by the LEAs to 
demonstrate officially-approved flexibility, and by the 
teacher unions to minimise the tendency within LEAs to 
implement the new structure at the minimum which, given 
Alexander's estimate that the new structure would cost an 
additional 25%, was understandable.
In the light of Dr Alexander's original proposals, and 
the fractured process of this particular round of Burnham 
negotiations, it is a nice irony that the principle of 
'the lack of strict relation between grade of work taught 
and the salary of the individual teacher' is often 
referred to as the Alexander argument.
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CHAPTER 6t ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE 1950-51 
BURNHAM (PE) NEGOTIATIONS
Before describing the effects of the 1951 salary
settlement upon FE college provision and conseguent
incentives for school and PE teaching staff, the
relationships within the Authorities' Panel and the role
of its Secretary are discussed first since these
contributed to the modifications of the initial Alexander
proposals and, thus, to the final 1951 settlement.
The Teachers' Panel's reactions are then interpreted, and 
the role of successive Secretaries of State and 
Governments briefly noted. The implications of the 1951 
Burnham settlement are then described.
Finally, the legacy of the Burnham Report for current 
16-19 provision is briefly explored. Here the values 
implicit in the Burnham Reports are noted in the context 
of the other factors within the education system, all 
acting together to skew provision towards the academic. 
The influence of the universities on non-degree work is 
highlighted. This Chapter also, therefore, provides the 
background context for the issues described in Part III, 
the Hacfarlane Review.
The Negotiators
(i) The Authorities' Panel
The preceding summary of the 1950-51 Burnham FE 
negotiations has already highlighted the fact that, on a
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number of oocaeione, the Authorities‘ Panel was not of 
one mind.
The following paragraphs provide some explanation of the 
differences between members of the Authorities' Panel. 
There was an underlying context for the tension within 
the AP. As noted earlier, the Association of Municipal 
Corporations (AMC) and the County Councils Association 
(CCA) held the view that the Association of Education 
Committees (AEC) ought not to have Independent 
representation on the Burnham Committees: the authorities 
in membership of AMC and CCA employed teachers; the 
Committees represented on AEC did not. The fact that the 
Secretary of AEC was also Secretary to the Authorities’ 
Panel would act to exacerbate any other grounds for 
dissension. (47)
And there were grounds for dissension. There was a
confidential message from Savage, LCC Education Officer,
to Alexander on the reporting of his statement on the 21
July 1950 meeting of the Authorities' Panel:
"What I complained of was the combination of leakage 
of information and distorted Information at that - I 
very deliberately used the word 'distortion' - since 
the occasion when the LCC, together with others, 
were in a minority was not on the point of reaching 
agreement to the teachers' claim". (48).
This was strong language from a man like Savage. All
earlier letters, since 1945, from Savage to the Burnham
Secretariat had been courteous: they had either contained
detailed - and solicited - advice or enquiries. In that
73
context, the 3 August 1950 letter would seem to 
demonstrate some serious loss of confidence.
So Sir Graham Savage had grounds for concern before the 
1950/1 FE negotiations. While It Is not Impossible that 
the LCC Education Officer might have been over-sensitive, 
Alexander himself provides evidence for Savage's 
judgment:
"... soon afterward [the circulation of the AP 
memorandum of 28 November 1950] Savage told me that 
although he had agreed to the memorandum as being 
the best possible solution to the appeals machinery 
procedure, he remained of the opinion that It would 
be unsatisfactory In working and suggested that It 
might lead to the rejection of the Report by the 
Associations". (49)
As Savage predicted, AMC and CCA did reject the 8 
December 1950 proposed settlement, and the Burnham 
negotiators were forced to revert to first principles. 
Savage's judgment proved sound.
Another situation Illustrating the tensions between the 
local authority Associations, as well as between 
Alexander and CEOs, concerned the publication of the 
schoolteachers' Salary Report. There was widespread 
resentment of Alexander's Issuing of the proposals for 
the 1951 Main Salary Report for schoolteachers on 27 
October 1950 to CEOs In membership of AEC and for 
releasing to the press on 1 November 1950. Such a tight 
lead-time made It clear that recipients' views on the 
proposals would not be taken Into account. (50)
The protest of Savage and the protests on the very tight
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lead time for the publication of the schoolteachers' 
Burnham Report should have given the Secretary of the 
Authorities' Panel grounds for proceeding cautiously.
The 1950-51 FE negotiations demonstrate, however, 
precisely the opposite of caution.
The Burnham Committee archives demonstrate that the 
Authorities' Panel normally involved their LEA 
constituents, either by direct request for comment or by 
representation on working parties, in any proposals for 
salary restructuring. Despite that practice, Alexander's 
26 October 1950 proposals for the restructured FE Report 
were produced without, apparently, any reference to 
constituents. One statement only, from the London and 
Home Counties' RAC, made any prior case for reform, and 
that statement argued for an increase in salary for all 
FE technical college teachers and not for a differential 
for those staff teaching on advanced level courses only.
Certainly, a lack of consultation on the proposals for a 
new FE Report would provide some explanation for the 
local authority Associations' rejection of the principles 
of the Authorities' Panel's proposals for the 1951 
Technical Report in January 1951. (51) Quite simply, the 
LEAS would not have had sufficient time to take on board 
the concepts within the proposed structure. At the same 
time, to be so unanimously rejected by constituents - the 
LEA employers - represents a serious vote of no 
confidence.
75
The two casua belli appear to have been, first, the lack 
of time for conatituenta to consider the terms of the 
schoolteachers’ salary Report before publication on 1 
November 1950 and. second, the unilateral conception of 
the FE salary structure poposala. Both occurred in 
October 1950. Given the archival record of adverse LE^ 
reactions on both counts, the following exchange within 
the formal Burnham (Technical) Committee proceedings is 
significant.
On 16 January 1951 the modified AP proposals had been
adopted by the Committee, and Alexander had suggested
that a press release of the agreement be issued on the
following Monday. 22 January 1951. The Verbatim then
records a clear difference of opinion as between the AP
Secretary and the Education Officer of the LCC. Sir
Graham Savage is reported as stating:
"It seems to me it is rather tough to put this in 
the hands of Authorities and let everybody know 
about it in four or five days' time. It is the kind 
of thing that gets the backs of Councils up rather 
badly". (52)
Alexander then suggested 27 January. Savage countered 
with 16 February 1951. Finally. 1 February 1951 was 
adopted as the date for the press release.
In the event, the meetings of the CCA. AMC and AEC on 24 
and 26 January 1951 refused to adopt the Technical 
Committee's provisional agreement, and the Authorities' 
Panel were forced to renegotiate from scratch on 8 
February 1951. In that context. Savage's proposed
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deferment of the official press release of a Technical 
Committee agreement proved timely In protecting the 
public credibility of the Authorities' Panel. More, 
Savage appeared to have taken on board the adverse 
reaction to the early publication of the schoolteachers' 
salary Report and Alexander appeared to be set to repeat 
the same 'offence'. Further, such an altercation In the 
formal Committee was rare.
Alexander's Initial proposal for such a short lead time 
between despatch of the 16 January 1951 recommendations 
which, as he was already aware (53), were not unanimously 
supported by the AP Sub-Comralttee that had proposed them 
was, at the very least, surprising.
Role of Alexander
The personal memoirs of Martin Wilson, CEO of Shropshire,
contain Illuminating comments on AEC and Alexander:
"Some may speculate whether the Interests of 
education would have been worse or better served by 
a less power-aware organisation,"
Wilson commented on the AEC. He continued by wondering
"whether in the make-up of the Leadership a greater 
emphasis on the characteristics of the 'educator' 
would have had a subtler Influence on the quality 
and the 'feel' of the education service, whether the 
misty and wayward English can absorb (and be fully 
and finely appreciated by) the ruthlessly logical 
Scot. Did the AEC by Its obtrusive efficiency 
nurture the seeds of its own dissolution?". (54)
The initial coherent set of proposals had had to be
turned on its head to ensure that it fitted the FE system
that it was designed to support. The logic of the
original 26 October 1950 proposals would have acted to
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aignificantly undermine the morale of PE staff by 
removing scope for any promotion for the majority.
Wilson provides a first-hand anecdote as to how
Alexander's personality contributed to AEC's high-profile
role in national negotiations:
"Perhaps Bill [Alexander] himself didn't always 
quite know how forceful he seemed to others. At 
times he would almost monopolise a meeting or talk 
other people down. At a working party at the 
Ministry one day he did this to me, interrupting to 
expound his own view and reducing me to silence. I 
vowed that this should not happen again. At the 
very next meeting. Bill Interrupted me once more. I 
raised my voice slightly and went on talking. Bill 
continued at normal diapason. I raised my voice 
again. Bill pursued his course unnoticing. To my 
amazement I found myself stopping - despite the 
Chairman's sympathetic eye - almost to admire. When 
he brought his exposition to a halt, I resumed with 
'I must apologise for interrupting Dr Alexander'.
He was plainly mystified by the burst of laughter 
which followed". (55)
Wilson noted later:
"Neither is he dictatorial nor as impervious as some 
suppose. He can listen, absorb, sympathise, 
adjust. You don't have to be intimidated, but you 
had better speak upl". (56)
However, there will have been very many within the
education service without Martin Wilson's own Puckish
persistence, and for whom such treatment would have
rankled. (57)
In the course of the negotiations for the schoolteachers' 
Burnham Report in 1950 Sir Offley Wakeman, at that time, 
Martin Wilson's own Chairman in Shropshire, had written 
to Alexander to record his disappointment at the lack of 
modification of the proposals
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"on the lines I suggested and which would have gone 
some way to meet the views of the CCA". (58)
Such a comment suggests that Alexander did not give a
high priority to appearing to accommodate the views of
his AP constituents.
From lack of archival evidence to the contrary, it has
been inferred that the 26 October 1950 proposals
originated in Alexander's own logical mind: that
inference has been supported by prominent individuals
within the ATTI. Edward Britton stated«
"Lord Alexander believed that those who taught on 
higher education courses, ie university and 
university-equivalent work, should be paid 
more".(59)
Tom Driver noted:
"Alexander wanted the level of work as the criterion 
for higher-graded staff". T60)
Finally, in a discussion on the underlying rationale of
the two Burnham Reports, Lord Alexander said that:
"The Oxford graduate would come into teaching 
and be paid according to the level of work 
undertaken Initially". (61)
Over more than 30 years. Lord Alexander consistently
maintained the original October 1950 rationale.
(ii) Teachers and the 1951 Structure
The account of the 1950-51 negotiations given in Chapter 
5 explains the concentration on the Authorities' Panel. 
The Teachers' Panel were not party to the conception of 
the 1951 structure. Two questions arise: the first, why 
the 1951 Teachers' Panel accepted the proposed new 
structure; and, the second, why their successors
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continued to negotiate within It.
Chapter 5 described how, at the first meeting of the 
1950-51 negotiations, Wickham Murray had presented a 
detailed case for a substantial rise In the salaries for 
all FE teachers. The AP response was not a comment on 
that case but, rather, the tabling of novel proposals. 
Given the lack of any forewarning of an alternative 
approach, the Teachers' Panel might have refused even to 
consider the scheme. Their reaction, however, was to 
attempt to explore the salary Implications of the AP 
proposals.
Dr Alexander's 1950s memorandum to the Authorities' Panel
had 'guesstimated' that the proposed restructuring would
give something more than a 25% Increase to the FE salary
bill for the country as a whole:
"... although In particular Institutions where a 
high proportion of work of a university standard Is 
carried out the Increase may be 30-35%". (62)
The answer to the first question would appear to be that,
quite simply, the Teachers' Panel perceived that more
money would be forthcoming via the new structure than
through any percentage Increase on the then current
scales.
An agreement to a particularly advantageous offer In one 
year does not, however, explain the Teachers' Panel's 
continuing acquiescence In an academically-oriented FE 
salary structure. Whenever any past or present member of
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the Teachers' Panel was asked for their own views on a 
more appropriate salary structure, the Teachers’ Panel's 
submission to the 1974 Houghton Committee of Enquiry was 
quoted as expressing the classic Association of Teachers 
in Technical Institutions (ATTI) perspective. Paragraph 
4.5 of that submission (63) deplores the incentive 
towards developing advanced work or teaching senior 
students as opposed to non-advanced work or younger 
students, and the submission argued for a neutralisation 
of those incentives. Why, then, did the ATTI not attempt 
to negotiate towards their 'official' position?
Tom Driver answered that question directly by noting
that, since the LEAs were always more prepared to concede
at the top of the scale than at the bottom, ATTI
attempted to work with that attitude. (64) Eric Robinson
amplified the pragmatic approach;
"ATTI itself was ambiguous. [Moreover] It always 
felt the need to hold onto its membership teaching 
on advanced courses". (65)
There is a continuum in the FE teachers' unions'
attitudes. David Trlesman, current Negotiating Secretary
for the National Association of Teachers in Further and
Higher Education (NATFHE), the successor to ATTI,
continues the realpolltik explanation:
"However egalitarian the policy-makers, the eventual 
policy usually has a very basic root - demographic, 
le the profile of the membership. It is demographic 
features (of the Association) that determine the 
policy [that] produce inertia, conservatism - with a 
small 'c'l 75% of NATFHE is on LII or above. The 
real answer to your question - responsiveness to the 
membership". (66)
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The commonality of the above view with that of Dr Seeley,
Secretary of the ATTI in the 1950s, is interestingi
"It is quite clear that the salary policies affect 
colleges' development and lead to principals 
concentrating on higher level work - that way comes 
money, prestige, and your staff are happy.
Evidence? Middlesex Polytechnic used to have both 
higher and lower work: the latter has now been 
pushed out. Why did the ATTI work with that 
policy? We had hoped to raise salaries for each 
grade of work ... bound up with social attitudes to 
HE ... Rightly or wrongly, this country gives 
priority to higher specialist knowledge - and less 
to teaching skills. I argued against this within 
the ATTI, argued that staff should have the 
opportunity to teach at all levels as we did in 
Derby Tech". (67)
The final word on the PE teachers' unions' continuing
acquiescence with an academically-orientated salary
structure should be Tom Driver's:
"The ATTI wanted the proportion of higher graded 
posts to depend on the numbers of staff; Alexander 
wanted the level of work as the criterion - hence 
the proportions of Appendix IIA [ie POP/COW] 
Alexander wouldn't wear this ... a thousand 
Irrelevant arguments and one real one: that such a 
system as ATTI proposed would compound the meanness 
or generosity of the LEA ... It was union policy to 
Improve the bottom ... A political impossibility to 
get a single scale, therefore a long-term policy to 
progress to a long scale to at least the top of the 
(current) Senior Lecturer scale". (68)
The answers to why the FE teachers' unions first accepted
and then continued to work within an academically-skewed
structure are, therefore, twofold. First, the relative
size of the total salary Increase and, second, the
perceived inadvisability of alienating a sizeable
proportion of their membership, specifically those paid
on the higher FE salary scales.
(lii) Secretaries of State
Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary of State frequently
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expressed surprise (69) that. In his view, the English 
and Welsh education service was so antipathetic to the 
worlds of employment. Industry and commerce. Whether or 
not his judgment be fair, any priority afforded by the 
education service to the academic vls-A-vis the 
vocational could be regarded as directly encouraged by 
the incentives of the teachers' salary systems.
However, the Secretary of State's predecessors have been 
active participants in the successive salary negotiations 
since 1945, initially as acceptor (or not) of the Burnham 
Committees' proposals and, from 1965, as a highly- 
weighted, voting constituent of the Management Panel 
under the private Concordat (70) between local authority 
Associations and the Department of Education and Science.
Secretaries of State cannot distance themselves from the 
implications of the continuum of values that they have 
expressed through their consistent influence on regular 
salary negotiations over a period of nearly forty years.
Implications for the FB Service of the 1951 Settlement
An exchange of correspondence in 1954 between Alexander 
and W G Stone, Director of Education of Brighton, 
demonstrates the strength of the hold of the 'proportions 
of posts/categories of work' (POP/COW) even within a few 
years. Stone reported that Brighton had welcomed the 
fact that the Authorities' Panel had proposed to provide 
additional allowances of up to £100 per annum for
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Assistants Grade B whose duties warranted additional 
recognition.
"The Authority felt that at last there would be an 
opportunity of recognising In a practical way the 
work done by Heads of fairly large sections doing 
comparatively little work beyond school standard, 
whose responsibilities deserved some financial 
recognition, but would not be regarded as coming In 
the category of Heads of Department". (71)
The Authority had, therefore, been surprised that the
newly adopted 1B54 Report no longer Included provision
for these special responsibility allowances [SRAs,
previously referred to as PSRsl.
The 1951 Report had deleted the SRAs on the grounds that 
the new salary structure could accommodate reward for 
additional responsibility via the level of work-related 
promoted posts. The Authorities' Panel was made aware 
by such feedback as Stone's that that accommodation was 
not taking place. Alexander replied that the 
Authorities' Panel:
"...would have been very happy Indeed to keep 
this proposal In the final Report, but the Teachers' 
Panel were under Instruction to press for Its 
withdrawal. It was a bargaining counter and In 
the course of the bargaining It had to be 
discarded". (72)
Why had the Teachers' Panel opposed the AP's 1954 
proposals to allow Assistants Grade B to have additional 
SRAs? They had argued that the logic of the 1951 
structure meant the additional money for additional 
responsibilities, which both sides of the negotiating 
table acknowledged, should be paid via an Increase In the 
proportions of Lecturers.
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The TP counter-proposal would have Incurred greater costs 
than the £100 maximum additional payment to assistants 
Grade B, as proposed by the AP. However, the counter­
proposal would have built on the general guidance of the 
1951 Report«
"While, therefore, standards of work should be the 
essential consideration. It will be competent for an 
Authority to take other factors into account which 
they consider relevant to the grading of posts".(73)
As stated above, both Panels found consolation, not to
say ammunition. In that qualification.
Logically, Eric Robinson, ATTI negotiator in the 1960s 
and now Director of Lancashire Polytechnic, was quite 
right in arguing that«
"If you really accept the Alexander argument that 
the level of teaching does not determine the salary 
of the individual teacher, which 1s what the '51 
settlement Intended, then the [1954] responsibility 
allowance proposal for Assistants Grade R was a 
nonsense ... Later concessions which permitted some 
higher posts for lower level work illustrate that 
contradiction ... because if you don't have the 
assumption that only those doing advanced work could 
be Lecturers, that concession Is unnecessary. It 
demonstrates that they do not think you should have 
them ... This is the basis of a long history of 
muddle, conflict, anomaly and confusion throughout 
the system. Virtually all the higher grades in both 
Reports have dual or multiple functions. Thus, a 
Scale 2 post In a primary school Is a post of 
seniority and responsibility. In an upper secondary 
school it is not. A Lecturer II post in a low- 
status department of a FE college Is a 
responsibility post. In a polytechnic it is not.
The grading of courses was originally based on 
criteria drawn from the academic (non-vocational) 
world ... and. In spite of modifications, has been 
widely regarded as prejudicial to vocational 
education". (74).
The logic is fair. However, the 1951 Report has already 
been demonstrated as not Impeccably coherent.
(35
Alexander's original October 1950 proposals were 
coherent« but they were abandoned in the course of 
negotiations.
Incentives in the FE Report
In the course of the consultations leading to the 1945 
Technical Report Lester Smith, CEO of Manchester, had 
writtent
"I have often wondered how a system of remuneration 
based on the number of higher grade students who can 
be kept on the books of a college is going to affect 
Regional co-operation and organisation. Will it not 
tend to make every college determined to keep its 
advanced students at all costs?” (75)
Lester Smith was a solitary voice. Twenty years later
the implications of incentives were still being ignored.
Robinson reported:
"Alexander wouldn't look at the incentives 
argument. I argued with Alexander, with Toby Weaver 
[Deputy Secretary at the Department of Education and 
Science] and with Brown [Education Officer at the 
CCA]. I could never get them to take incentives 
seriously. When I said 'You say you want more 
part-time work and more non-advanced work: your 
Burnham Report proposals will make colleges cut it 
back, drop it'. Bill wouldn't have it. 'They are 
professional people'. In the mid-1960s at the time 
the Government was changing the law for Alec Clegg's 
middle schools, Alexander proposed a change in the 
points scheme for schools. Gould argued that the 
change would give teachers a salary incentive to 
resist middle schools: Alexander wouldn't see it; 
the 'They're professional people' argument.
Alexander saw himself meting out justice, not 
dealing in incentives. After the 1965 Woolwich 
speech I argued, separately, to both Toby Weaver and 
Crosland [Secretary of State] that if they felt it 
important for polytechnics to keep part-time and 
sub-degree work, if they meant what they said, then 
they needed to look at pooling, the weight for 
part-time students within the Burnham Report and the 
whole of the Burnham Report, etc. All neglected the 
principle. Alexander actually said in the Burnham 
Committee 'We are not here to discuss educational 
policy: we are here to talk about salaries'". (76)
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The quotation from Eric Robinson Is given In full since 
It demonstrates that at least Alexander was not alone In 
this apparent Indifference to the force of the Incentives 
argument. Further, It also provides an example of the 
way that the negotiators were responding to different 
perceptions of the needs of the FE service. This point 
will be developed later In Chapter 11.
Professor Gerry Fowler endorses Robinson's point about
the Importance of Implicit Incentives quite graphically:
"Why sweat your guts out teaching young thlckos of 
an evening when they count for only 0.15 of a human 
being (or now, 0.2)? Why not Instead teach someone 
who may even be less bright and certainly less 
deserving, but Is full-time, has a grant, does not 
create the same problem of filling In registers, 
does not create any difficulties with that ghastly 
librarian about opening hours and counts as a real 
human being? After all, the teaching load Is not 
going to be six or five times as great; It will 
probably be no more than twice as great, and It will 
fall within what are deemed to be 'social' hours 
... Advanced work has always had an enormous 
advantage over non-advanced. It was greater In the 
days of the open-ended pool than It Is today. Put 
simply. It was that you cost your LEA nothing, or 
nothing that was discernible. Councillor Bloggs and 
his concern about the Impact of the rates on the 
pensioners of Swanly Ward could go get lost: there 
was no Impact". (77)
Professor Fowler Is not guilty of exaggeration In the
above caricature of the way In which the Burnham
differentials compound the pooling factors to Intensify
'academic skew'. Fred Janes, then Principal of Yeovil
(Tertiary) College, quotes the following expression of
the power of the Burnham Incentives.
"A colleague In my college, an engineer, had been 
splendidly successful In devising and teaching an 
Industrial Studies syllabus for PT Day CGLI lads.
He came to me In some distress lest his timetable In
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future included a greater proportion of such work. 
'Surely', he said, 'I am damaging my promotion 
chances? If I am to get an LII I should be taking a 
greater proportion of the engineering classes in the 
fourth and sixth year work, rather than this low 
level stuff I" (78)
Janes thus provides first-hand evidence of the Incentives 
that Robinson had predicted would operate on the PE 
system.
Further, it is noted that the skill shortages in the 
country as well as the FE system are particularly acute 
at the 'craft' level: there are serious shortages of 
plumbers, carpenters, builders, etc.
Legacy for Post-16 Provision
(i) Cluster of Separate Factors Promoting Academic Skew
"What was it that gave rise to the seemingly inexorable 
drift towards upgrading courses?" (79) Christopher Ball, 
then Chairman of the Board of the National Advisory Body 
for Public Sector HE (NAB) and Warden of Keble College, 
Oxford, was well placed to answer his own question. He 
noted the Burnham salary rules, and added the following 
factors: the prestige of the universities which largely 
avoid sub-degree work; the mandatory awards regulations; 
and the desire of many professional bodies to upgrade 
qualifying courses to degree level to enhance the status 
of their profession. Each of these factors deserves some 
brief commentary.
Before turning to the impact of the universities on the 
development of non-university educational provision, the
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other factors that Ball Identified deserve some brief 
note here. The Anderson Report of 1960 recommended an 
expansion in the support for students on degree courses. 
The Education Act of 1962 made the provision of a grant 
(subject to parental income) mandatory upon an offer of a 
place on, for the most part, a full-time three-year 
Honours Degree course. The coincidence of that provision 
with the dramatic expansion of university places 
following the Robbins Report of 1963 may well have 
distorted student demand as well as the balance of 
post-school provisions students would have been attracted 
towards courses whose places guaranteed mandatory awards.
Additionally, Ministers and some senior civil servants in
the 1950s and 1960s were thought to believe that
part-time degrees were 'second best'. (80) The
professions were also perceived to be eager to cut off
the part-time route to professional status:
"... the determination of the Professional 
Institutions to get rid of the part-time route to 
membership. For Instance, the Engineering 
Institution phased out the Higher National 
Certificate route to professional membership, 
thereby making it almost impossible for anyone who 
had slipped out of full-time education to become 
professionally qualified. The ostensible reason was 
the raising of professional standards but the actual 
reason was much more closely connected with 
status". (81)
It should be noted that each of these factors was 
introduced after the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report, that each 
reinforced the skewing effects of that Report, and each 
represented the same priorities and incentives.
Attempting to differentiate the effects of the Burnham
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(FE) Report from those of the other strands would be an 
Impossible task*
(11) The Influence of the Universities
The educational world of the early 1980s had responded 
positively to the Government's Technical and Vocational 
Education Initiative (TVEI) for 14-18 year olds of all 
abilities. TVEI had itself reinforced the 'Education for 
Capability' Initiative co-ordinated by the Royal Society 
of Arts.
However, even after those separate Initiatives the
Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the 'Standing Conference
on University Entrance' could still publish advice that
applicants should choose conventional, academic A levels:
"'Least acceptable of all', the pamphlet says, are 
'subjects which involve practical skill'. However,
A level design and technology is 'increasingly 
considered to be demanding in the way that is not 
true for the craft subjects' ... The same stigma of 
practical skill appears to apply to electronics and 
computer science". (82)
It takes a quite serious affliction of professional 
myopia to have provided such advice in the face of the 
RSA and TVEI initiatives, and of a government already 
critical of the universities .
At the 1985 Conference of the Council of Local Education
Authorities (CLEA), Sir Keith Joseph had noted that
"This country greatly under-values and 
under-produces the skilled sort of people - 
craftsman, technicians and middle management - who 
are so vital to a successful economy". (83)
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The then Secretary of State offered no explanation. Lady 
Warnock, a key speaker at the same Conference, identified 
two major problems in the education system. First, there 
was a highly unsatisfactory division made between 
education and training. Secondly, the universities had 
far too dominant an influence through the examination 
system on secondary education. (84)
Lord Alexander had earlier made a similar critique to
Lady Warnock. His own explanation for the academic
skewing of the education system was«
"the power of the universities. The academic 
tradition is the tragedy of the English educational 
system". (85)
Lord Alexander's own perspective will be developed below.
In his review of Correlli Barnett's recent publication,
"The Audit of War", Stuart Haclure draws together the
individual perspectives quoted above.
"The story of English education since 1945 as it 
emerges from Barnett's less than complete account, 
is of the failure to devise anything which can be 
recognised as a secondary education for all, even 
though this was the chosen priority. All along the 
best has been the enemy of the good. The 'best' in 
this case being the elite, university-orientated,
GCE 0 and A level model, and its continuation even 
after schools were reorganised on comprehensive 
lines.
Barnett does not seem to recognise how much England 
has suffered from the emphasis which has been placed 
on speed - in particular, the fetish of a three-year 
first degree and the effect this has had on early 
specialisation. The fact is that most other 
countries don't just have a different curriculum - 
they have much more education, so that it is quite 
possible to combine a general education with 
appropriate forms of professional training • (8 6)
It is at least noteworthy that Sir Keith Joseph, when
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Secretary of State, did not taXe the opportunity to 
review the role of the universities on examining bodies 
when he established the new GCSE.
Lord Alexander had offered his own antidote to the
stranglehold of the over academically orientated
universities - the establishment of a high-status
technological institution. (87) In that context the
commentary of Sir Edward Britton is illuminating:
"It could be argued that in 1950 there was a very 
real need for the country to develop full-time 
advanced courses. It was before the Robbins 
development and the new universities of the 1960s.
It was before the polytechnic development. It was 
even before the development of the CATs.
Southampton, Hull, Exeter and Leicester had not yet 
become universities in their own right. It could be 
argued that the 1951 structure met an important need 
for the time and met it very successfully". (8 8)
Many of those Interviewed who have been active in
education and, especially, further education, over a
number of decades have emphasised that the perceived need
of the early 1950s was to raise the profile of further
education.
"Vfhy not give the universities incentives [to 
broaden their base] rather than build up PE?
Because you could move the colleges; you couldn't 
[move] the universities". (89)
The autonomy of the universities was a matter that the
government tackled obliquely in the next next decade with
its binary policy for higher education. (90). For the
early 1950s, however:
"... there was a positive, determined effort to 
introduce salaries which would attract into 
Technical Colleges the people who could cope with 
the new demand [from ex-servicemen who could qualify 
for grant-aided entry to degree courses], ie that
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the 1951 settlement was a positive and deliberate 
act o f policy". (91)
As exemplified at the end of this chapter, that presumed 
policy proved highly effective.
(lii) The 'Alexandrine' Framework for 16+ Provision
The October 1950 proposals for FE salary reform should,
perhaps be set within the larger context of Alexander's
view of the priorities for the education system as a
whole. He noted, and deplored that:
"For too long in this country we have accepted that 
an institution concerned with academic education 
necessarily ranks higher than an institution 
concerned with technical education". (92)
Alexander's way of achieving the right kind of status for
technical education was to ensure that teaching on higher
technical courses would be paid at university-equivalent
rates. In the late 1960s he described the way forward
for post—compulsory education salary structures:
"There would have to be sufficient grades to cover 
all needs, and no doubt different proportions of 
staff in particular establishments would need to be 
employed in different grades, but this is a 
necessary step if we are to achieve unity in higher 
education and if we are to avoid the concept of 
higher education being first grade and second 
grade". (93)
In that sense, the incentives of the 1951 Report were 
deliberate. The aim, and it was widely shared by those 
concerned with FE provision, was that of raising the FE 
profile and particularly that of higher technical 
studies.
The research through which Alexander gained his 
doctorate, (94) provided a scientific demonstration of
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the existence of a practical intelligence which was 
unrelated to verbal intelligence, the tool of the 
professionals!
"... we may make clear the relation of verbal 
ability to practical ability. They have 'g' "ie 
intelligence "in common. That is all". (95)
Alexander's statements over four decades confirm his
concern that the education system over-valued the verbal
intelligence and, by virtue of so doing, devalued the
technological: "... Children of this country have
suffered because of our acceptance of the idea that
Intelligence was a matter of words" (96) and "... Too
many children in the past have been sacrificed on the
altars of a purely academic teaching". (97)
At the end of the war, Alexander had extrapolated from a
relatively constant School Certificate pass rate of about
1 2*5% of the age cohort to argue that, in future, local
junior or young people's colleges could provide an
alternative route to university entrance to sixth forms.
"In 10 years, or it may be 20 years, ... transfer 
sixth form courses to these young people's colleges. 
... Are we not in danger of forming judgments 
because of our desire to protect the institution 
which is the grammar school rather than to form a 
judgment which solely has regard to the best 
interests of the pupils?". (98)
Alexander's war-time analysis of the needs of the 16-18
year olds provides an accurate summary of problems which
have continued through to the 1980s.
(iv) Implications of POP/COH
The Government Departments' over-riding concern for.
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first, the total cost of a salary settlement (99) and, 
second, for differentials, is well-attested through 
archive evidence and contemporary Burnham Negotiations. 
(100) The 1951 settlement demonstrated a choice in 
favour of a high differential for the highly-qualified as 
opposed to a FE modification to the then more egalitarian 
model of the Burnham (Main) Report for schoolteachers.
The 1951 PE Report certainly introduced the promotion 
differential for those teaching advanced-level work.
At the same time, it is possible that that same
differential acted as a necessary and sufficient spur to
the virtual explosion in post-war FE provision
"The number of full-time and sandwich course 
students has increased most rapidly from 9,660 in 
1954 to 54,500 in 1966. The numbers of full-time 
and sandwich course students taking non-advanced 
courses has also risen rapidly from 46,000 in 1954 
to 145,000 in 1966". (101)
Maclure's statistics demonstrate an expenditure increase 
of 2,200% [£6m in 1945-46 to £29m in 1955-56 and £142.5m 
in 1966-67] "FE's share of LEA current expenditure has 
risen from 4.3% in 1945-46 to 7% in 1955-56 and to 11.2% 
in 1966-67. (102)
The further education system certainly flourished under 
the Alexandrine aegis. As Tom Driver freely 
acknowledged:
"Alexander did more to get money for education than 
anyone else. He persuaded the Government to spend. 
AEG were unanimous about one thing and that was 
'more money for education'. In a time of percentage 
grants in a time of expansion, in terms of Burnham, 
Alexander went beyond the Authorities' brief". (103)
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Had the educational establishment accepted the 
Alexandrine framework for 16+ education provision, LEAs* 
difficulties in reconciling the underlying competition as 
between sixth forms, sixth form colleges and FE colleges 
would not have been on the agenda for the 1970s and 
1980s. However, institutions generate their own 
loyalties; once created, sixth forms prove curiously 
resistant to removal from their 'host', the secondary 
school. That said, the role of the Department of 
Education and Science in reinforcing the academic role of 
the sixth forms and sixth form colleges by very limited 
revisions to the Schools Regulations is an issue to be 
considered later.
The Alexandrine framework for 16+ provision may seem to 
sit somewhat oddly with the clearly hierarchical 
proposals of October 1950. However, Alexander's view 
that it was right to pay more for higher level work is 
entirely consistent with his belief that the English 
educational system over-valued the academic vie-&-vi8 the 
technological. Alexander believed that teaching on the 
higher level technological courses should be remunerated 
at the same - higher - level as were university courses 
because he believed that both were of equal worth. In 
his advocacy of technical education at a time when, for 
reasons explored in Chapter 10, the English culture was 
not yet sympathetic to the technological 'imperative', 
Alexander deserves much credit.
96
References to Part II
( 1) See Saran, R. (1985). The Politics Behind Burnham. 
Sheffield City Polytechnic Papers in Education 
Management No 45 for a full picture of 
schdolteachers' salary negotiations from 1945-85.
( 2) See, for example, Lodge & Blackstone (1982)
Educational Policy and Educational Inequity, Martin 
Robertson, Oxford and King (1976) School and 
College - Studies in Post-16 Education, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.
( 3) Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp81-7.
( 4) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, pp34-38
( 5) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, p59
( 6 ) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, p91.
( 7) Box 17, File No 48. Correspondence with LEAs, 
1944-47. Burnham Archives (since 1986, held Ijy 
Brotherton Library, Leeds University).
( 8 ) Ibid.
( 9) Box 18, File No 49. Correspondence with Ministry
January 1944-45, December Burnham Archives.
(10) Box 17, File No 48. 26 October 1944. Letters from 
Brockington to Sir Edward Le Breton, CCA member. 
Correspondence with LBAs 1944-47. Burnham Archives.
(11) Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp95-102 and Box 17, File 
No 48. Op Cit, Burnham Archives.
(12) 'Technical' was a Burnham term for 'FE' in the 1940s 
and 1950s.
(13) Box 19, File No 50. 26 February 1945 letters from 
Brockington to Miss Casswell, Headmistresses' 
Association. Correspondence with TP 1944-47. Burnham 
Archives.
(14) Box 19, File No 51. 10 November 1944 letter from 
Brockington to Renrick, AP Leader. Correspondence 
with Kenrick. Burnham Archives.
(15) The grading of [coal]mlne deputies' courses was a 
matter of long dispute between the teachers' and 
employers' representatives on the Grading of Courses 
Working Partyt the employers argued for senior 
schools equivalence on the grounds of the lack of 
academic qualifications required of a student; the 
teachers pressed - successfully - for a higher 
grading on the grounds that any student would have 
considerable experience and responsibility, and that 
the course content included aspects of management.
97
(16) File B7, Correspondence with Authorities' Panel, 
1950-51. AEC Archives, at BrotVierton Library, 
University of Leeds and in Burnhan Archives.
(17) Ibid File B7, para 4 of 120/10.50. London and Home 
Counties Regional Advisory Committee (RAC)
Statement.
(18) The concentration on the Authorities' Panel, rather 
than on the Teachers' Panel is explained in the 
discussion on the teachers' reactions to the 1951 
settlement in Chapter 6 .
(19) ATTI (1952). The Technical Journal, ppl46-7.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Submission of the FE Teachers' Panel to the Houghton 
Inquiry, extracts from pp3-5.
(22) 16 October 1950 letter from Jackson to Alexander. 
Correspondence with Authorities' Panel 1950-51. 
Burnham Archives.
(23) Despite a thorough search of Burnham and AEC 
archives, I could not find any reference to the 
proposed FE restructuring before Alderman Jackson's 
16 October 1950 letter. There were consultations 
with, and unsolicited comments (and criticisms) 
from, LEAs on major and minor changes in both 
Burnham Reports. The lack of any correspondence on 
the FE restructuring proposals suggests that no 
formal consultation had taken place. That said, 
there was a consensus amongst those I interviewed 
who were most active in the 1950s that those 
teaching on advanced courses should be paid more 
than those teaching on non-advanced courses.
(24) See (17) above.
(25) Correspondence with AP Hay 1950-January 1951.
Burnham Archives.
(26) See (25) above.
(27) Dr Alexander is credited with the proposal since, 
see (23) above, no evidence of a wider authorship is 
available.
(28) The Verbatim Record of 8 December 1950. Burnham 
Technical Negotiations, p46. Burnham Archives.
(29) Material and quotations not separately referenced in 
the account and analysis of the Burnham Committee 
meeting held on 3 November 1950 are taken from the 
Verbatim Minutes of the 22nd meeting of the Burnham 
(Technical) Committee of that date. Burnham 
Archives.
98
(30) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951. 
Burnham Archives.
(31) See (23) above.
(32) Verbatim Report of 23rd meeting of the Burnham 
(Technical) Committee held on 8 November 1950? 
p4. Burnham Archives.
(33) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951. 
Burnham Archives.
(34) Ibid.
(35) 1 January 1951. Correspondence with Authorities' 
Panel 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Correspondence with AP Hay 1950-January 1951. 
Burnham Archives.
(38) Ibid.
(39) The Verbatim Record of the 24th meeting of the 
Burnham (Technical) Committee held on 8 December 
1950. Burnham Technical Negotiations, p2. Burnham 
Archives.
(40) Minutes of 8 December 1950 meeting as in (39) 
above. Burnham Archives.
(41) Ibid, p8 .
(42) Ibid, p9.
(43) Ibid, pl3.
(44) The Verbatim Record of 25th meeting of Burnham 
(Technical) Committee held on 16 January 1951. 
Burnham Archives.
(45) The Verbatim Record of 26 meeting of Burnham 
(Technical) Committee held on 8 February 1951, p2. 
Burnham Archives.
(46) Alexander, Dr W P. The Burnham Report (1951) for 
Further Education. ~R commentary, councils ana 
Education Press Ltd, p8 .
(47) See Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp34-38.
(48) Box 24, File No 60 (listed as 61). Correspondence 
with LEAs, April 1947-31 December 1950 ana 
Correspondence with AP May 1950-Januarv 1951. 
Burnham Archives.
99
(49) 1 January 1951 letter from Alexander to Alderman 
Jackson. Correspondence with Authorities' Panel 
1950-51. Burnham Archives.
(50) eg lietters from Mason, Chief Education Officer, 
Nottinghamshire, Newbury [St Helens], Spink, 
CNorthumberland], Stone [Brighton]. File Bl34(a). 
AEC Archives.
(51) 29 January 1951 letter from Alexander to the 
Authorities' Panel. Correspondence with AP 
1950-51. Burnham Archives.
(52) Verbatim Record of 25th meeting of Burnham 
(Technical) Commiteee, p45. Burnham Archives.
(53) "... It was rather hard going, but we finally 
hammered out a memorandum which was circulated to 
the Panel on 28 November ... As neither Woodhead 
nor Gittins [the other members of the Sub-Committee] 
had been very wholehearted in their support...". 
Extract from Alexander's 1 January 1951 briefing 
note to Jackson. Correspondence with AP 1950-51. 
Burnham Archives.
(54) Wilson, Martin. (1984). Epoch in English Education - 
An Administrator's Challenge. Sheffield Papers in 
Education Management, No 3?, pp84-85.
(55) Ibid, p83.
(56) Ibid.
(57) TES. (1974). 1 March, pi.
(58) Correspondence with AP, 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
4 Hay 1950.
(59) Interview with Edward Britton, 3 April 1980.
(60) Interview with Tom Driver, 7 April 1980.
(61) Interview with Lord Alexander, 22 October 1984.
(62) Correspondence with AP 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
(63) Driver, T. ATTI, APTI, NSAE, NFTCA, Submission of 
the FE Teachers' Panel to the Houghton Inquiry. 
Victoria House Printing Co (TU).
(64) Interview with Tom Driver, 7 April 1980.
(65) Interview with Eric Robinson, 20 January 1981.
(6 6) Interview with David Triesman, 18 December 1984.
(67) Interview with Dr Seeley, 20 June 1984.
100
(6 8) See (64) above.
(69) Education. 21/28 December 1984, p523.
(70) By the Remuneration of Teachers’ Act the Government 
imposed its own representatives on the Authorities' 
Panel. The Concordat gave the Secretary of State 
the highest weighting within the Authorities' Panel.
(71) W G Stone to W P Alexander. File B150A in AEC 
Archives.
(72) Ibid.
(73) The 1951 Burnham (Further Education) Report. HMSO, 
Appendix K, para 2.
(74) See (65) above.
(75) 8 December 1944 letter to AP Secretary. Box 21.
File Mo 53. Correspondence with Members of the 
Technical Committee 1944-47. Burnham Archives.
(76) See (65) above.
(77) Letter to author from Professor Fowler, 21 February 
1983.
(78) Letter to author from F Janes, 3 September 1981.
(78) Education. 6 April 1984, p279.
(80) "Eccles pronounced the death of part-time degrees in
1956 and it was this that led the CATs to 
concentrate on full-time work". Derek Weitzel, 
Past-President and Negotiating Secretary of NATFHE, 
letter to author, 18 June 1985. Other interviewees 
made the same point - that while part-time degrees 
were acceptable if there were no other alternative 
provision, HMI and the Ministry of Education were 
perceived to believe that the preferred scenario was 
the three year FT (residential) Honours degree.
(81) Letter to author from Sir Edward Britton, 11 June 
1985.
(82) Report in Times Educational Supplement, 24 May 1985, 
p3.
(83) Reported in Education, 26 July 1985, p89-90.
(84) Reported in Education, 26 July 1985 p90.
(85) Interview with Lord Alexander, 22 October 1984.
(8 6) Times Educational Supplement, 11 April 1986, p4.
101
(87) Interview on 22 October 1984.
(8 8) Letter to author (see (81) above.
(89) Interview with P T Sloman, previously DBS 
representative on the Burnham Management Panel and 
later Education Officer, Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities, 15 May 1985.
(90) Elliott, D. (1985). "Higher Education: Towards a 
Trans-Binary Policy?" in Hughes et al Managing 
Education. Holt, Rinehart & Winston Ltd, p202.
(91) Interview with J Sturgess, Principal FE Officer, 
Hampshire, 26 August 1985.
(92) Sir Wm Alexander. Towards a Hew Education Act 
(1969). An Education Paperback, Council and 
Education Press Ltd, p44.
(93) Ibid, pp43-44.
(94) William Picken Alexander. (1934). Intelligence - 
Concrete and Abstract - A Study in Differential 
Traits J University of London, May 1934.
(95) Ibid, p273
(96) Dr W P Alexander. Educational Needs of Democracy 
1940, pl4.
(97) Ibid, p30.
(98) Dr W P Alexander. Some Problems Confronting 
Administrators Consequent upon the New Education 
Bill, (NUT Conference, Easter 1944), pl4.
(99) Frank Walton, Joint Secretary for Authorities' Panel 
in the 1970s, letter to author 17 August 1985 "... 
it would be a further illustration of the distortion 
of cost in which the Authorities' Panel's officers 
had to indulge in order to try to ensure that the 
DES representatives did not reject it as adding more 
to the pay bill than their ^litical masters were 
prepared to accept. That kind of manoeuvre was a 
constant feature of all Burnham proposals. It would 
be no exaggeration to say that, over issues like 
that, negotiations with the DES at officer-level 
were much more difficult than anything which took 
place in Burnham itself and nearly always focussed 
on cost to the total exclusion of practical 
conseguences. It is no wonder that the few changes 
which took place were fudged, with the emphasis on 
doing something, whatever it was, rather than 
continually saying 'No' to the Teachers' Panel 
simply because the DES thought it would cost more 
than could be accommodated as a marginal or 
insignificant addition to the pay bill".
102

PART III - 16-19 AHD THE MACPARLAHB HEVIBH
CHAPTER 7f 16-19 PROVISIOH - VALUES AHD IHCEHTIVES
Earlier chapters have described how the academically- 
skewing POP/COW weightings within the FE Report were 
achieved, and have commented on the incentive for each PE 
College to aspire to offer courses graded at a higher 
academic level. However, FE provision for students over 
post-compulsory school age co-exists with that offered 
for 16-19 year olds in schools and sixth form colleges, 
which operate under the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) 
Reports with its age-weighted provisions. Part III sets 
out some of the concerns raised by LEAs arising from 
their attempts to review 16-19 provision in institutions 
governed by the separate salary reports, and the response 
of the Macfarlane Review to those concerns.
This second major study of the thesis also describes, 
first, why the Macfarlane Report was chosen as the best 
source of data on the issues within the 16-19 arena, and 
draws on the published literature to illuminate the 
underlying values of policy-makers. The terms of 
reference of the Macfarlane Report are described.
The mixed, and adverse, reception of the Report is noted 
and, as part explanation, the reports of internal 
divisions within the Hacfarlane Group and the late 
revisions to the Report, are provided. Then, from an 
analysis of the Issues highlighted by the revisions, and 
a comparison between these and the Issues highlighted by
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the LEAs when consulted by the Macfarlane Group, it draws 
some conclusions about the values underlying the system.
The Nacfarlene Review
The review of educational opportunities for 16-19 year 
olds conducted under the chairmanship of the then 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department 
of Education and Science, Neil Macfarlane, in 1979-80 
provides excellent data for any consideration of the 
issues involved in 16-19 rationalisation. This chapter 
draws on that data, which is of particular significance 
for several reasons.
First the Review Group was composed exclusively of the
representatives of those who had the power to execute
policies. King, having noted the various interests among
the professional groups involved in post-16 educational
provision, stresses the important role of LEAs and DES.
"Interest groups differ in their power to Implement 
their ideas. [But] The power to decide the form of 
post-16 education rests at the level of the local 
education authorities and at the Department of 
Education and Science". (1)
The composition of the Review Group as exclusively
provider-driven and not including teachers, parents or
students, meant that what was achievable and what would
be acceptable would count as important criteria when
considering new policy initiatives. Further, the power
of the employee associations to Influence policy
according to sectional Interests was thereby reduced. At
the same time, and for the same reasons, the power of the
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Review Group to Implement its proposals was thereby 
enhanced.
The final significance of the composition of the Review 
Group was that the Government was fully part of the 
proceedings. It would be that much more difficult for 
the Government to ignore the Report's final 
recommendations. That fact may perhaps explain the 
hyperactivity in the closing months of the Review Group's 
activities.
Second, the Review Group invited all Chief Education 
Officers (CEOs) to specify the principal barriers to the 
rationalisation of 16-19 provision, and what the Group 
should do to minimise these difficulties: the responses 
of 92 of 104 LEAS were available for perusal and provide 
a unique 'snapshot' of the perceptions of relevant Chief 
Officers at a particular point in time. These are 
summarised below under the [1980] consultations in 
Chapter 9.
Third, the Macfarlane Group tapped the expertise and 
experience of a high proportion of LEA and DES staff who 
had been wrestling with the problems of 16-19 provision, 
and the Hlnisterial-steered group was composed of leading 
LEA elected members. For Government and local 
authorities the Review Group acquired a high profile and, 
overall, arrived at a consensus view on post-16 
provision. This threw into sharp relief the last minute
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political interventions which almost led to a set of 
conclusions which would have been very nearly opposite to 
those contained in the final version.
Finally, and of most significance for this author's 
study, the negotiations leading to the 1951 FE Salary 
Report and those within the Macfarlane Group have marked 
parallels! in both cases the penultimate stages nearly 
led to outcomes that would have had opposite results to 
those which actually occurred. The very late attempts to 
modify the outcomes of negotiations in both cases made 
explicit the values of negotiators: these values are 
usually merely implicit, but nevertheless mould the shape 
of decisions about educational provision.
Incentives for 16—19 Schools and Colleges
Before moving to the Macfarlane Report (2), however, it 
is necessary to describe briefly the salary Report 
governing salaries of all teachers employed in schools 
and sixth form colleges (3). The thesis originated with 
the wish to explore whether or not the provisions of the 
Burnham Reports did, as generally believed, distort 16-19 
provision. The structure of the FE Report has been 
described already. It is necessary now to summarise the 
Schools Report as it operated in the late 1970s.
The first post-war settlement included additional 
allowances for head teachers of £50 per annum for each
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group of 30 pupils over school leaving age. The
Secretary of the Authorities' Panel in 1945 defended this
age-weighted differential in the following terms«
"The advantages of the unit system [ie the 
age-weighted system] seem to me two-fold. It 
disarms criticism. It does differentiate (which the 
mere counting of heads does not) the grammar schools 
from the modern school by the character of the work 
which the former is doing at the upper end - except, 
of course, for those strange beings who hold that 
the head of a kindergarten should receive the same 
salary as a University Professor ....". (4)
That one differential has been modified through
successive Burnham negotiations.
In 1979, Dennison (5) summarised the schools' unit total
salary system in the following simple table
Bach Pupil Units
Under 14 counts 2
Between 14-15 counts 3
Between 15-16 counts 4
Between 16-17 counts 6
Over 17 counts 8
Dennison's article demonstrates how this weighting
discriminates against the Primary or Middle School with
400 pupils by comparison with the sixth form college with
the same number of pupils on roll. The latter has a
higher unit total and this enables it to offer promoted
posts at higher salaries to many more of its teaching
staff.
Tudor David, then Editor of Education, described the 
implications of the schools' age-weighted salary report 
for 16-19 reorganisations«
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"Where separate sixth forms or tertiary colleges 
have been established or are planned, it means 11-16 
schools. An NUT [Head] teacher of an 11-18 mixed 
comprehensive was fully aware of the implications!
•my defence of the sixth form will surely be 
influenced by my agonised experience of the Burnham 
Triennial Review of salary points [units]. Every 
sixth former adds eight points ... every 12 year old 
... two points. When all these are added together,
I then have some idea about how many above-Scale 1 
posts I can offer ... Crude, yes; non-educational - 
perhaps. However, until Burnham manages to reform 
its system ... it is unlikely that many heads or 
Governing Bodies of comprehensive schools will leap 
forward with alacrity when a break at 16 is 
proposed'". (6 )
The above quotation is unusual only in that its author 
was prepared to make available for publication the fact 
that head teachers of 11-18 schools are not disinterested 
parties when proposals for sixth form or tertiary 
colleges would mean that the secondary school would lose 
its sixth form.
Dennison's article reinforces the quoted views above:
"Take for example the education of 16/19 year olds 
... It is all very well discussing the relative 
merits of small and large sixth forms ... the 
leadership role of older pupils, or whether courses 
are better in sequence or in separate institutions, 
but it must be remembered these are essentially 
secondary factors. It is the unit score calculation 
and the effects it has on teaching career prospects 
which is of prime importance ...". (7)
Dennison concludes that the only reason for the
continuance of the age-weighting system in schools is
that both Teachers and Management Panels have a vested
interest in continuing to use it.
The response to Dennison of A G Gronow, then Under 
Secretary at the Local Authorities' Conditions of Service 
Advisory Board (LACSAB) which acted as Secretariat for
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the Management Panel, should be noted here:
"Finally, and perhaps in a spirit of mischief that 
could be criticised as unfair, I would put forward a 
question for Dr Dennison to consider. If he really 
believes that the Head Teacher of a 450-strong 
Middle School should be paid as much as the Head 
Teacher of a 450-strong sixth form college, and that 
equality of treatment should stretch within the 
service, does he equally concede that the rewards to 
a class teacher, be that person working with 
reception class infants or University under­
graduates, should be remunerated on an equal 
basis?". (8 )
The above provides a useful public statement of the 
values perceived to be acceptable that were operating in 
the late lD70s.
There is an interesting continuum in the values of the 
Secretaries of the 1945 (9) and 1979 Management Panels. 
Both used the assumed perceptions of a contrast between 
appropriate remunerations of University and 'rising 5s' 
teachers. They both defended, by choice of extreme 
examples, Burnham Reports that employ the same basis for 
differentials. The presumed judgment is that the actual 
sharp contrast between the remuneration of University 
Professors and Nursery Teachers justifies a much more 
obviously discriminatory remuneration for a much more 
obviously similar workload, that of the Head of a middle 
school and of a sixth form college. The rhetoric is 
legitimate, but it obscures the fact that the 
differential expresses a cultural assumption of the 
relative values of the contrasted teachers. A different 
culture could, equally validly, reverse the 
differentials.
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In the same year as the above exchange of views (1979) In 
the educational press. Sir William Pile, former Permanent 
Secretary at the Department of Education and Science, was 
describing non-advanced Further Education as one of the 
two sectors of the educational service - nursery 
education was the other — that had advanced least in the 
period of post-war expansion.
systematic nation-wide scheme of part-time 
attendance at Colleges for all those under 18 who 
are not in school is the only major objective of the 
19 4 4 Act that has proved unattainable ... The only 
judgment must be that the results remain 
unsatisfactory ... When 40% of boys and girls leave 
school with no qualifications and have no further 
contact with either education or training, it is 
clear that this is an area to which priority must be 
given ..." . (1 0 )
Sir William Pile's concern was widely shared.
In the same year and with the same concern, the
Government issued three separate consultative papers -
I6-I81 The Education and Training of 16-18 Year Olds,
Providing Educational Opportunities for 16-18 Year Olds
and Pi Better Start in Working Life. (11) The Council of
Local Education Authorities (CLEA)
"approached the Government with the suggestion that 
together they should form a joint group to consider 
the problems faced by local education authorities in 
providing for 16-19 years olds". (12)
Thus local and central government providers demonstrated,
and acted on, the same concerns as Sir William Pile's.
The joint group under Weil Macfarlane worked between
Autumn 1979 and December 1980 on the issue of educational
provision for 16-19 year olds.
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Additionally, the Central Policy Review Staff's 1980 
Report, Education. Training and Industrial Performance, 
Included recommendations on 16-19 education. Regarding 
policy towards the overlap between schools and FE 
Colleges for the 16-19 age group, the Report recommended 
that«
"attention be given to the scope for rationalisation 
of small sixth form courses, to the need to remove 
anomalies between teachers and FE Lecturers’ pay 
.... and [to] the advantages of a break between 
schools and sixth form colleges". (13)
On the last point the Report stated;
"Even where tertiary colleges combining FE Colleges 
and sixth form provision are impracticable, there is 
gain in setting up separate sixth form colleges.
This way the 11-16 school has no vested Interest in 
diverting children towards academic courses rather 
than vocational ones and the natural inertia which 
leads people to stay in the same institution would 
be broken". (14)
The 'vested interest' of the 11-18 school which the 
Central Policy Review Staff notes corresponds to 
Dennison's Inference that it is the existence of the 
11-18 school that impairs LEAs’ scope for rationalising 
16-19 provision.
It should be emphasised that the identification of 
undoubted vested interests does not mean that the 
proponents of 11-18 schools were merely protecting their 
own interests in resisting a 'break at 16'. Sixth form 
or tertiary college reorganisation will mean that heads 
of 11-18 schools will lose their sixth forms - the 'break 
at 16' - and thus the source of additional promoted posts 
for the school and salary for the head. It does, 
however, illustrate clearly that there is an Intrinsic
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association of self-interest with educational values for 
those schoolteacher associations that protest, on 
educational grounds, at 16-19 reorganisation proposals.
King provides a powerful description of the centrality of 
the concept of the 11-18 school as a community (15) to 
the Knglish educational tradition, and how its supporters 
denigrate the more limited cohesion of the Technical 
College
"Where they [the students] need only to attend 
lectures ... Education needs to concentrate 
principally on the problems of living together 
in a community as well as the liquidation of 
ignorance". (16)
However, his attempts to represent fairly the altruistic 
and disinterested motives of the proponents of the 
integrated sixth form within the 11-18 school precedes an 
analysis of precisely those same vested interests that 
nennison and the Central Policy Review Staff have also 
highlighted.
King noted, additionally, the need for a process to 
unmask "covert intentions". (17) Certainly the head 
teachers and staffs of 11-18 schools lose disproportion­
ately when the schools lose their sixth forms. Perhaps 
only interviews with that statistically-minute proportion 
of ex-11-18 head teachers who are now heads of 11-16 
schools might provide the mechanism to disentangle the 
disinterested principles from self-interest. However, 
the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) provided some 
useful data on this issue in its 1979 survey of 16-19
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provision: of 170 heads of 11-16 schools« the majority 
were satisfied that their schools had not suffered as a 
result of their lack of sixth forms. (18)
The Open University's The Politics of Educational 
Policy-Makinq has provided a useful discussion on the 
difficulties of distinguishing between the 'sectional' 
and 'promotional' interests of any pressure group which 
helps to illuminate the 'self-interest' from the 
altruistic or disinterested concerns. While "sectional 
groups aim to protect and advance the collective 
Interests of their members (a section of society), 
promotional groups ... advocate some more altruistic 
(promotional) cause". (19) The Unit notes that the 
Society of Teachers Opposed to Physical Punishment 
(STOPP) provides a relatively clear example of a 
'promotional' group: STOPP members would not benefit 
personally from achieving their aim of the Society. Even 
this example does not provide an absolute discriminator 
as between the concepts of sectional and promotional. 
STOPP members would benefit by not being required to 
perform disciplinary acts of which they did not approve. 
However, there is a clear difference between the two 
concepts in that they occupy the extreme ends of the 
spectrum of Interest and disinterest which includes them 
both.
The Unit summarises the inter-changes between the members 
of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee and
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representatives of the National Union of Teachers (NUT) 
and the National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of 
Women Teachers (NAS/UWT) on the issue of whether their 
organisations had ever found the functions of 
professional association and trade union in conflict.
NUT and NAS/UWT were clear that there was no issue: since 
they claim, properly, that they perform both functions, 
perhaps they could hardly have been expected to state 
publicly that those functions might ever be in conflict.
However, there is a real issue which those whose work 
involves the evaluation of the promotional cases of 
sectional pressure groups should always keep in mind.
The research concerns the perceptions of the LEAs and 
government, rather than the views of head teachers of 
11-18 schools, on the educational Issues of the 'break at 
16', and on tertiary provision, for the 1980s. It is 
essential to draw attention, at this early point in the 
exploration of values implicit in the Macfarlane Review, 
to the fact that some of those representatives of the 
LEAs and government may have interpreted the sectional 
stances of individual teachers and of teachers' 
professional organisations as promotional.
King's analysis of the 'school-as-community' and the 
'technical college-as-association', provides an 
explanation for Pile's concern - precisely why 
non-advanced Further Education has received such low 
priorityI
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"The Idea of educational organisations as 
communities Is very strong In England. For those 
who hold It, It Is thought to be natural and the 
best; the Technical College model receives less 
approbation - a second class model for a second 
class Institution ... Each form of post-16 
education has an associated Ideology which Is used 
to justify and to defend It. These Ideologies are 
held and propagated by Individuals and, more 
particularly, groups associated with different 
organisational forms". (2 0)
Whether or not each form of post-16 education has an
associated Ideology, It Is certainly true that the
proponents of the 11-18 school have pressed the concept
of the 'school-as-communlty' In their attempts to resist
any break at 16, and that technical colleges have prided
themselves upon providing the 'second chance’ route.
King's categorisation of the 'school-as-communlty' and
the technical college-as-assoclatlon Is given a
fascinating corroboration In the National Association of
Schoolmasters' Committee for Technical Education,
Educational Objectives In Further Education. The paper
»rgues that further education Institutions have four
Inherent disadvantages as far as providing a liberal
education for their students Is concerned:
"In the first place, the college community Is 
divided by conditions of attendance, only a minority 
attending full time ... This makes It difficult to 
acquire a sense of partnership In the college 
community, and without a feeling of 'belonging' a 
full liberal education cannot be enjoyed". (p4)
That judgment, from a teachers' Association not noted for
over-liberal views. Is categorical, and reflects the
assumptions of professional educators of the 1960s.
It took the crisis In youth unemployment of the late
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19708 and the examination of why the 16+ were not 
choosing to stay on for a full-time education, to start 
to shake the professional assumption that belonging to 
the full-time education community and a liberal education 
was necessarily appropriate for the whole age cohort.
Vihat is critical for the shape of 16-19 education 
provision is that the technical college form of post-16 
provision has suffered in public esteem merely by virtue 
of the existence of the sixth form. Quite simply, sixth 
forms in schools have had a higher cultural profile than 
have technical colleges.
■i/
In setting the Macfarlane Report in its historical 
context, it should be noted that Crowther's concern that 
in the late 1950s the sixth form acted as (merely) 
processor of
"an academic elite for higher education and 
high-status occupations ... through the intensive 
study of a few subjects. (2 1 )
was justified, too, for the late 1970s. The issue of the
differentiated provision of post-compulsory education as
between the professional and the academic, and the
vocational and the technical, had been on the agenda
since the 1940s.
The problem that Crowther faced in 1959 and Macfarlane 
wrestled with in 1979 and 1980 was, quite simply, a 
result of a 16-19 provision which included (at least) two 
distinct types of providing institutions, the sixth form
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on the one hand and the further education or technical 
college on the other. Further, by the tine of the 
Hacfarlane Review, there were added the sixth form 
college and the tertiary college.
Each of the two forms of provision, schools and sixth 
form colleges under Schools Regulations and technical and 
tertiary colleges under FE Regulations, were presumed to 
have a distinct ethos, and the ethos of the sixth 
form and the sixth form college was presumed to be that 
of the more academic. As with grammar, technical and 
secondary modern schools, most parents wanted their 
children to experience the ethos of the higher status 
establishment. In one sense at least, the Issue of the 
differentiated 16+ provision of the late 1970s mirrored 
the Issues of the selective secondary provision of the 
first post-war decades.
There Is a tendency for participants to regard whatever 
system they are operating In as Inevitable. However, It 
Is not self-evident that sixth forms and Technical 
Colleges should have co-exlsted as competing providers 
for 16 plus full-time education. Indeed, Alexander's 
1944 (22) and 1969 (23) proposals would have led to a 
universal system of 'junior' colleges that provided all 
post-16 general education and vocational provision.
Had Alexander's 1969 proposals been adopted, the 
Macfarlane Review Group would not have been struggling
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with the implicit competition between sixth forms, 
technical and tertiary colleges a decade later in its 
attempt to address the problems of the predicted 
demographic decline which would make many remaining sixth 
forms educationally-unviable, the comparatively low 
participation rate in post-compulsory education, and 
reduced public expenditure.
However, in 1980 there were still serious reservations 
about the passing of the sixth form from the English 
educational landscape. Disinterested assessors might 
have perceived some connection between the concerns of 
the Macfarlane Review Group and the activity of sectional 
Interest groups, eg the sixth form lobby. It is 
significant that the consensus of the Group became 
distorted, at a very late stage, by the pressure from the 
proponents of the 'integrated sixth form' le the 11-18 
school with sixth form.
The effectiveness of the 11-18 lobby suggests that 
something rather more than the power of vested interests 
and, rather, that a cultural priority was active.
Indeed, the issues that the Macfarlane Group considered, 
and the late 'putsch', provide some indication of why 
Alexander's proposed junior colleges had and have not 
been universally adopted.
At the end of this introduction, it is important to 
recognise that the Burnham Reports for School Teachers
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and FE Lecturers have differing bases which do not cohere
as far as 16-19 provision is concerned. John Bevan
expressed the difference succinctly:
"A strong contrast between schools' and PE's 16-19 
provision is that in the schools' sixth form the 
pupils doing 'A' levels, 'O' level repeats and 
CSE/CEE will all count the same towards a school's 
unit total, whereas in FE the three kinds of 
students have different values for the college's 
unit total: in schools it is age-weighting, 
regardless of academic level? in FE it is 
academic weighting, regardless of the age of the 
student". (24)
Both 11-18 schools and FE Colleges will have some 
incentive towards providing for 16-19 year olds. However, 
the 11-18 school has a much stronger incentive.
The existence of a sixth form is popularly regarded as a 
proxy for academic quality, but the sixth form also has 
practical benefits for the 11-18 school, or sixth form 
college. The school gains higher age-weighted points for 
its 16 plus students than for those of compulsory 
schooling age whatsoever courses are studied. At the 
same time, the incentives of the FE College are to 
increase its proportion of students on only the more 
academic courses such as 'A' level and university- 
equivalent courses.
Would schools have pressed for the Certificate of 
Extended Education (CEE), a version of the CSE for 16 
plus students, had the Burnham Report for schoolteachers 
not weighted aU, 16 plus students so - relatively - 
highly? (25) It is a nice conjecture. However, King's 
work and the analysis of material which follows on the
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Macfarlane deliberations would indicate that, 
notwithstanding salary incentives, the proponents of the 
'school-as-community' would have still attempted to press 
for a longer exposure to the presumed benefits of a 
liberal education in school for the 16 plus age group.
The 'sectional' interest of the 11-18 schools lobby has a 
nice symmetry with the 'promotional' case for pastoral 
care for the adolescent. The issue of the pastoral care 
of the adolescent will arise as an issue in the context 
of the Macfarlane Review.
Perhaps it is worth re-emphasising at this point that the 
incentives of the Burnham FE salary structure, and all 
other facets of the FE system, will encourage FE colleges 
to increase their degree and degree-equivalent work, at 
the expense of 16-19 provision if necessary.
121
CHAPTBR 8 t  THE HACFARIAHB REPORT
The terms of reference for the Macfarlane Group,
established in 1979 at the request of the local authority
Associations working jointly through the Council of Local
Education Authorities (CLEA), were«
"To review the educational provision made by LEAs 
for the 16-19 age group in England and Wales, with 
due regard to factors affecting the demand for this 
type of provision and to the impact of related types 
of provision; and to report to the Government and 
the LEA Associations. Within this general remit;
(a) to take account of the effect on the demand for 
various types of education of;
(i) the expectations of young people and their 
families;
(ii) the perceived requirements of employers 
and industrial training boards;
(iii) expected technological change and levels 
of economic activity;
(iv) co-existent training and apprenticeship 
provision;
(v) known demographic trends to the mid-1990s;
(vi) geographically and socially disparate
rates of participation in 16+ education;
(vii) the financial policies of central and 
local government;
(b) to consider, from the point of view of the 
providers of education, the relationship 
between education and training agencies;
(c) to examine the relationship between schools and 
further education, and in this connection;
(i) the compatibility of the legislative
framework associated with the sectoral 
divisions in education; school and college 
structures, articles of government;
(i i) manpower;
(iii) l e a s' allocation of resources to secondary 
and further education;
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(iv) provision of systenatlc vocational 
guidance, careers education and 
information;
(v) to survey work already done by LEAs and 
groups of LEAs In rationalising 16-19 
education and to assess the evidence of 
cost-effectiveness of existing 
provision". (26)
With that comprehensive brief, CLEA's 12 July 1979 
meeting agreed to the establishment of a DES/Welsh 
Office/LEA Group to review educational provision for 
16-19 year olds.
The Review was conducted at two levels. Ministerial and 
Officer. The Sixteen to Nineteen Education Officers' 
Group (SNE(O)) under Messrs Bird and Walker from the 
Department of Education and Science included 
representatives from four Counties, three Metropolitan 
Districts, one London Borough, ILEA and the Welsh Joint 
Education Committee (WJEC). The Officers' Group's 
Secretariat included the Under Secretaries (Education) 
from both local authority Associations and the 
Department. The Officers' Group included, additionally, 
representatives from other government departments, 
including the MSC.
The Officers' Group responded to requests for briefing 
and forwarded their reports to the political level of the 
Minister's Group which was chaired by Neil Macfarlane, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the DES. The 
Sixteen to Nineteen [Minister's] Group (SNE(M)) included 
leading elected members of the Association of
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County Councils (ACC), the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities (AHA) and the Welsh Joint Education Committee 
(WJEC), some CEO advisers to both Associations' Education 
Committees and senior staff from the DES and Welsh 
Office. Essentially, the Officers' Group acted as a 
source of technical expertise and advice to the 
Ministerial Group on the detail of 16-19 issues. A high 
proportion of the officers were also involved in Burnham 
negotiations.
At this point, it should be noted that the brief of the 
Macfarlane Group was not, in any respect, fulfilled on 
the second of the three areas for attention, viz "to 
consider, from the point of the providers of education, 
the relationships between education and training 
agencies". Notwithstanding the inclusion of Manjjower 
Services Commission staff within the Officers' Group, 
there appeared to be a deliberate avoidance of the 
contentious issue of MSC-funded activity, certainly by 
the MSC officers and, perhaps, by DES staff, within the 
local 16-19 provision. The pressure of Councillor 
Horton, AMA representative, to open that Pandora's box 
was frustrated by various technical devices. However, 
the Macfarlane Group's third brief - the relationships 
between schools and further education - provided 
sufficient tension in itself.
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The Report's Recoeaendatioas
The Macfarlane Report was published, a little later than 
had been intended (since it was officially dated '1980') 
on 26 January 1981. Briefly, it reviewed the problems of 
the 16-19 demographic decline - alxsut 30% on average, but 
up to 50% in some areas, from 1982 to 1994 - and of the 
low 'age participation rate'. Its clear message was 
that t
"There are indeed powerful arguments in favour of 
educating 16-19 in fairly large groups, and [we] are 
clear that a scatter of small sixth forms offering 
an inadeqate range of options at high cost must 
wherever possible be avoided. In some areas, sixth 
form or tertiary colleges may be the best solution 
r>oth educationally and financially". (27)
The Report ended with the unequivocal statement:
"We are convinced ... that 16-19 provision needs to 
be examined carefully, area by area, by individual 
authorities, in terms of the range and quality of 
opportunity offered to young people and the ways in 
which they are guided to the choices that will 
affect them for the rest of their lives". (28)
LEAS were thereby given a clear brief to review their
16-19 provision and some indication that government would
give sympathetic consideration to any reorganisation
proposals involving the removal of small sixth forms.
To achieve such simple conclusions, and explicit 
recommendations for LEA action, the Macfarlane Groups had 
considered a veritable encyclopaedia of all facets 
relevant to the provision of 16-19 education: the 
administrative and legal framework (statutory 
arrangements, local authority structures, charges in 
further education, central government funding (the block
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grant), examining and validating bodies, training 
agencies, articles of Government, part-time attendance in 
schools and sixth form colleges, capital expenditure and 
accommodation), the differences between schoolteachers 
and FE Lecturers pay and other conditions of service, and 
the issue of qualified teacher status for FE Lecturers.
The areas listed above are covered in paragraphs 52-79 of 
the Report, and are listed here to demonstrate that the 
approach of the Macfarlane Group was not simplistict 
there had been a consideration of, and report upon, the 
significant areas affecting LEAs' 16-19 provision.
Further, the Report provided a summary on the 
'effectiveness and costs' of the various forms of 16-19 
provision - the integrated sixth form (paras 84-6), 
co-operative arrangements as between contiguous sixth 
forms and/or FE Colleges (paras 87-8), co-existence of 
11-18 and 11 or 12 to 16 schools (para 89), the sixth 
form college (para 91-3), and the tertiary college (para 
94). There was also a section on Further Education 
Colleges (paras 95-6), which coexist with all forms of 
16-19 provision noted above, and a section on the effects 
of a break at 16 on 11 or 12 to 18 schools.
The above paragraphs would appear to describe a thorough 
review of both the contextual constraints upon 16-19 
provision and, additionally, the advantages and 
disadvantages of each form of that same provision. The
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Report also closed with clear advice to LEAs on action to 
be taken. In the light oi that clear execution of its 
brief, the antagonism of the reception afforded the 
Report was curious.
The Report's Reception
It should first be noted that the Report was eagerly 
awaited. A number of LEAs had suspended their own 16-19 
reviews so as to take account of the recommendations of 
the forthcoming Report. Further, the sectional interests 
of most of the professional teachers* associations were 
involved.
Less than a month after the press launching of the 
Report, the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) was 
reported as pressing for the Report's withdrawal: the 
Report was too much in favour of concentration, and had 
overlooked 'one of the most promising models for falling 
rolls - the community school, extending part-time and 
adult education and giving young people a view of 
life-long education before they left school'. SHA was 
concerned at the proposal that LEAs should tighten their 
control over the school curriculum. (29)
SHA did not make clear why those then choosing to 
leave school at the earliest age possible according to 
the law of the land should wish, under SHA's model, to 
return for part-time education: indeed the later 
discussion on part-time schooling for 16 plus suggests
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that an interest in retaining healthy enrolments ran 
counter to both the belief in the intrinsic value of a 
full-time 16-19 education, and to the distaste for the 
'marginal' educational experience of the part-time 
experience of further education.
That said, SHA was representative of a majority of 
secondary heads, one of the 'interested parties', and 
such a prompt request for the withdrawal of the Report 
from that professional Association would indicate that 
the apparently-mild proposals of the Report touched a raw 
nerve of that particular interest group.
The Report had recommended that the 1945 model articles
of government for schools might be revised to
"require Governing Bodies to exercise their 
powers within the framework of the policies 
adopted by an authority and subject to any 
directions it might give for their 
implementation". (30)
Vfhile there was no explicit reference to the curriculum 
in the above recommendation, the danger perceived by SHA 
was that of a challenge to the de facto autonomy of the 
school to offer whatsoever courses head teachers 
authorised. It is a nice irony of the 1980s that, under 
the 1987 Education 'Reform' Bill, the Secretary of State 
is now intending to take for himself those powers that 
SHA feared LEAs or governing bodies might exercise.
The statutory position for both schools and FE Colleges 
is that the individual institution determines its
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curriculum within the LEA's overall strategic plan for 
the locality. (31) Traditionally, LEAs have exercised a 
course approval system over PE college courses but not 
over those at school, the potential scope in the latter 
being more restricted. The issue of the autonomy of the 
school will be considered later.
SHA was alone in criticising the Macfarlane Report for 
potentially invading too far the then current 
distribution of powers over the school curriculum. Most 
reactions were strongly critical that the Macfarlane 
Report did not go far enough in that, and other, areas.
It has been compared adversely with the Crowther Report 
as t
"... an altogether meaner document ... Where the 
whole tone of the Crowther Report had been 
expansionist, Macfarlane's hey notes were 
rationalisation, resource-management and cost- 
effectiveness". (32)
Of particular interest are the comments of officers whose 
LEAS had been involved at the Officer-level deliberations 
of the Review Group. Barry Taylor, CEO of Somerset, 
wrote:
"In a County served by three tertiary colleges ... 
as well as other FE Colleges, a sixth form college 
and all-through schools, the Macfarlane Report makes 
strange reading. Not because tertiary colleges are 
condemned or denigrated at the expense of the 
alternative, but because the obstacles to their 
establishment envisaged by the presenters of the 
Report - or those standing behind them - are so 
patently at variance with our own experience". (33)
Cornish of Lancashire, another participating Authority,
reinforces the point:
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"Indeed, there are those who would have welcomed 
a stronger lead from Macfarlane [a point of 
particular interest in the consideration below of 
the later stages of SNE(M)'s activities] ... but 
the major disappointment ... is on the question of 
the institutional basis of 16-19 provision. The 
report is not merely inconclusive but somehow 
manages to be so splendidly even-handed that 16-19 
educators of all persuasions can find something to 
endorse their particular prejudices. Concentration 
of 16-19 students is applauded but small sixth 
forms are also given a pat on the back. Running 
a small sixth form puts undue pressure on the 
staffing of 11-18 schools; but, it is said, HMI 
have found staffing problems in the 11-16 
schools". (34)
These criticisms of the Macfarlane Report have special 
significance since both Taylor and Cornish had some 
first-hand comparative experience of the actual 
'effectiveness and costs' of the various forms of 16-19 
provision. Both Somerset and Lancashire were unusual in 
that they then contained some tertiary colleges, but also 
maintained sixth forms and sixth form colleges.
The 'effectiveness and costs' (paras 80-98) sections of 
the Macfarlane Report, which purported to describe the 
advantages and disadvantages of various forms of 16-f 
organisations, do not quote any evidence on effective­
ness and costs- apart from a passing reference to NFER's 
objective survey of 16 plus provision (35) - in spite of 
the fact that holders of that evidence were available as 
part of the technical support to the Ministerial Group; 
rather, the "splendidly even-handed" treatment of the 
variety of 16-19 providers reads as though the paragraphs 
were designed to be even-handed. The Macfarlane Report's 
lack of reference to even the little available evidence
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that existed on effectiveness and costs of the various 
types of 16+ providing institutions made the Report 
somewhat banal to those hoping for a lead from 
Government.
Six years later, the Report is still "utterly 
disappointing [in that] so many intelligent people spent 
so much time to achieve so little". (36) It is clear 
from the fact that the above criticisms contradicted each 
other that significantly differing hopes and expectations 
had been aroused by the Review.
Reports of Political Tensions
It is important to note here the political tensions which 
came to light during the last few months of 1980 before 
the Hacfarlane Report appeared.
The critics who considered the Report insufficiently
radical had been anticipating something more along the
lines of the Chairman's comments, reported in October,
three months before the Report was published:
"The end of the traditional sixth form is in 
sight ... The Macfarlane Report ... would mark 
the greatest shift in the education service since 
the war ..." . (37)
However, the following week the same journal. Education,
reported that Mrs Angela Rumbold, Chairman of CLEA and
member of SME(M), was pressing for the retention of that
same traditional sixth form:
"... I don’t think children have changed that much 
in recent years. They think they prefer a college 
of further education and giving up school uniform
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and ao on. But sonetiBiea t^ey make a mistake.
There are many children who need the security of a 
school sixth form to grow through those rather 
difficult years. Some children would like tertiary 
colleges, but not for all children, please". (38)
The more recent press report is interesting on three
counts. Most obviously it is noteworthy because Mrs
Rumbold had been a participant within the Ministerial
Group, yet chose a public platform to press a view that
was central to the Ministerial Group's agenda, only eight
weeks before the Report was due to be published. She was
also Chairman of the Education Committee of Kingston Upon
Thames, one of the very few LEAs still committed to
secondary selection.
Second, the issue she highlighted is that of the 
appropriate institution for 16-18 year olds and is not 
concerned with the contend of their educational 
experience.
Third, the use of the terms 'children' and 'security' 
suggests a hitherto unnoted facet in the 16-19 debate, an 
antithesis Isetween the 11-18 school and the PE or 
tertiary college of dependency on the one hand, and 
personal autonomy of the 16+ student on the other. The 
ethos of the former is one where the 16-19 year old is 
still dependent on the wisdom and care of the staff? the 
ethos of the latter pre-supposes student autonomy within 
a 16+ institution where the principal exercises less 
absolute autonomy than heads of sixth form colleges or 
11-18 schools conventionally enjoy. These two concepts
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of dependency and autonomy are compatible with, but not 
identical to. King's 'school-as-community' and 'FK 
College-aa-association' .
By November 1980 both Education and the Times Educational 
Supplement carried major stories on the Ministerial 
Group's activities. Education reported a Ministerial 
split between Lady Young, Minister of State, and Dr 
Rhodes Boyson on the one hand and the Secretary of State, 
Marh Carlisle and Neil Macfarlane on the other. The 
former Group
"object to the tertiary basis of the Report and 
want it further watered down - possibly even beyond 
the re-writing asked for at Monday's meeting; [the 
latter grouping] was said to believe that the report 
should be strengthened rather than weakened and the 
establishment of sixth form colleges as centres of 
excellence encouraged". (39)
The Times Educational Supplement devoted its Leader to
the reported disunity among Ministers:
"The Macfarlane report will not now appear until 
next year ... because of a rear-guard action by the 
defenders of the traditional sixth forms who felt 
that it was in danger of coming down too strongly 
on the side of the tertiary colleges and a break at 
the age of 16. It seems that Lady Young and Dr 
Rhodes Boyson have reinforced the traditionalists 
who reckon they can count on Mrs Thatcher's 
sympathy also - against the Further Education 
solution ... [by way of explanation of the latest 
turn of events] ... it is not possible to spend 
80 or 90 years making the academic sixth form the 
jewel in the crown of secondary education without 
creating a professional presumption that every 
secondary school should have one ... But potent as 
these academic instincts may be, there remain the 
uncomfortable statistics about the size of the sixth 
form collected by the DES for Mrs Williams when she 
looked into this in 1977 ... Everything points to 
the tertiary solution, making use of the flexibility 
of the Further Education system ...". (40)
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This was unambiguous and direct, as was the leader’s 
final sentencet
"It was always on the cards that a committee of 
insiders would be nobbled by those with a vested 
interest in the status quo. It is to be hoped 
that the report, when it appears, will prove the 
critics wrong, but the present omens do not look 
promising". (41)
A fortnight later. Education reported rifts between 
Councillors Merridale and Lawton of Hampshire and Kent 
respectively, the former favouring tertiary and sixth 
form colleges and the latter 'a die-hard defender' of 
school sixth forms. (42) Those reports of dissension 
appeared when the final draft of the report was to be 
considered in the following week.
The Official Record - Late Revisions
Press reports represented informed public conjecture.
The minutes of the Officers’ and Ministerial Groups 
confirmed the press reports. The Ministerial Group on 21 
October 1980 had welcomed the "thrust and style" of the 
draft of the final report, (43) and the final meeting had 
been booked for 17 November.
The minutes of the Officers’ Groups’ ninth meeting on 31 
October 1980 had described a general agreement on 
refinements of a 27 October 1980 redraft as reflecting 
the 21 October discussions. Whilst there was a record 
that, in the "effectiveness and costs" section, ’care 
should be taken to avoid appearing to be biased against 
the 11-18 school’ (44), that refinement represented but
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one of a number of apparently uncontentious modifications 
to be made following the Ministerial Group's 
discussions. Up to the end of October 1980, then, the 
minutes of both Officers' and Ministers' Groups indicated 
a smooth move to the planned (1980) publication date 
within a broadly-agreed consensus that had operated for 
over a year of very detailed deliberation.
There were fundamental shifts in position at the
Ministerial Group's meeting on 17 November 1980. The
'thrust and style' of the 27 October re-draft were no
longer welcome, and the Officers' Group were required to
redraft again according to a new principle!
"The impression should not be given, even 
accidentally, that except in special 
circumstances a break at 16 was preferred". (45)
The section on "effectiveness and costs" was, at that
stage, a discussion on the educational and economic
arguments favouring larger teaching group sizes than
could be were sustained in small sixth forms and,
therefore, broadly, favourable to a break at 16. That
whole section
"should be revised so as to reflect the 
advantages and disadvantages of each form of 
organisation".(46)
Thus, the 'splendidly even-handed' treatment of the 
institutional basis of 16-19 provision that Cornish had 
derided was deliberate, and the commentary of 21 November 
1980 Times Educational Supplement editorial entirely 
apposite.
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The Ministerial Group met again on 9 December 1980 to
consider a further (1 December) revision to the draft
report. Members' attention was drawn to significant
re-writing of the Foreword, the required revision to the
section on effectiveness and costs and the Conclusion. A
succinct summary of the differences between the 27
October and 1 December versions of the draft report was
provided. The minutes of the meeting record the views of
one participant who noted that, whilst feeling
"... that institutional options should be left more 
open [than in the 27 October version], the balance 
appeared to have tilted too far in the direction of 
the sixth form [in that of the 1 December]. The 
framework of the report had suffered in 
consequence". (47)
The Ministerial Group was clear that the report should
say something about the types of institutional provision,
and believed that the issues should not be presented as a
debate between the relative merits of the sixth form
versus a separate post-16 provisions
"A balanced appraisal was essential... Many 
authorities, however, were hoping for a lead, 
(author's emphasis) and some, especially in 
metropolitan districts, were looking for help in 
presenting locally the case for some form of 
institutional change". (47)
With these conflicting priorities, the Ministerial Group 
agreed to preface the 1 December version on the 
"effectiveness and costs" section with the opening 
paragraphs of the earlier, 27 October version, and to use 
the original conclusion.
Thus there was a late attempt to undermine the consensus 
that had operated within the Ministerial Group until the
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end of October 1980, but that attempt had been resisted. 
The final Report had retained the original conclusion - 
with its clarity - on both the need for LEAs to review, 
and keep under review, their 16-19 provision and the 
likely lack of educational or economic viability of 'a 
scatter of small sixth forms'. Tertiary or sixth form 
colleges were commended. The essential original messages 
of the Macfarlane Group had been retained. While the 
body of the Report retained the redrafted 1 December 1980 
casuistry of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages 
of the different modes of institutional provision (paras 
84-6 inclusive of the Macfarlane Report), the conclusion 
- a more significant position for any policy statement - 
had retained the original thrust that the Ministerial 
Group had welcomed in October 1980.
As further evidence of the survival of that October 1980 
message, the Department of Education and Science's press 
release issued on the day that the Report was published 
stated:
"The Group concludes that because of the variety 
of local conditions there can be no situation 
which would be everywhere appropriate, but 
consider that educational considerations point 
strongly though not without exception to the 
concentration of 16-19 year olds and students 
into larger groups ... * (author's emphasis) (49)
That was the message of the section of the 27 October
draft that had been replaced by the "effectiveness and
costs" paragraph of the 1 December version and final
report: the original Intentions had been honoured.
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laaues Highlighted by Reviaiona
A careful comparison of the versions of 27 October, 1 
December, and the final Report revealed only a limited 
number of modifications. These are noted as evidence of 
what the members of the Ministerial Group considered to 
be critical Issues and, where they differed from those 
arising from consultations with LEAs, described later, 
they deserve particular attention.
(i) Appropriate form of institution to meet 16+ needs
A "splendidly even-handed" effectiveness and coats 
section was substituted for the paragraphs that had 
provided cogent arguments for the conclusions, which (see 
above) were emphasised in both the published Report and 
in the Press Release. That choice of treatment of the 
information implied that the different types of 16+ 
institutions, each experiencing various problems and each 
providing some benefits, were equally suitable. However, 
by contrast with the descriptions of other post-16 
institutions, the brief paragraph on tertiary colleges - 
para 94 - which had been introduced with revision of the 
effectiveness and costs section designed so as *to 
reflect the advantages and disadvantages of each form of 
organisation' (50) - appears to treat the problems that 
sixth form colleges and FE colleges also experience as 
more significant for tertiary colleges.
(ii) Staylng-On or 'Age Participation* Rates
The explicit October statement that a break at 16 would
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have positive effects on staying-on rates was made more 
obliquely in para 95 of the December draft and appeared 
finally under a reference to the NPER research and HMI 
statistics under the sixth form college section in para 
92. It would, however, be fair to note that those 
references are not drawn to the attention of the reader 
of the Report. Given the priority the Report paid in its 
early sections (paras 5-48) to the need to raise the age 
participation rate, this is noteworthy.
(iil) Small sixth forms
It is important to recall that one of the reasons for the 
Hacfarlane Review was the concern that small sixth forms 
were neither educationally nor economically sound. The 
strong case against small sixth forms in para 93 of the 
October draft becomes the relatively milder message of 
para 86 of the final Report. An illustration of the 
modifications is provided in the Report where the 
statement:
"It seems to us that sixth forms will [author’s 
emphasis] still be needed in the future, 
particularly in sparsely populated areas where 
large concentrations are impracticable ...". (51)
The October draft had been less categorical by virtue of
a 'may' for 'will': the Report stated that sixth forms
would continue to play a part in 16+ provision; the
wording of the earlier draft had left the future of sixth
forms open. However, the conclusion of the published
Report did retain the original consensus against 'a
scatter of small sixth forms'. (52)
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(iv) sice of Teaching Groups
Para 96 of the original October draft had stated firmlyt
"A najor determinant of 16-19 teaching coats 
[author's emphasis] is teaching group size. Thus 
the educational case which we see for review of that 
aspect is reinforced by economic considerations. We 
believe that in general both kinds of consideration 
call for larger teaching group sizes in the future".
That message became the milder assertion of the published
paragraph 82:
"We conclude that educational considerations point 
strongly though not without exception towards the 
concentration of 16—19 pupils and students into 
large groups".
Thus the published version referred only to educational 
considerations. The economic considerations were removed 
from the public arena - and, presumably, from the 
attention of LEAs who were clearly exhorted to review 
their 16-19 provision on educational grounds alone.
The Arthur Young, McClelland, Moore & Company 
Consultancy, who had been commissioned to derive a 
methodology that LEAs could use in costing their 16-19 
provision, reported on the basis of discussions with 
seven LEAs with experience of various forms of 16+ 
organisations :
"None of the LEAs visited regarded cost as 
the most significant factor in determining the 
organisational structure for the education of 
16-19 year olds. In general, they maintained 
that decisions are made primarily on educational 
grounds, and that costs flow from these decisions. 
Provided the costs then calculated are acceptable 
to the local authority, they play little further 
part in decision-making". (53)
Perhaps, then, the fact that economic considerations were
dropped as a relevant factor for review of the size of
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teaching groups was an acknowledgenent of the reality of
operation within those LEAs who had already executed some
16-19 rationalisations. The consultants had reinforced
the political dimensions of the issue:
"... education is often a sensitive issue in local 
politics and talk of closing particular schools as a 
means of cost-cutting or saving tends to be 
unpopular". (54)
and, the consultants might have added, counter­
productive. A local community may be persuaded to accept 
changes on the grounds that the educational provision for 
their young would be improved by so doing. An argument 
based on cost-cutting is interpreted locally as the 
locality suffering for the potential good of another 
area; parents tend not to see such arguments in other 
than parochial terms.
These four areas - appropriate 16+ institutions, staying 
on rates, small sixth forms and the size of teaching 
groups - constitute the total of the significant 
differences as between the October draft and the final 
Report. Essentially, the differences are of tone rather 
than content. Vihilst the 1 December draft would have 
given a more muted message to LEAs, even that milder 
version did not radically amend the messages of the 
October draft. The press reports, however, had indicated 
quite fundamental differences between the members of the 
Ministerial Group. If indeed their differences were of a 
fundamental nature, the issues analysed above provide the 
best clues as to the content of those conflicts of 
judgement and priorities.
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The lack of reference to available experience within the 
Group and to published statistics and research have been 
noted above. The Group had access, additionally, to the 
responses to three different consultations, and the 
evidence of the concerns of - inter alia - LEAs will now 
be noted, with particular reference where possible to the 
four issues noted above.
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CHAPTER 9I OOHSOLTATIOUS AHD HACPARLAHB RESPONSES
There is a fascinating contrast between the issues 
highlighted by the Macfarlane revisions and those noted 
by the providers when responding to the formal 
consultations of 1978-1980. The 1979 consultations were 
open to any interested party« those of 1978 and 1980 were 
directed to LEAs. The dissonance was not between the 
responses from the various constituencies, but between 
the gist of all the responses on the one hand and the 
responses of the Macfarlane Report to the feedback on the 
other. Simply, the Macfarlane Report did not respond to 
the articulated concerns of the service.
LEAS had responded to three separate consultations on 
their experiences and/or views on 16-19 provision in as 
many years. The two local authority Associations whose 
members had educational responsibilities, the Association 
of County Councils (ACC) and the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities (AMA), had issued a joint 
consultation in 1978 stimulated by their membership of 
the Expenditure Steering Group (Education). ESG(E) was 
concerned about imminent falling rolls, and information 
public about sixth forms which were already vulnerable.
In 1979 the Government issued three separate consultative 
documents on areas central to 16—19 education and, 
finally, the Macfarlane Group authorised its own 
consultation in the light of the responses to the 1978 
and 1979 consultations.
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1978 Survey of LKAs
The 1978 survey invited LEAs to comment onj
participation rates in schools and PE and the 
composition (ie as between A level and the 'new 
sixth formers' including Certificate in 
Extended Education (CEE) candidates)? 
criteria of sixth form viability (ie minimum 
size of A level teaching groups in free- 
-standing sixth forms, minimum numbers of A 
levels to support a sixth form, minimum size of 
teaching groups in minority subjects, etc)? 
co-operation, rationalisation and 
reorganisation.
LEAS were invited to respond? there was no 
reguirement to do so • In that context, it is fair to 
assume that the fact that 24 (of a potential 104) LEAs 
responded meant that the 1978 survey provided a 
substantial sample of views of at least those LEAs who 
were already seized by the Issues.
The Ministerial Group received a report of the 1978 LAA
Survey, Progress Towards Rationalising 16-19 Provision in
October 1979. In the light of the Issues highlighted
above, certain paragraphs are reproduced.
"This reluctance of some member LEAs to answer very 
general questions provides an important insight into 
the difficulties faced by LEAs in any review of 
16-19 provision. In 1978, many authorities were in 
the process of implementing approved schemes of 
comprehensive reorganisation. Schools with sixth 
forms have considerable pride, and other reasons for 
vested interest, in that form of organisation.
There is covert, and sometimes overt, rivalry
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between school», and between schools and colleges.
In these circumstances, it can be a major effort for 
an authority to achieve even a modest recognition of 
the problem by those concerned". (55)
"... Some felt that [co-operation, rationalisation 
and reorganisation were] quite impossible given the 
strength of entrenched interests ... Most 
recognised the need to associate schools and FE in 
this process, but were inhibited by a combination of 
rules and regulations and the traditional jealousies 
between the sectors". (56)
"In 1978, consultation and co-operation were seen as 
necessary ends in themselves, but a few respondents 
reported that the decline in numbers will cause this 
to be a means to a more radical concentration of 16+ 
in tertiary, sixth form or PE colleges, or 
•mushroom' schools. Overall, however, there was 
little evidence that LEAs were planning major 
schemes of reorganisation however clearly they saw 
the bad effects of declining numbers on the
Points of note here are the references, in the first and 
second quoted paragraphs, to vested interest in, 
specifically, sixth forms? the awareness of the 
deleterious effects of rivalry between competing 16+ 
institutions and, of later significance for the author, 
the reference in the first quoted paragraph to the then 
current implementation of approved comprehensive 
reorganisations. The reported judgment was that schools 
which had recently experienced the changes and traumas of 
adjustment from selection to comprehensivisation should 
not be expected to experience too immediately a further 
reorganisation.
It is worth noting that the assumptions of the 
educational world when proposing schemes of secondary 
reorganisation, and the leisurely approach adopted by the 
Department to those proposals, could not take account of
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factors unique to the late 1970s - specifically, the 
unforeseen dramatic increase in the youth unemployment of 
the late 1970s, the Unified Vocational Preparation and 
Youth Opportunities Programme schemes, and the fact that 
an increasing proportion of 16+ would be encouraged to 
stay on at school for non-academic courses.
Crowther had warned of the changes needed to provide 
properly for the 'new sixth former', the non-academic 
young person choosing to stay at school after the age of 
compulsory attenance therej at the same time, the working 
assumption of those planning LEA provision in the early 
1970s did not normally include an awareness of the later 
orthodoxies that 16+ resources in schools would be spread 
over a smaller number of students with a wider ability 
range and who would, therefore, be taking a more 
differentiated curriculum.
The quoted passages also demonstrate the need, 
acknowledged at the 9 December 1980 meeting of the 
Ministerial Group, that LEAs' experiences and responses 
to the Survey necessitated a national leads the problems 
should not have had to be faced by LEAs standing alone.
1979 Consultations with All Interested Parties
In 1979, the educational world was consulted three times 
on areas concerning 16-19 provision - on Education and 
Training for 16-18 Year Olds (February 1979) (58); on
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Providing Educational Opportunitie« for 16-18 Year Olds 
(April 1979) (59); and on A Better Start in Working Life 
(April 1979) (60). The Ministerial Group received a 
report (61) on the responses to the three papers in May 
1980.
The responses to the second consultation are most
directly relevant to this study, and are dealt with in
more detail below. The first and the third consultations
concerned the needs of the 16-19 age group in the context
of increasing youth unemployment and the lack of an
enforced system of compulsory day release. Broadly, they
foreshadowed the introduction in the early 1980s of the
two-year Youth Training Scheme (YTS) as a universal
'traineeship' for all 16-18 year olds not receiving
full-time education. It is worthy of note that, in the
section devoted to the responses of major 'educational
bodies' to the first document, the summary reads:
"moves should be made towards the development 
of a universal scheme of education and training 
opportunities ... Greater co-ordination is 
needed between the education and training worlds 
and, within education, between schools and FE 
colleges". (62)
The Macfarlane Group Secretariat, as noted above, 
certainly appeared to have worked to ensure that the 
Group did not address the interface between separate 
education and training provisions.
On the same first consultation it was reported that
"The ACC asks whether a unified tertiary system 
for 16-18S would not be better than the present 
overlapping systems of schools and FE". (63)
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That response/ and the fact it was highlighted in the 
report to the Ministerial Group, is particularly 
interesting in the light of the political tensions of the 
later activities of the Macfarlane Group.
The ACC had considered its response formally through its 
Education Committee and was therefore reporting the 
consensus of the views of County Councils who provide for 
about two-thirds of the population of England and Wales. 
Philip Merridale, supporter of separate sixth form and 
tertiary colleges, was Vice-Chairman of the ACC Education 
Committee and Alistair Lawton, reported as supporting the 
[11-18 school] sixth form lobby pressure, was Chairman of 
that same Committeei both were, additionally. Chairmen of 
Education Committees of substantial Counties, Hampshire 
and Kent respectively. The reported ACC response to the 
1979 consultation demonstrates that the consensus within 
the Macfarlane Group towards rationalising small sixth 
forms in favour of sixth form or tertiary colleges had 
already been achieved within the representative body 
(ACC) of the majority providers of 16-19 education.
The agenda of Providing Educational Opportunities for 
16-18 Year Olds, the second of the 1979 Consultative 
Papers, was nearly identical to that of the Hacfarlane 
Group, and the summary of responses reported to the 
Macfarlane Group are therefore dealt with more fully (and 
the third is omitted as not pertinent to this study).
The summary of the responses noted reports on 66 from a
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potential 104 LEAa, and is therefore significantly more 
representative than the 1978 survey.
The summary Included sections on the effect of
examinations on young people and their families, 
perceived requirements of employers and Industrial 
Training Boards,
expected technological changes and levels of 
economic activity.
Views on the co-existence of training and apprenticeship
provision, on demographic trends to the mid-1990s, and on
geographically and socially disparate rates of
participation in post-compulsory education had been
invited. On the last issue, it was reported:
"The emphasis on academic subjects in schools (ACC) 
is seen as a deterrent. It is also thought that 
school structures may have an effect. A move away 
from sixth form colleges and into consortia or 
centres is advocated by NUT and NAHT, and ACFHE 
link the move from sixth forms to a trend towards a 
longer educational life. The FEU sees new curricula 
approaches as a means of selectively increasing 
participation from lower socio-economic groups".(64)
There were further sections on the comments made on the
financial policies of central and local government, the
relationship between education and training agencies and
the relationship between schools and FE.
The issue of the schools/FE relationship had generated 
the greatest volume of responses, and the summary below 
notes points which became particularly charged within the 
Macfarlane Group (author's emphasis throughout):
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"There is universal agreement on the need for action 
to change the present position but prescriptions 
vary with the viewpoints of the respondents. One 
thing is clean the issue of tertiary colleges is 
tiie central these Land not the issue of a breaK at 
m r  NATFHE anT'ACPHE are pro-tertiary for all 
(NATPHE moved from mild support in early 1979) APC 
and AVPC are also pro-tertiary (APC in favour of all 
post-16 education to be given to the PE Sub­
committees). ACC Education Committee favours a 
tertiary approach, but calls for DES research into 
the relative merits of tertiary systems, sixth form 
colleges and 11-18 schools.
"The Associations representing schools staff do not 
favour the tertiary system, and argue for 
collaboration between schools and PE colleges, and 
consortia of sixth forms as the best way to meet 
local needs and preserve availability of choice. 
However, both Surrey LEA and one Headteacher say 
that school autonomy has prevented or hindered 
attempts at collaboration. NAHT propose a universal 
application of consortia for 16-18s in both 
education and training institutions. yJT, NAS/UWT 
and SHA are in favour of schools providing part-time 
couraes of various sorta * for adults^ 16—19s in 
employment, vocational.
"There is widespread agreement on the need for 
changes in the legislative f r a m e w o r ^ The NUT,
SHA and HATFHE, each from their different 
viewpoints, call for common regulations for the 
two [schools and PE] sectors. (65)
Finally, it was reported that on the issues of staff
mobility between the two sectors, conditions of service
and 'qualified teacher (QT) status', SHA would accept PE
teachers who did not have that QT status to teach
vocational courses in schools, and favoured comparable
conditions of service as between schools and PE staff
involved in teaching 16-19. The Regional Advisory
Councils [consortia of LEAs established to co-ordinate
advanced PE on a regional basis] and LEAs also supported
comparable conditions of service for the two sectors.
NUT opposed the use of PE teachers without QT status on
schools' vocational courses. (66)
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The Ministerial Group were therefore informed that 
two-thirds of LEAs and the representative bodies for 
schools and PE teachers agreed on the need for action, 
specifically for changes to the legislative framework? 
that the issue of tertiary colleges as the appropriate 
16+ institution - and not the subordinate issue of a 
'break at 16' where 11-18 schools lost their sixth forms 
to either sixth form or tertiary college - was central to 
more respondents? and that a substantial body of school 
teachers' organisations favoured a change in the 
regulations to permit schools to provide part-time 
courses for those over 16. The issue of the autonomy of 
the educational institutions, specifically schools, as an 
inhibitor of 16-19 review had also been placed firmly on 
the agenda of the Macfarlane Group.
1980 Survey of LBAs
In the light of the limited response to the 1978 survey 
the Ministerial Group had authorised a new survey, which 
was dispatched on 20 March 1980 for a response by 21 
April 1980.
The survey made explicit that it was concerned with both
the local factors and the local perceptions of the
implications of those factors?
"One essential step in SNE(M)'s work is to survey 
the perceptions [author's emphasis] of LEAs about 
the form and scale of the problems they face in 
the 1980s, and to collect information on the 
progress being made in consideration of those 
problems". (67)
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Questions were posed concerning LEAs' plans for the 
decline in numbers of those over the statutory leaving 
age, the nature of local participation rates in 
post-compulsory education and details of co-operative 
arrangements (if any) with neighbouring LEAs. Most 
significantly for this author’s investigations, the 
fourth question ashed,
"What are the principal barriers to the rational­
isation of provision? What assistance might be 
given at national level and how do you feel the 
work of the Macfarlane Group could assist review 
of this important area?"
The responses of LEAs to this last question provide a 
unique source of data of the varying perceptions at a 
specific point in time on the then current problems of 
16-19 provision, and provides a checklist for judging the 
final Report of the Macfarlane Report.
Earlier paragraphs have reported the general perception 
that the Macfarlane Report did not propose sufficient 
changes or provide a sufficiently clear lead to enable 
LEAS to meet the problems of 16-19 provision in the 80s 
and 90s. However, that 'general perception* represents 
the views of an informed minority. Journalists rarely 
contact LEAs through structured samples: they, under­
standably, concentrate on those whose Chief Officers are 
involved in the various national and negotiating and 
consultative bodies. The results of the 1980 survey 
provide a fairer base on which to evaluate the final 
Report.
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The report of the 1980 survey to the Ministerial Group,
T.FAs ronsideration of Provision for 16-19 Year Olds - T h ^  
Report of a Survey by the Local Authority Associations, 
was based on 69 responses, h further 23 LEAs responded 
before the Report was finalised and these reinforced the 
messages already passed by those on whom the summary was 
based. The responses to the 1980 Survey have the 
additional virtue that respondents knew that their 
replies were to be considered within a major Review.
The 69 responses were analysed before the report to the 
Ministerial Group was referred to. Since the summary 
reported to the Group was found to provide a full and 
fair account of the responses to the survey, that summary 
is drawn upon fully.
The principal concerns of respondents were summarised as 
follows!
"Of the 69 respondent LEAs, and excluding those 
which already had a break at 16, only six expressed 
a determined view that they were not engaged (and 
some saw no reason ever to be so engaged) in 
considering some form of rationalisation".(para 4.6)
"From a number of written comments it was clear 
that some LEAs are trying co-operation between 
institutions [author's emphasisj as a tirst step 
and wit)iout'much more detailed investigation it is 
impossible to say what might be done if that does 
not succeed. Overall the response revealst 
widespread concern about how beat to meet the 
educational needs of the 16-19 year olds as numbers 
decline; considerable movement towards the least 
disruptive forms of rationalisation; very many 
working parties and, in some LEAs, the first steps 
in a massive programme of consultation". (68)
Thus the Macfarlane concerns were central to the majority
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of LEAS who, through working parties, were already 
involved in the normal preliminaries to the formulation 
of policy proposals for reorganisation strategies.
Principal Barriers to 16-19 review
The local authority Associations, the Secretariat to the 
1980 Survey, reported that the six principal barriers to 
the 16-19 rationalisation, as perceived by 69 Chief 
Education Officers, weret-
" (i) a commitment to the traditional roles of
schools and FE colleges;
(ii) the protection of Institutional autonomy and 
in particular the scope for governors to 
frustrate attempts by the LEA to secure 
rationalisation between a number of 
institutions;
(iii) rules, regulations, pay and other conditions 
of service;
(iv) the attitudes of teaching staff, chiefly 
stemming from (ii) and (lii) above, but 
described in strong if understandable terms 
by CEOs as 'blinkered' or 'self-interested'; 
such attitudes are, of course, exaggerated 
by the defensive posture of the principal 
unions;
(v) an unwillingness to disrupt schools and 
whole parts of LEAs recently reorganised 
along comprehensive lines; many responses 
express concerned understanding of the 
problems facing schools as sixth forms 
decline or even fail to materialise but 
there is an overwhelming desire for 
stability on the part of parents and hence 
of elected members;
(vi) the very strong and widely held criticism of 
what the official group has come to call the 
educational offering presently available to 
young people". (69)
Again, as with the 1978 survey, the Issues of 
institutional autonomy, and the Regulations and
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conditions of service come high on the list of problems 
that LEAs considered as principal inhibitors to 16-19 
review. The 'self-interested' or 'blinkered' attitudes 
of the interested parties ((iv) above) relates to those 
issues King noted. The 'unwillingness to disrupt schools 
... recently re-organised along conprehensives lines' was 
an unexpected reinforcement to the message of the 1978 
survey. The issue of particularity, ie the Implications 
of the specific moment for policy-making, will be 
considered in a later chapter.
The report of the 1980 survey noted LEA recommendations
for Ministerial Group action according to a 'hierarchy of
intervention' which, given the uniqueness of the survey,
is worth reproducing relatively fully.
"There are those who seek a basic restructuring of 
the system and believe that SWE(H) Lthe Ministerial 
GroupJ should point the way to a break in~ 
educational provision at the end of statutorv 
schooling; tnls view is represented by demands for a 
strong legislation-based initiative by central 
government. There ie a wider preference for some 
sort of firm lead towards rationalisation, as one 
CEO put it 'not only to conserve resources but to 
preserve and~possiblv enhance student opportunity'. 
In its less radical form such a lead would represent 
a requirement for LEAs to review 16-19 provision 
and, at the top of the centralist hierarchy, that 
development plans should be prepared and submitted 
to the Secretary of State. The submission of 
development plans is not a necessary consequence of 
the requirement to review and SNE(M) may wish to 
consider that suggestion at a later date". (70)
"Among the more detailed legislative changes sought 
are the matters of rules, regulations and conditions 
of service to which the official group has already 
given a great deal of time. CEOs suggest that an 
interesting, if obvious, recommendation by SNE(M) 
might be that the Burnham pupil-weighting should be 
cTianged so that pupils aged 11-16 were g^en greate'r 
value at the expense o i those over 16. There are 
loud and ¿reguent pleas for LEAs to have greater
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power to overrule governing bodi 
must be given at national level
'aone thought
"... Many LEAe want 'a clearer understanding of what 
should be available to 16+ students, so that local 
provision may be compared to it*. They seek a 
statement of aims, a curriculum which is available 
to all students regardless of their institutional 
bane and a nationally validated 16+ examination 
which in both credible with employers and useful to 
pupils. Here LEAe are highly critical of the 
sectoral boundaries between schools and FE and seek 
one examination which looks like CEE as described by 
Keohane, added to the PE-type examination described 
in the Mansell Report and which is available txjth in 
schools and FE colleges". (72)
"At the very leant LEAs want SHE(M) to change the 
climate of opinion towards 16-19 rationalisation. 
They believe that parents, teachers and the media 
need to understand 'the desirability indeed the 
inevitability of a flexible approach to 16+ 
organisation*, hence they believe that SNE(M) should 
be engaged in 'generally tilling the ground to 
encourage receptiveness to local initiatives'.
There is among many CEOs a clear belief that SNE(M) 
could greatly assist a campaign for the hearts and 
minds of the consumer of the education service, at 
the lowest level in order better to inform any 
over—passionate defence of institutional autonomy 
when course sharing is proposed". (73) [author's 
emphasis throughout]
Thus there was a clear message that LEAs were seriously 
considering 'breaks at 16' and wished for some firm 
national lead regarding the need to rationalise 16-19 
provision: such a lead would be a valuable tool to 
reinforce LEAs already engaged in the preliminary - and, 
inevitably, disruptive - work on 16-19 review. Certain 
LEAs had recommended that the Burnham age weighting for 
schools should be revised to reduce the incentive for 
schools to increase their 16+ numbers.
Further, the powers of governing bodies, which acted to
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reinforce Institutional autonomy, were perceived as 
inhibitors of 16-19 reviews. Finally, LEAs pressed 
SNE(M) to change the climate of opinion towards 16-19 
rationalisation.
Macfarlane Response to Issues Raised in Consultations
The responses to the various consultations had pointed to 
the need for action on the following 16-19 issues: 
changes in the statutory framework - ie amending the 
Schools Regulations, specifically to permit part-time 
schooling (ie part-time attendance of 16-f students); and 
a modification of the Burnham (Primary & Secondary)
Report to reduce the age-weighting differential and, 
thereby, the incentive for schools to attempt to retain 
16-f pupils when the pupils' Interests might not be best 
served by so doing. From the LEAs there was clear 
pressure to reduce the de facto autonomy of the school 
over its curriculum.
Requests for non-statutory action included, first, the 
need to pass from the centre the message to all LEAs that 
16-f review was desirable and, second, the need for 
central and local government to recognise that areas 
which had recently experienced re-organisation of their 
secondary schools needed further time before they should 
be submitted to 16-f re-organisation.
How did the Hacfarlane Report respond to the requests for 
action? The issues will be taken in turn.
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On the 'non-statutory’ areas of concern, the Macfarlane 
Report was exemplary in its response to its 
constituents. The Report, taken as a whole, emphasised 
the need for all parts of the English and Welsh 16+ 
provision to be reviewed. At the same time, it 
acknowledged that there was no one perfect solution for 
the country as a whole, and that areas would differ as to 
their ability to move to an ideal solution.
On the response to the requests for statutory reform, 
however, the Macfarlane Report was less than helpful. 
Indeed, since the 'statutory framework' lies entirely 
within the remit of the providers - principally, the 
government consulting or responding to its employer 
partners within the LEAs - this area of (lack of) action 
may explain the general disenchantment with the Report.
At this point, it should be noted that the paragraphs of 
the Report dealing with Articles of Government 
recommended review»
"Local education authorities must be able to 
secure compliance with policies designed to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of courses and teaching 
groups that are unduly small. We, therefore, 
consider that the 1945 model articles should be 
reviewed and that authorities may meanwhile wish to 
propose amendments to the articles of county 
secondary schools. Such amendments might require 
governing bodies to exercise their powers within the 
framework of policies adopted by an authority and 
subject to any directions it may give for their 
implementation ...". (74) [author^s emphasisj
A nod is as good as a wink and, as noted above, SHA was
early in condemning this proposed change in schools' de
facto autonomy. Thus far, at least, the Macfarlane
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message was unambiguous, and represented a clear response 
to the repotted concerns of LEAs.
On the other proposals to amend the statutory framework, 
however, the Macfarlane Report achieved nothing. There 
were two facets - first, the review of Schools 
Regulations for pupils over the age of compulsory school 
attendance to permit part-time schooling and, second, the 
proposals to modify the Burnham (Primary & Secondary) 
Reports age-weightings.
The Macfarlane Report's recommendations on the
age-weightings of the Burnham (Primary & Secondary)
Report were unambiguous.
"We believe that the calculations which are 
involved need to be examined carefully with a view 
to avoiding the incentive in schools to increase the 
number of older pupils and, in further education, to 
give priority to post-'A' level courses. The aim 
should be to make the calculations neutral between 
sectors as regards the standing of similar courses 
... Having reviewed this range of Issues 
concerning pay and other conditions of service, we 
strongly recommend that negotiators in Burnham and 
other joint fora should seek to minimise the 
differences [as between schools and FE] within 
their field which exist at present and which can 
cause problems for authorities seeking to achieve 
closer inter-sectoral collaboration". (75)
Since the Ministerial Group included members of the
Burnham Committees for Schoolteachers and FE salary
negotiations, it is somewhat surprising that they
appeared not to heed their own advice.
The later 1980s' review of the structure of 
schoolteachers' salaries did not include the full
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adjustments which were initially proposed for a revision 
of the age-weightings and the Secretary of State imposed 
a salary settlement. Apparently early proposals to 
minimise the differentials were overtaken by issues of a 
higher political profile - a collegiate versus hier­
archical kind of salary scale. At a late date, 
apparently, NAHT and SHA were invited to jointly produce 
recommendations on age-weighting whose financial 
implications would lie within the 'pay envelope* that 
were already included within the ACAS/Coventry 
proposals. In the event, these two head teacher 
associations could not agree. This, since they were 
representing members with signficantly different 
interests over the age-weighting issue, is hardly 
surprising. The Macfarlane recommendations for 
structural reform of teachers' salaries were, therefore, 
ineffectual.
The Macfarlane Report did recommend a revision of Schools 
Regulations!
"... It would therefore not seem helpful to create 
separate regulations for 16-19 education, at least 
at this stage. Nevertheless, we believe that, when 
under the Education Act 1980 the existing Schools 
Regulations and Further Education Regulations are 
superseded by new regulations, it would be useful 
for them to bring together the features that are 
common to both sectors ". (76)
That recommendation was clear.
The 1981 Statutory Instruments were marked by a lack of 
any changes that would implement any of the Hacfarlane
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Report’s recommendations. The Education (Schools and 
Further Education) Regulations 1981 deal with, for 
schools, substances and apparatus involving health 
hazard, inspection of hostels, transitional exemption 
orders under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, duration of 
school year and day, and leave of [pupil] absence for 
employment; and for FE, approval and discontinuance of 
advanced FE courses, restrictions on teacher-training 
courses; and co-ordination between LEAs. (77)
It is not clear what pressing needs of the education 
service were answered by the above changes to the 
Regulations. What is absolutely clear is that they did 
not deal, in any respect, with the service’s perceived 
needs as articulated to the Macfarlane Group and, later, 
by that same Group in its Report.
Why had the 1981 Schools Regulations not included any 
modification of the prohibition on part-time schooling 
for 16+ students? The Macfarlane Report’s clear 
recommendation was that, notwithstanding some contrary 
arguments:
"... the possible effects on the character of 
the school, perhaps affecting especially the 
position of younger pupils, and there is a risk 
that pupils might undertake courses which might 
t>e less useful to them than those which can only 
be provided effectively in colleges of further 
education ... Nevertheless, we think that there 
is a case for enabling authorities to provide 
part-time education in schools if they judge it 
appropriate in the light of their local 
circumstances". (78)
So, on balance, and in spite of some dangers, the Group
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had concluded in favour of the possibility of part-time 
schooling for the 16+. This, indeed, had been the 
position of the two largest school teacher associations, 
NUT and NAS/UWT, and of the Secondary Heads Association 
(SHA). Why then had the Report’s recommendation on this 
apparently uncontentious proposal not been executed 
through the 1981 revision of the Schools Regulations?
There are two different explanations, each with its own 
validity and neither mutually exclusive. The first is 
that the revision of the Schools and FE Regulations 
coincided with a time of undue legislative activity on 
the part of Departmental staff - the 1981 Education Act 
governing special education provision was a matter of 
contemporaneous activity with a very 'high profile' - and 
the reported divisions between Ministers as to the 
overall thrust of the Macfarlane Report could have led 
civil servants to give low priority to the execution of 
the one of its few firm recommendations that lay within 
central government's power to execute. According to this 
argument, the recommendation had dropped too low in the 
hierarchy of Ministerial interests and, therefore, in 
the administrative priorities of DES staff.
A second, alternative, explanation would complement the 
first. It is possible that the recommendation was not 
enacted at an unusually convenient time [ie when the 
Regulations were already under review as a result of the 
Education Act (1980)] because the recommendations
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conflicted with a Departnental view - within the senior 
civil service or between Ministers, or both - and thus 
the lack of action was deliberate.
There is some evidence for the second explanation within 
the Macfarlane papers. The 30 January 1980 'Status 
Report', drafted by the Officer Group as a summary of 
progress on relevant issues for the Ministerial Group 
statedi
"It is already clear that the Official Group 
will recommend that the statutory bar on 
part-time tuition in schools be removed for 
pupils over the statutory age [of compulsory 
attendance at school]". (79)
but
"... while disposed to favour the relaxation of 
existing school attendance regulations to bring 
the school sector in line with existing FE regime, 
the Group wishes to identify clearly the legal 
impediments, how they might be overcome and the 
implications of so doing". (80)
The desired Identification of the relevant legal issues
was provided in a detailed paper, 'Legislative
Provisions, Teachers' Pay and Other Conditions of
Service'. The paper dealt first with the advantages of
fully utilising [spare] space and teachers, and with the
fact that several major teachers' associations supported
a change. Then:
"Furthermore, by acting as a catalyst for other 
changes, part-time schooling could help to mahe the 
regime in schools less restrictive for [presumably, 
full-time] 16-19 year olds. On the other hand, the 
loss of communities of full-time participants might 
be regretted, [author's em^^asis] and some students 
persuaded to undertake courses which might be less 
useful to them than those available in FE". (81)
The second reservation is understandable within the
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widespread belief that the age-weighting provisions of 
the school teachers' salary report might be actively 
distorting student choice.
The first reservation, "the loss of communities of 
full-time participants", is more significant. It draws 
attention to the Importance of 'school-as-community' 
composed of full-time scholars and its effect on the 
ethos of the school sixth form and sixth form college.
It gives context to the concern about the potentially- 
adverse effect on the 'character of the school' (82) of 
part-time students who would have allegiances and 
loyalties outside the sixth form boundaries and beyond 
the authority of the head or principal.
King's critique of the schools sector as resisting 
potential threats to the 'closed system' of the school 
community is particularly apposite here, as is the Report 
of the Working Group of the Association of Principals of 
Sixth Form Colleges (APVIC) which appeared to regard the 
more multi-faceted loyalty of the FE student body and, in 
particular, that of its part-time students as inhibiting 
'a corporate community ethos like that of a secondary 
school or sixth form college'. (83) It is worth noting 
the APVIC's Working Party appears to have worked solely 
on the basis of the advice of MATFHE's Handbook to (FE) 
College Management, and one would have been surprised if 
the Working Party would have given such similar credence 
to a Handbook for school management published by the
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National Union of Teachers, had such a document existed.
It is nevertheless interesting that a Working Group of 
sixth form college principals, established as a result of 
the Macfarlane activity to explore the implications for 
sixth form colleges of tertiary re-organisation, should 
be reinforcing King's 1976 perception of 'school-as- 
community’ and 'PE college-as-association'. However 
accurate APVIC's perceptions were for the 1980s, the fact 
that the 1981 revision of the schools Regulations did not 
follow the Macfarlane recommendations on part-time 
schooling meant that the dichotomy of role was thereby 
reinforced.
There is a nice irony in that the perceived dichotomy was 
clearly potent in reducing the possibility of 
modification of the Regulations to permit part-time 
schooling. Those who considered the dichotomy to be 
valid had sufficiently influenced those on the Macfarlane 
Group to stop that Group doing precisely what SHA, NUT 
and NAS/UWT had wished them to do.
The Ministerial Group's May 1980 paper, 'Legislative 
Provisions ...' had noted that schools were legally 
inhibited by Pupils' Registration Regulations 1956 and 
Schools' Regulations 1959 regarding registration, maximum 
dally instruction and leave of absence and while the 
current Regulations permitted a limited attendance of 
part-time students
165
"... the legal validity of these devices [ie young 
unenployed attending school on a part-time basis and 
other part-time attenders] is not beyond dispute 
[author's emphasis] ... . Primary legislation
would be needed to put LEAs' capacity beyond doubt 
and would be essential if it were expected to become 
wide-spread”. (84)
It is interesting that the Hacfarlane Report becomes very 
categorical on a matter viewed rather more open to the 
Group itself:
“Such [ie part-time schooling] provision is 
outside the scope [author's emphasis] of the 
Education Act 1%44 and would run counter to 
currrent regulations (85)
The motive of those who became so categorical could have
been that of attempting to minimise the incentive of
schools to divert their school leavers from more
appropriate FE college course. The issue is, however,
interesting since it demonstrates the potency of the
normative over the factual.
The 'Legislative Provisions ...' paper dealt with a 
related issue, 'transfer to tertiary colleges below 16', 
that was not included in the published Report with all 
its caveats. The issue was simply that a 15 year old in 
advance of his peers could transfer to a sixth form 
college, which operates under schools regulations, while 
only in very exceptional circumstances would that 15 year 
old be permitted to transfer to the FE or tertiary 
college, both under FE regulations. Since tertiary 
colleges were intended to provide sixth form education 
for their areas, the spread of tertiary colleges was 
acting to highlight the logical nonsenses of this legal
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discrimination as between sixth form college and tertiary 
college.
The 'Legislative Provisions paper outlined the
implications of potential change - the first sections 
argued essentially on the 'first breach in the dyke' 
principle that it might be difficult to contain early 
transfers to 15 year olds once a precedent had been set. 
The implication is that such a containment would be 
either difficult or undesirable or both. The paper 
described obstacles to changes within the law - first, 
that there would be a resistance to a lowering of the 
school leaving age
"which had been raised in the conviction that 
whatever their academic standing, young people 
would benefit from school up to the age set by law? 
[second] school teachers' associations would see it 
as exacerbating for schools the problems of falling 
rolls (though a negotiating link might be possible 
with the permitting of part-time education in 
schools for the over 16s); [and, third,] PE colleges 
and associations of FE teachers might be unwilling 
to accept students subject to compulsory attendance 
requ i rement s". (86)
None of the arguments have much force.
The raising of the school leaving age had been determined
at a time when a relatively lower proportion of full-time
16-19 year olds were attending FE colleges and, since
then, the concept of a choice between schools and FE
institutions had been pressed;
"On the other hand, some authorities were of the 
opinion that 'any thorough-going division of 
functions ... between sixth forms and FE would 
eliminate the element of choice [author's 
emphasis] for pupils as to the setting in which
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they prefer to pursue post-sixteen studies ...
This element of choice is seen by many as being in 
itself desirable". (87)
The rise in the perceived importance of choice has
coincided with the threat to the sixth forms presented by
falling rolls. For example, the Education Committee of
Surrey County Council amended a comprehensive set of
principles to govern its 16-19 provision. They inserted
the phrase "maintaining some variety of establishments
within each locality where this is possible and
desirable" [to precede the officers' draft of
"in areas where more than one establishment 
may offer education for 16-19 year olds, ensuring 
that a clear relationship exists between such 
establishments, with defined responsibilities 
for course provision". (88)
How far the issue of choice of institution at 16+
provides an example of a covert agenda, or whether the
issue merely illustrates the tension between sectional
and promotional interests, will be considered later.
To return to the Officers' Group's advice on transfer 
before 16, the schoolteachers' associations would 
certainly have seen such change as multiplying their 
■falling rolls' problems; however, whether the providers, 
the LEAS and government, should have been inhibited by 
such an argument is an open question.
The section of the 'Legislative Provisions ...' paper 
concludes with a recommendation that, if the Ministerial 
Group wished to pursue the issue of transfer to tertiary 
college for the under 16s, HM Inspectorate advice on the 
educational implications should be invited.
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"In considering a possible change in the law, the 
Official Group would regard the ability of LEAs to 
plan the overall provision for their areas as of 
critical importance in view of the implications of 
changes listed in the paragraphs above". (89)
This was a curious avoidance from an increasingly
important issuet the Department of Education and Science
was, at that time, strongly resistant to proposals from
those few LEAs who wished to revise their schemes of
further education. The effect of the advice of the
Official Group was to sink the issue of early transfer to
tertiary or PE colleges below the Macfarlane agenda.
It was probably practical considerations that explain the 
lack of further consideration, or inclusion in the final 
Report, of this issue. No particular interest group was 
pressing for the resolution of the problem of early 
transfer to tertiary or FE colleges, while the 
Ministerial Group's agenda was already full with a large 
number of other issues which one interest group or 
another, or the providing LEAs, believed should be 
settled through the Macfarlane Review.
In summary, therefore, of the response of the Macfarlane 
Report to the issues articulated by LEAs and teachers' 
associations to the 16-19 consultations, it would be fair 
to say that the Report was over-cautious. The LEAs in 
particular had positively invited a relaxation of the 
legislative framework and more explicit support for 16-19 
reorganisation. While the Report did press LEAs to 
review their 16-19 provision, it did not tackle firmly
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enough those legislative inhibitors to review, and the 
Governnent singularly failed to act on the Macfarlane 
recommendations when the opportunity to revise the 
Schools Regulations was easily available. The problems 
remain. (90)
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CHAPTER lOi BVALDATIOH OP THE MACFARLAHE THEMES
The final section of this analysis of the 1980-81 review 
of 16-19 education provision seeks to highlight the 
educational values implicit in the processes of the 
Macfarlane Review and, then, to use the wider historical 
context of the post-war years to draw some conclusions 
regarding the values that have contributed to the scale 
and form of post-16 education and training provision.
The previous chapter has summarised how the Macfarlane 
Report responded to the issues articulated in the 1978, 
1979 and 1980 consultations, and has noted the effect of 
some of the Macfarlane recommendations. Chapter 8 
considered which issues the Ministerial Group considered 
of such importance as to warrant the substantive 
re-drafting at a very late stage in the Group's 
programmed activities — the appropriate institution for 
the education of 16-19 year olds; whether or not an 
institutional break at 16 threatened the validity of the 
education of the full-time academic 16 year old; and the 
educational and economic viability of small sixth forms.
Of these 'late redraft-worthy' issues, the second and 
third are subordinate to the first; they are concerned 
with issues that arise if and only if there had been a 
prior tendency to favour 11—18 schools with sixth forms. 
However, as was reported to the Ministerial Group, the 
(1979) consultation had highlighted the fact that the 
critical issue to the LEAs was that of provision via
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tertiary colleges, as opposed to sixth form colleges or 
11-18 schools with sixth forms (91)t the LEAs had moved 
on from the position that the Ministerial Group perceived 
to be still the concern of the system.
It is clear that the Macfarlane Group was less than 
energised by the available evidence from published 
research, or the experience of LEA officers within the 
Officers' Group, or by the results of several 
consultations. Rather, the perceptions of the 
Ministerial Group were affected, late in the Review 
process, by a normative evaluation of the critical 
Importance of sixth forms for schools to the academic and 
social validity of 16-19 education.
There is a nice parallel between the pro-sixth form 
advocacy of Spooner and Sutton, the first published soon 
after the Macfarlane Report was finally released, and the 
second five years later. In 1981, Bob Spooner 
explained the motivations of the early advocates of 
comprehensive schools. The priority, as he saw it, was 
for education
"... to be less socially-divisive ... We 
planned for large 12 form entry schools because 
we foresaw that a large base would be necessary 
for the development of varied sixth-form courses 
designed to suit diverse abilities ... We knew, 
even then, that the choice of institution mattered 
more than choice of subject, and that for many 16 
year olds, the opportunities to extend their 
education of their own free will, would depend on 
the capacity of the schools they were in to cater 
for their needs". (92)
Spooner, like the Secondary Heads Association in its
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response to the Macfarlane Report, assumed that sixth 
forms within 11-18 schools were the forms of organisation 
most likely to attract those who would otherwise leave as 
soon as school attendance was no longer compulsory: the 
factual basis of such a belief is obscure; there is no 
doubting Spooner’s conviction or sincerity.
The same article contains the following statement on 
tertiary colleges:
"... which, no doubt, have some merit for those 
secure and mature enough at 16 to make a break 
[from school], but can hardly be regarded as a 
universal panacea". (93)
This commentary on the suitable clientele for the 
tertiary college - "those secure and mature enough at 16" 
implies the identified characteristics are not possessed 
by the normal 16 year old. It also contains echoes of 
the earlier quotation from Angela Rumbold which 
illuminated a hitherto unremarked dichotomy of, 
'dependency' in the sixth form or sixth form college 
versus student 'autonomy' in the FE or tertiary college. 
Such a dichotomy would complement King's own analysis 
(94) that the opposition to tertiary colleges among 11-18 
head teachers was related to the fact that 16-18 student 
choice would then lie outside the boundaries controlled 
by the heads of the schools.
There is a 'sectional' facet to Spooner's views. At the 
same time there is clearly an altruistic or 'promotional' 
dimension to Spooner's Canute defence against, in his
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perception, the tertiary tide. There is no doubt that 
sone educationaliats still perceive 16 year-olds as too 
imiiature to choose wisely, and as such still necessarily 
dependent upon the wisdom of their teachers. This is not 
to argue that the view is valid but to note that, even 
for those for whom it may be true, delayed dependency may 
delay maturity.
In a much more recent polemic for the retention of the
sixth form, John Sutton, Head of an 11-18 school and
now General Secretary Designate of SHA, assertedt
"The headlong rush to set up tertiary colleges ... 
is based more upon the arguments of administrative 
convenience and supposed economic advantage than 
upon any serious analysis of educational 
grounds". (95)
Sutton’s case was, essentially, that the sixth form which
had contributed so much should not be thrown aside. Its
endangered virtues were
"a high level of academic achievement and 
scholarship ... a sound basis for higher education 
and for recruitment into the professions, industry 
and business at the age of 18 ... [the provision 
for many young people] with an additional year of 
development [author's emphasis] and achievement 
between 16 and 17". (96)
Sutton described the endangered virtues of the sixth form 
within the 11-18 school - the quality and continuity of 
teaching for the 16-18 year olds; the quality of teaching 
in the main school; and the continuity of pastoral care. 
He presented the case for the 11-18 school, for 'no break 
at 16' on the basis of his own experience in Corby, 
Northamptonshire, of 11-18 school/FE college 
co-operation.
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However, the 'endangered virtuee' of the sixth form that 
Sutton described could be protected within a provision 
with a break at 16 where separate 11-16 and 16+ 
establishments permitted joint appointments. It is 
interesting to note that where LEAs considered such 
appointments (97) the opposition has come from the heads 
of educational establishments. However highly the head 
teachers' value Sutton's 'endangered virtues', it would 
seem that the virtues rate lower in their priorities than 
does the issue of the autonomy of head teachers to 
appoint, and direct, their staff.
The perception that the issue of the break at 16 is more
about headteacher and principal autonomy than the nature
of 16+ students' experience is reinforced by the response
of Austin, now Chairman of the Tertiary Colleges
Association, to Sutton's case. Austin noted Sutton's
advocacy for the co-operation as between Corby's schools
and colleges, then arguedj
"If, in such arrangements, relationships are close, 
there would seem to be no reason to eschew the 
obvious step of confirming the closeness and making 
a single institution, with a single admissions 
policy, a single set of aims and objectives, and the 
opportunity of establishing parity of esteem for all 
students. If the relationship is not so close, it 
is clear that nothing has been achieved". (98)
Austin may, therefore, be considered to have countered at
least a substantial part of Sutton's argument.
Sutton's arguments are shown to be related more to the 
working conditions of head teachers and staff than to
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educational provision for 16-19 year olds» Again» King's 
analysis that a high proportion of the arguments for 
sixth forms are 'sectional' rather than 'promotional' 
proves apposite.
Finally, a recent article describing events of over a
decade ago, and on a different tension between
educational institutions, provides a more disinterested
context for the arguments about the desirability (or not)
of sixth forms. Bruce Lockhart, a retired head teacher
of an independent school, described how his school's
sixth form had moved from single-sex to co-educational.
At an early stage he had consulted the heads of
neighbouring girls' schools. Lockhart reported the
substance of the head teachers' unambiguous opposition:
"Experience showed how they [the sixth form girls] 
needed quiet and seclusion to steer a safe course 
through the most difficult years of adolescence, 
and to make the best of the key learning years ... 
continuity between 'O' and 'A' levels teaching 
was vital ...". (99)
Before describing how the co-educational project had not
fulfilled the gloomy predictions of the heads of the
girls' schools — indeed, on all known educational
criteria, had proved successful - Lockhart noted
"While not entirely unexpected, the ferocity of 
the broadside induced some shell-shock. It was 
hardly reasonable of us to expect the girls' 
schools to accept, in the sometimes difficult 
financial climate of the 70s, the diminution 
of their sixth forms without spirited 
resistance". (100)
Herein Lockhart, from the relative security of 
retirement, notes the intrinsically 'sectional' flavour
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of the arguments of the heads of the girls' schools.
This is in no way to impute that the heads were arguing 
what they did not believe: rather, that what they 
believed was, thanks particularly to Burnham's age- 
weighting provisions for school teachers' salaries, a 
rather perfect coincidence with their own interests.
The similarities of the arguments deployed by Lockhart's 
heads of girls' schools in defence of their own sixth 
forms echo those of Spooner and of Sutton. There are 
"special tensions [between self-interest and policy] 
which are peculiar to professional unions ...". (101)
Lodge Si Blackstone's analysis of the role of unions and 
pressure groups in educational policy-making includes 
comment on the National Union of Teachers' support for 
the additional year of compulsory secondary education 
entailed by the Raising of the School Leaving Age (RSLA) 
to 16:
"It [NUT] did not consider whether the most 
obvious method of extending opportunities for 
this age group - the expansion of part-time 
education for 15-18 year olds, possibly on a 
compulsory basis — might be a more desirable 
use of the resources. It was, however, hardly 
in the n u t 's interest to do so. The union 
represented schoolteachers, and the alternative 
policy would have meant expanding the further 
education sector rather than the secondary 
schools". (102)
The example, with those provided above, illustrates the 
problem of attempting to isolate the promotional from the 
sectional aspect of the comments of the professional 
associations on policy proposals.
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The above reference reinforces, too, the choice of the 
Macfarlane Review as the source for the values underlying 
educational provision for the 16+: while the providers 
were not demonstrably skilled themselves in separating 
the professionals' promotional arguments from the 
sectional ones, at least the LEAs and the Department were 
not themselves interested parties in the outcome. Their 
aim was the more effective provision for the 16+, and not 
protecting schoolteachers’ jobs at the expense of the FE 
sector, or vice versa. The disinterested partners in the 
Macfarlane Group had intended, and achieved, LEA review 
of 16-19 provision. (103)
This commentary on the professional defences of the sixth 
form has concentrated on the sectional bases of those 
arguments. It has not, however, explained to the 
author's satisfaction the strength of the belief that the 
sixth form provides the best quality education.
Obviously, when the educational landscape contained only 
two variants of 16-19 provision - nearly two-thirds of 
all 17 year old pupils in the late 1950s were in 
maintained grammar schools (104) - the sixth form acted 
as a route to universities and the professions and the 
technical college as 'second chance' for some and first 
opportunity for craft and technician education. In those 
circumstances the sixth form held a clear edge on 
life-chances. The issue becomes more problematic when 
16-19 education can be offered via sixth forms, further
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education and technical college«, and sixth form and 
tertiary colleges.
Vfhen the school sixth form is compared, on the one hand, 
with the sixth form college which ought to include all 
the academic advantages of the former within a more 
effective unit and, on the other, with the FE tertiary 
college which should contain all sixth form colleges' 
advantages and additionally, offers more vocational 
provision, the sixth form is shown to be relatively 
deficient.
However, the late redraftings of the Macfarlane Report 
concerned the value and validity of sixth form 
education. The sixth form was still believed, by some of 
the Ministerial Group, to be worth the special measures 
involved in redrafting the Report to reduce the threat to 
sixth forms.
More recent government statements on 'proven worth' run 
directly counter to their exhortations to rationalise 
16-19 provision. VThen there is such confusion of policy, 
either some entrenched vested interest with which no 
government wishes to tangle is being threatened or, in 
combination with some vested Interests, some raw nerve of 
a high cultural priority is being touched. The 
co-ordinated weight of the Secondary Heads' Association, 
so clearly an interested party in the 16-19 debate, was 
not a sufficiently powerful lobby itself to cause the 
re-drafting of the Macfarlane Report at such a late
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stage. The actions taken indicate that the sixth form 
represents a high cultural priority and that tertiary 
colleges are seen as a threat to that cultural value.
Succeeding paragraphs of this Chapter set the Macfarlane 
activity on 16-19 education within a wider historical 
context, and within the wider educational context of 5 to 
18+, and attempt thereby to explain the cultural norms 
that the Macfarlane redraftings illustrate.
Implicit values are thrown into high relief by what
governments actually do when choosing between competing
priorities. Lodge & Blackstone compare the actions of
government as against the rhetoric. For example:
"Eccles chose expansion of university places 
rather than either RSLA or reductions in the 
number of over-sized classes". (105)
and again:
"In 1964 Boyle stated that RSLA would affect
350.000 pupils (at an estimated cost of £60m per 
annum) and that acceptance of the Robbins Report 
would cost £3,500m over 10 years (for an extra
174.000 students by 1973/4). Thus in crude 
terms over a 10 year period, the Robbins 
commitment meant spending nearly six times the 
RSLA resources". (106)
Thus, the over-riding educational priority of the 
Government in practice in the early 1960s was that of 
increasing access to higher education. It chose to do so 
via a policy of extending support via student awards 
unlike most comparator countries with their loan schemes, 
and through the creation of new universities. The latter 
would have been costly enough; to the cost of additional
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universities the government added a student support 
system for all qualified students accepted onto the 
increased number of university places«
In the 15-18 educational arena, the same Government's
priorities were for the addition of a compulsory year of
secondary education rather than, an equally—valid
alternative on the face of it, compulsory part-time
education for all 15-18 year olds. The Government shared
the priorities of its Reporting Committee:
"Crowther dismissed the idea of part-time 
further education as an alternative to RSLA, 
chiefly because a full secondary education was 
taken to be an essential basis for subsequent 
part-time education. (107)
As Lodge & Blackstone note, Butler had promised in 1944:
"to tighten the [1944 Education] Bill to make 
the establishment of county colleges a duty 
for LEAS within three years of a leaving age 
of 15". (108)
That promise was not fulfilled.
Similarly, Fisher's 1918 Act provided for a right to 
compulsory day release and was also postponed — in the 
event, indefinitely:
"Fisher was forced to make a fundamental 
concession to the industrial lobby, by which 
[day] continuation schools for 16-18 year olds 
would not be introduced for seven years. In 
Fisher's view, had this concession not been made, 
the Bill would have fallen. ... [Yet] Fisher 
described the proposal as the most novel feature 
of the Act. (109)
So, when governments have a choice, they have opted for 
the full-time, general education provision rather than 
the part-time and technical provision.
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Yet Fisher wanted compulsory day continuation schools, 
and Butler had pressed for the county college which would 
provide for the part-time study needs of the 15-18 year 
olds. Crowther had been strongly torn between the 
alternative policies of part-time further education for 
15-18 year olds on the one hand and one full-time 
compulsory additional year of secondary education on the 
other before finally opting for the latter. Why have the 
successive Governments so consistently given priority to 
full-time general education as opposed to the technical 
alternative?
Some illumination may be found through the example of one 
occasion when the government of the day ostensively gave 
equal priority to technical education. The 1944 Act 
provided for free secondary education for all, and the 
Circulars of advice to LEAs on the implementation of the 
Act, gave implicit backing to the tripartite system of 
secondary education in which three different forms of 
secondary school - the grammar school, the technical high 
school and the (secondary) modern school - should be 
resourced equally. The technical high school was to have 
equal status to the grammar school and entry for both 
would be governed by ability tests, the 'll plus’. It 
was intended that there would be equal numbers of grammar 
and technical schoolsi in the event, only a few LEAs 
included technical schools as part of their secondary 
provision. Why?
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The current Government'« 'Technical and Vocational 
Education Initiative (TVEI) for 14-18 year olds and 
its intention to create a limited number of 'City 
Technology Colleges' for 11-18 year olds activated the 
memories of some participants in the creation of the 
post-war secondary education system to offer explanations 
for why the technical schools had not flourished.
John Hudson, Deputy Secretary in the DES from 1969 to
1980, noted that many LEAs did prepare development plans
Including junior technical schools which failed to
materialise for the following reasons. By their
recruitment at 13, the grammar schools already provided a
second chance for 11+ failuresr the junior technical
schools were not encouraged to support sixth forms and
did not prepare pupils for the prized secondary
examinations, virtually the exclusive domain of the
grammar schools; and the Ministry commitment to technical
education was concentrated mainly on the development of
technical colleges. Hudson concludes;
"To sum up, the early secondary technical 
schools were weakly transplants competing with 
more vigorous, established growths [the grammar 
schoolsj ... In a wider sense, perhaps, they 
were casualties of the dichotomy which has long 
roots in English educational history. Many 
thoughtful people were exercised about 
efficiencies in technical education in the 
nineteenth century and in 1837 the government 
provided modest funding for a school of design.
This developed into the Department of Science 
and Art at South Kensington which continued 
throughout the century, but as a separate 
organisation from the main education department.
In 1899 the Board of Education Act brought both 
Departments together under the Board, but their 
historical apartheid cast a long shadow ... The
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separateness of the two traditions may have been 
both a force of strength in the development of 
non-university higher education and an obstacle to 
the penetration of technological and vocational 
concepts of secondary education". (110)
Thus Hudson's explanation for the lack of development of
technical schools was, essentially, related to the
structure of the Government Department responsible.
However, he invited staff from LEA or technical schools
to contribute their own views as to why junior technical
schools had not flourished.
A fortnight later the TES published a number of responses
to Hudson's article. Don Porter, retired HMI, drew
attention to the fact that«
"... so many LEAs were able to get development 
plans approved that did not make sufficient 
provision for secondary technical schools," (111)
and thus highlights the role of the Ministry. By not
exercising its power to refer back development plans
which did not include technical schools, the Government
thereby illustrated that its own priorities did not, in
fact, include technical education. However, Porter's
answer to Hudson's question was that the interest of the
educational world was diverted towards the implementation
of comprehensive schools.
Max Morris' contribution provides an alternative 
explanation for the demise of the tripartite secondary 
education system. He argued from his first-hand 
experience as a teacher in a secondary technical school 
that i
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"There waa (and la) In fact no 'technical type' 
at either 13 or 11 plua and ao no place for a 
achool baaed on the mythical theory. We were 
in practice a grammar achool with a technical 
biaa". (112)
The tripartite ayatem of grammar, technical and modern 
aecondary achoola waa predicated upon the belief that 
technical ability waa not aynonymoua with verbal ability: 
the selection teata for entrants to the grammar school 
thereby excluded those whose technical abilities were 
high, but whose verbal abilities were relatively low; 
these would attend the technical school. (113) Don 
Porter's letter had noted that the very first of the 
pamphlets published by the new Ministry of Education,
The Nation's Schools, had stated that the academic bias 
of the pre-war secondary [grammar] schools had "robbed 
industry and commerce of their fair share of talent". 
There was a general recognition of this deficiency of the 
grammar school, and a consensus that technical secondary 
schools would remedy the problem. (114)
Morris argues that the secondary technical schools had 
failed to materialise on any significant scale because 
they were based on a false premise. The tripartite 
system presumed that the top 15% of 11 year olds with 
technical ability would be a different top 15% to those 
with verbal ability. The system failed to recognise 
that, in practice, there is a significant overlap.
Morris' letter demonstrated that the overlap was very 
high, and that the system which had been designed to 
raise the profile of technical education had the effect
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of placing it as second to academic education In a 
three-tier systems
"Grammar schools flourished because of social 
and education pressure based on their legacy 
from the public schools. Technical schools 
failed to catch up because they were a 
'second-tier* selection". (115)
Since there was not an administrâtively-convenient set of
11 year olds who were clearly gifted practically and not
academically, parents tended to prefer their children to
experience an academic schooling which provided a route
to higher education and the professions.
Morris’ explanation for the failure of the tripartite 
system is given support by Tudor David, former Editor of 
Education:
"... The secondary technical schools had long 
since effectively transformed themselves into 
grammar schools. They were forced to do so by the 
English examination system; that is to say they 
became 'O'- and 'A'-taking schools because 'O' and 
'A' levels, in the view of parents and employers, 
had long since become the only examinations worth 
taking". (116)
By "worth taking", David means that it was the GCE 
examination passes that had general currency as public 
statements of ability. The context of the above judgment 
was a commendation of the recent Technical and Vocational 
Education Initiative which was designed to ensure that 
all 14-18 year olds in full-time education experience 
some technical education.
The post-war attempts to reduce the over-academic 
orientation of the education system ran counter to other
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policies. There was a long-standing assumption within
the Board of Education that:
"the Board should encourage the transfer of 
pupils from one kind of school to another 
[then elementary to secondary] rather than 
attempt to educate all types of pupils In a 
single school". (117)
The supposition that the comprehensive nature of primary 
education could not be replicated In the secondary sector 
has, until the Introduction of TVEI, condemned further 
generations to an over-academic educational diet.
A fascinating Insight Into the value assumptions of
senior civil servants Is provided by Savage In her
summary of the 1937 debate within the Board of Education
Cpredecessor to the Ministry of Education] on whether or
not technical high schools could be deemed 'secondary'.
The Issue was critical since the answer to the question
would determine whether technical high schools would
enjoy the higher resourcing of secondary schools, or the
lower level of staffing and other facilities that the
elementary and technical Institutes experienced.
"... Board officials did agree on certain minimum 
attributes of a secondary school. These Included 
recruitment by examination at 11 plus, an extended 
course of study lasting at least five years that 
prepared the students for university, and a 
professional staff .... G G Williams (Cl Secondary 
Schools) noted that technical high schools would 
lack a sixth form - another traditional 
characteristic of secondary schools. R S Wood 
(Principal Assistant Secretary In charge of 
technical schools) argued that secondary schools 
did not provide 'vocational' education, and that 
Technical High Schools would do just that. Board 
officials finally concluded that Technical High 
Schools should be administered by Further Education 
rather than secondary regulations thus ensuring them 
a lesser status". (118)
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In the event, the regulations for pre-war secondary 
schools gave equal weighting to all three facets of the 
post-war tripartite system. However, their 
administrative equality did not create or lead to any 
public recognition of technical education as having equal 
status to grammar schools. Parents opted for grammar 
schools first, and secondary technical schools second, 
and as the basis for the selective 11 plus came 
increasingly under fire, the pressure for comprehensive 
education was intensified.
However, having achieved a policy that gave technical
education an equal recognition to the academic education
of the grammar school, the (by then) Ministry was not to
be shaken from its commitment to the tripartite system:
"The decision to have a tripartite system (1945-48) 
was the logical culmination of a view which had 
been taken in the Department over a good many years 
and this was not going to be easily overthrown by 
such wide-eyed men as R H Tawney". (119)
The above adds weight to those who have considered the
civil service as too wedded to selection. It does not,
of itself, demonstrate that the civil service was partial
to grammar schools at the expense of the technical
schools.
It is the Department of Education and Science's more 
recent policies in the 16-19 debate that provide certain 
evidence that the civil service has reinforced the 
academic tendency of English education. The earlier 
summaries of the consultations on 16-19 in Chapter 9 have
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provided evidence of the perceived short-falls of 16-19 
education provision. However, in 1984 David Hancock, 
Permanent Secretary at the DES, described the 
Department's strategy to improve 16 plus education 
provision: since three-quarters of the most able students 
dropped either science/maths or arts subjects and 
specialised, the Government would introduce 
qualifications in complementary or contrasting studies - 
the Advanced Supplementary (AS) levels. That was all.
The Macfarlane Committee might never have reported on the 
problems of demographical decline and the consequent need 
for a review of 16-19 education. All that the Permanent 
Secretary suggested, some three years later, was a 
commitment that the top 15% of the ability range would be 
offered the opportunity of complementary academic 
studies. In this context, Hancock's justification for 
the limitations of the introduction of AS studies is 
worth note.
"The Department is not proposing any more radical 
move in the direction of the Scottish Higher or 
the French Baccalaureat or the German Abitur 
because this would call into question our 
specialised three-year degrees". (120)
Notwithstanding any evidence that the Permanent Secretary
had appreciated the concerns of the Macfarlane Review,
the above was a quite unusual public statement. First,
the universities' control of the public examination
system of schools was generally regarded as a matter of
concern and not a matter for accommodation. Second, as
the Department's sole policy for the 16 plus in schools.
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it reinforced the perception that the Government'e only 
concern was the academic diet of the academic 'top soil'
- rather than, say, that of increasing the participation 
rate so that a much higher percentage stayed on at school 
or college.
The lack of Government commitment to the Macfarlane
recommendations had been a matter of note:
"... In the event, the Report was not followed 
by a White Paper, and Circular 4/82 (para 4) made 
the point 'that the Secretary of State would not 
approve changes of use which would close sixth forms 
that 'have already proved their worth''". (121)
The "proven worth" issue had arisen with Sir Keith
Joseph's rejection of Manchester's reorganisation
proposals, and had fed the public perception that the
Government's only interest was in preserving the acadamic
'top soil' of provision.
It would be unfair, however, to attribute to the civil 
servants a continuum of policy from the 1930s to the 
1980s. Certainly, the "proven worth" issue - and, 
perhaps. Sir David Hancock's own limited perspective - 
owed more to a recent radical Conservative Government.
The foregoing report of the Macfarlane Committee's 
activities provides evidence that the civil service was 
as active as were the local authority representatives in 
formulating proposals that would help to create a 16-19 
provision that did not cater exclusively for the academic 
high-flyers. That said, it would not be unfair to note 
that the Government's own policies have not evinced any
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sign of taking on board the concerns of the Macfarlane 
Report, and that the local education authorities have 
been as active In tackling the Macfarlane Issues (122) as 
the Government's more recent priorities - eg protection 
of schools of 'proven worth', the majority with small 
sixth forms - have permitted.
The paragraphs above give some reasons why the secondary 
technical schools were not embedded Into mainstream 
post-war secondary education provision: civil servants 
did not give sufficient priority to their Inclusion 
within l e a s ' proposed development plans, and parents 
tended to opt for grammar school provision for their 
children where they had the option.
Both tendencies raise the same question. Why was 
technical education relatively under-valued by both the 
providers and the consumers? A fashionable explanation 
for the myopia of successive Governments to the need for 
a technological dimension to education provision Is 
provided by Martin Wiener (123). Wiener's agument Is, 
simply, that the English culture Is antipathetic to trade 
and Industry. Although Wiener Is not successful In 
explaining the cultural values which underlie that 
antipathy, he does provide an admirable description of 
them. This thesis has been largely concerned with the 
effects that those same values have had, amongst other 
consequences, on the provision of education and training 
for 16-19 year olds.
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PAST IV - POLICY AHD VALUES
CHAPTER 11» POLICY-MAKIBG HODELS
This chapter will first refer to some recognised models 
of educational policy-making and then, in the light of 
the dominant themes of the two case studies of the 
1950-51 FE teacher salary negotiations and the more 
recent Macfarlane Review of 16-19 educational provision, 
propose that an alternative perspective for the analysis 
of educational policy-making is used.
An alternative perspective is required since the 
established models do not sufficiently illuminate the 
policy-making process unravelled by this study. They do 
not provide the means to explain why it was that one 
policy was adopted and not another, or why some policy 
issues never even reach the political agenda. The 
proposed perspective would accommodate the particular 
problems of the established models described below, and 
would provide a new tool for analysis of current 
educational policy-making. Chapter 12 provides a 
development of the alternative perspective which arises 
from this particular research.
A Critique of Establimhed Frameiiorks for Analysis of 
Education Policy
In the introduction to Managing Education (1), Meredydd 
Hughes provides an excellent and panoramic overview of 
the various theories of educational management that have 
been influential over the last 40 years. Hughes
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identifies three principal policy-naking frameworks - 
"Easton's political systems model, Simon's modified 
rational model and Lindblom's incremental model" (2) - in 
his summary of policy-making models.
The systems model adapts the systems approach to the 
arena of political decisionsi this model first identifies 
the parameters of the system to be considered and, then, 
the system's various inputs and outputs.
The systems framework is useful in identifying the 
components of political decisions and, thereby, enabling 
deductions to be made as to the values and the intentions 
of the policy-makers. For example, the government, the 
local authorities and the teachers' unions have continued 
to support a high differential for resourcing as between 
the education of five-year olds on the one hand and the 
16+ students on the other: that differential input into 
the funding of the education system provides sound 
evidence from which deductions may be drawn as to the 
policy-makers' relative priorities.
The framework is certainly also useful to the practising 
administrator or educational policy-maker. By making 
explicit what the actual 'outputs' of the system are, it 
does provide a tool for evaluating the priorities of 
current policies and, therefore, facilitates a more 
objective review of current priorities than normal 
working conditions encourage. It does not, however.
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provide any explanation of why certain decisions have 
come to be taken and not others.
The 'modified rational’ approach is similarly limited. 
March & Simon (1958) identify three phases of decision­
making - problem recognition, the search for a solution 
and the choice of a particular solution. It is true that 
these are three elements in decision-making. However, 
the rationality of the political decision-makers is 
necessarily limited by contingency. A medieval 
definition of God included the attribute of omniscience. 
Very few decision-makers would claim that they could, or 
did, entertain all possible options in their search for 
solutions to the 'recognised' problem. Indeed, Simon's 
'modified rational' approach is an explicit 
recognition that decision-makers do not 'entertain all 
possible options.
Further, the identification of the problem by 
decision-makers will be limited by their own perception 
of relevance. The political balance that the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) seeks to achieve in its 
current affairs programmes usually excludes the National 
Front and Communist perspectives, both providing 
particular interpretations of the political scene but 
both perceived as outside the spectrum of British 
politics as conventionally interpreted. The constraint 
which the BBC's charter imposes relates to the acceptable 
spectrum and not to the actual spectrumt viewers are
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aware of the cultural or conventional constraints under 
which the the BBC operates, and most approve; the 
exclusion is a decision taken by the BBC, Educational 
policy-makers similarly exclude what they perceive to be 
unacceptable to their relevant current political 
constituencies.
There is, however, a more fundamental limitation to the 
•rationalist perspective'. Prior to Einstein, the 
Newtonian explanation provided the theoretical limits to 
scientific discourse: the implications of the law of 
relativity were outside the appreciative frameworks (3) 
of the most objective scientists. Hughes notes Vickers’ 
criticism of the 'rational* model in the context of the 
sheer difficulty of achieving an omniscient recognition 
of the problem: Vickers' own perspective, which is 
explored later, also recognises the impossibility of 
achieving a value-free recognition of the problem - and, 
indeed, his own theory acknowledges that policy-analysis 
must incorporate the limitations in policy-maker's 
perspective.
There is a yet further and more fundamental problem with 
the 'rational' framework: all who are not Certified or 
Certifiable under the common or criminal law are assumed 
to be rational. To say that a policy is 'rational' does 
not provide any basis for discrimination as between those 
policies which are 'good' solutions to the recognised 
policy problem and those that are 'bad*, for each
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solution will have its own rationale. The Spring 1987 
statement of the Hillgate Group (4) was predicated upon 
very different assumptions and priorities from those of 
the architects of the 1944 Education Acti a year later, 
the Hillgate Group's views are likely to be translated 
into education law. The Secretary of State is now 
proposing a prospectus for compulsory education which 
differs from the current system by as much as Newtonian 
physics differs from Einsteinian. However, the Hillgate 
Group's analysis of the problem and proposed solutions 
are entirely rational. The differences between the Group 
and those who defend Butler's legacy do not relate to 
relative rationality but, rather, to the perceptions of 
the problem and the values which underlie the choice of 
preferred solution.
The point that the reference to the Hillgate Group's 
statement attempts to exemplify is that the use of the 
term 'rational' does not add to policy-analysis. All - 
or, at least, most - policies are rational; protagonists 
and antagonists of any particular policy would differ on 
whether all relevant facts are accommodated by the 
proposed policy. And, most relevantly, they would 
dispute what were the relevant facts. The Vicker's 
approach, described later, does accommodate these issues.
March t  Simon's 'rational' approach, therefore, is 
fundamentally flawed as a tool for analysing policy­
making. The rational model, like the 'systems model' has
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a utility In that It reninds the active pollcy-aaker and 
administrator of the ground rules that they ought to be 
working to. In that, the rational framework is 
essentially didactic. That said, the 'rational* 
framework of policy-making does not add new perspectives 
for the policy analyst.
Similar criticisms were made of the systems approach to 
policy-making analysis which dominated American education 
administration from the 1950s. The 'New Movement' was 
based on the ideal of
"a general theory of human behaviour, within 
which the theory of administrative behaviour in 
education would be a sub-system". (5)
The New Movement's systems-derived approach was 
pre-eminent for two decades in the English speaking 
world. T Barr Greenfield's advocacy of a phenomeno­
logical approach to educational administration which 
acknowledged the
"invented social reality [of organisations] 
reflecting the values of people with access 
to power" (6)
attacked the fundamental basis of the New Movement's 
perspective. Greenfield's case was a plea for 
educational administrators to take on board the fact that 
systems, all systems of which people are components, are 
essentially human constructs and not subject to universal 
laws which are independent of the human beings that 
invent them.
The rational approach has been the subject of the same
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criticism. Jenkins demonstrates how the rational actor's 
actions are modified by, on the one hand, the political 
vested interests of the actors and, on the other, the 
weight of organisational and administrative structures. 
(7) The vagaries of the specific interests of the 
political actors and of institutional inertia are 
essential features of policy-making. Both factors can be 
accommodated within Vickers' framework, described below.
The third framework for policy-making analysis, 
identified by Hughes is Lindblom's 'disjointed 
incrementalism', essentially a modification of the 
rational approach. Here, political priorities are 
established through the bargaining of the interested 
parties so that decision-making is based on small, 
incremental shifts towards a desired policy rather than 
any radical re-orientation.
Disjointed incrementalism is superficially attractive in 
that it certainly bears a closer correspondence to normal 
policy-making conditions than does the rational frame­
work. Very rarely is any individual or group able to 
completely scrap existing structures that were designed 
to fit earlier policies and circumstances. Where the 
brief includes radical change, it is normal practice to 
propose modest changes that will re-orientate an existing 
structure towards a new end rather than to propose the 
abolition of existing structures and thereby invite solid 
opposition and the defeat of the proposals.
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However, the disjointed incremental theory is subject to 
the criticisms already noted of the rational framework. 
Merely to use the small discrete components within an 
overall policy re-direction as the basic unit for 
policy-analysis means that the framework is more modest. 
That 'modesty', however, raises the issue of whether the 
approach contributes anything at all to policy-analysis.
A theory ought to be able to illuminate why one decision, 
however modest, was taken and not another. However, any 
series of events, however bizarre, can be accommodated 
within the disjointed incremental framework.
Disjointed incrementalism is a classic case of the kind 
of theory that Popper's 'falsifiability criterion' would 
demarcate as outside the bounds of scientific theory. 
Popper argues that if any event can be accommodated 
within a theory, and, there are no instances where the 
theory can be falsified, then the theory becomes 
vacuous. It may also be dangerous: the easy 
identification of a rational or disjointed incremental 
interpretation may cause the policy analyst to ignore 
more significant messages from the data. This point is 
illustrated later by reference to recent analyses of 
16-19 educational provision.
It is important to emphasise here that there is no intent 
to argue that the established frameworks have no utility 
for the policy analyst but, rather, to assert more 
modestly that the use of the models by current policy
205
analysts Is suspect where the models do not fulfil the 
policy analysts' claim and do not add to the Illumination 
of the data - as was found in this research and 
particularly in respect of the two major case studies.
J^plications of Established Models to 16-19 Policy- 
Making
The following pages concern the application of the above 
models to recent 16-19 policy-making. It has not been 
possible to refer to the use of the models to the Burnham 
(FE) salary Report(s) since that area of policy-making 
has not enjoyed much attention from education 
pollcy-analy81 s.
From research into post-war 16+ developments and a 
detailed investigation of the Macfarlane Committee's 
progress, the evidence does not support the 
identification of any 'systematic and defensible 
strategy' (8) which is the basis of the incrementalist 
framework. Rather, the policy Imperative of vocation- 
alism has come into conflict with the policy for 
defending and intensifying the academic diet of the upper 
quartile of the ability range, and the result is that the 
education service experiences conflicting Imperatives. 
This point is noted at the outset of the discussion on 
the application of existing models to 16-19 policies, 
since the papers below all presume some strategy.
(i) Ranson's review of government policy towards 16-19 
educational provision (9) leads him to deduce that.
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"there was nevertheless an underlying consensus 
of policyt to prepare a more vocational curriculum? 
to rationalise resources? and to differentiate 
opportunities”. (10)
Ranson bases his interpretation of recent government
policy on the presumption of an 'underlying consensus' of
policy, notwithstanding the evidence he notes of?
"formidable clashes of interests between the 
sectoral traditions of the schools and FE 
branches over Departmental strategy. (11)
The underlying cohesion which Ranson asserts, however,
sits uneasily with his own evidence. Further, the
detailed investigation into the Macfarlane Review,
summarised in Chapter 8, confirms the 'formidable
clashes' that Ranson reports.
An alternative analysis would lead to the conclusion that 
Government policies for 16-19 are the results of separate 
and discrete policy imperatives that are, coincidentally, 
intrinsically contradictory. The policy has hardly 
seemed rational to non-governmental participants in 16-19 
policy-making and provision.
Over the last decade the government, under both Labour 
and Conservative administrations, has given highest 
priority to the then currently-held consensus of the 
needs of the A level and university students, the 
academic 'elite'? at the same time senior civil servants 
have pressed a different set of policy aims for the whole 
of the 16-19 age group, within which Departmental staff 
have consciously and properly included the
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■elite*. There have been tensions between the two sets 
of policies.
Ranson has rightly noted the three thenes of Government 
policy towards 16-19 provision - the pressure on schools 
and universities to permit a more vocational orientation 
within the curriculum; to rationalise resources; and to 
differentiate opportunities. However, he fails to 
convince that there is an 'underlying consensus on 
policy*. Those three themes are certainly present, but 
for very different reasons and, sometimes, leading to 
contradictory conclusions.
Ranson himself acknowledges the tension between the 
senior staff of the Department and, equally significant, 
the tension between Government Ministers, as to the 
appropriate scenario for 16—19 general education 
provision. That tension is borne out by the policy to 
replace Certificates of Extended Education (CEEs) by the 
Keohane-preferred Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education 
(CPVE) catering, as does TVEI, for all abilities within 
the 14-18 age range, which exemplifies the re-orientation 
towards a more vocational curriculum for all. At the 
same time, successive governments required schools to 
publish their public examination results, and instructed 
the Higginson Committee on GCE A levels to take as given 
the retention of these public examinations and make 
recommendations accordingly. (12) These separate 
measures served to shore up the over—academic orientation
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of secondary education and thus ran counter to any 
vocational imperative.
The policies quoted above serve but to illustrate 
the problems of Identifying any underlying coherent 
policy. It would be difficult to weigh the effects of 
the 'vocational' and the 'academic' policies to be able 
to draw conclusions as to which more properly represented 
the priorities of the government who made the policies. 
Vfhat is certainly true is that these policies gave 
contradictory messages to those within the education 
service.
Similarly, the other two themes that Ranson identifies - 
pressure to rationalise resources and encouragement to 
differentiate provision - can be easily seen as giving 
opposite messages to the education system: if an LEA 
differentiates provision, particularly at a time of 
demographic decline, then it is less able to rationalise 
its resources; the Government's Rate Support Grant 
contribution to local government has been predicated upon 
an assumed loss of primary, secondary and 16+ 'places': 
at the same time, the same Government has been dilatory 
in passing those same messages to local constituencies 
and the country at large when any proposals for 
rationalisation start the journey from LEA proposal to 
LEA consultation to, finally, reach the Secretary of 
State's desk for approval. LEAs have, therefore, 
experienced the difficulty of attempting to follow
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'administrative' guidelines on rationalising provision 
while, at the same time, government has played its own 
part in the execution of those guidelines.
Thus, while Ranson can detect an 'underlying consensus on 
policy', the study points to contradictory messages which 
can only be accommodated within a - new - theory of 
discrete and unrelated strands of policy-making. This 
new facet of policy-making lies outside the models for 
policy analysis and outside Vickers' model which, as 
argued later, provides a better tool for analysis than do 
the systems, (modified) rational and disjointed 
incremental models. It is important to emphasise here 
that the research bears out the presence of the three 
themes Ranson isolates. What is disputed is that they 
constitute - or, indeed, could - a coherent policy.
Further, Ranson's raw data is derived from a relatively- 
limited framework of interviews with senior Departmental 
staff which took place fairly soon after the Macfarlane 
Committee's review of 16-19 provision. Moreover, it does 
not take on board those other policies that the 
Department was simultaneously pursuing! Ranson was 
explicitly concentrating on the Macfarlane Committee's 
Report and its aftermath. The contradictory compromise 
cobbled together in the Macfarlane Report, through the 
processes described in Chapter 8, certainly do lead 
his respondents to highlight the three themes that Ranson 
notes.
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A wider contemporary context, however, would have led the 
interviewer to pause before concluding that there was an 
underlying cohesion. Those interviewed would have 
acknowledged the separate pressures - the disparate views 
as between Government Ministers on 16-19 provision; the 
pressures from the Treasury within a Monetarist ideology; 
and, a latecomer to the feast, the new criterion of 
'choice' whose only virtue appeared to be that of 
protecting, and increasing, differentiated 
opportunities. The civil service were subject to all 
three pressures: that the separate pressures did not, and 
do not, cohere into a tidy consensus on Government policy 
towards 16-19 education was hardly the civil servants' 
fault. It is, however, the reality of the situation for 
the LEAS as providers of 16-19 education.
Thus Ranson's conclusions as to the three expressions of 
the underlying policy consensus must be noted with 
interested caution. The material on which he bases his 
conclusions - the civil servants' interviews - were 
related to a more limited context than Ranson's own.
(ii) In the same year that Ranson's analysis of 
Government policy on 16—19 appeared, Cordingley published 
an account of the Inner London Education Authority's 
[i l e a's] progress towards a 16-19 policy framework for 
that Authority (13). Separate researches (14) into 
i l e a's 16-19 policy reinforce Cordingley's analysis of 
events. The single but critical caveat against
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Cordlngley’s astute account is that It presumes an 
underlying policy consensus in ILEA's policy development 
similar to that Inferred by Ranson on behalf of the 
government.
Cordingley's analysis is anchored within the rational
analysis of policy-making. She states:
"Proposals were developed through papers 
explaining options and objectives, optimum 
solutions were selected, negotiations took 
place and the policy was disseminated formally.
This pattern apparently follows closely the 
generally accepted model of rational policy 
development (Jenkins 1978) which, however 
challenged in the literature, remains closely 
in tune with the expectations of education 
officers". (15)
Cordingley's description of events is a fair account of 
the implementation of a policy that had already been 
given official Authority status. However, Cordingley is 
describing a rational implementation process and not a 
rational policy-making process. [It should be noted, 
additionally, that education officers do not hold the 
rationality of policy development as one of their 
highest expectations: they experience a policy-making 
environment which includes the values and character of 
the policy-makers].
Research undertaken for this thesis has highlighted the 
absence of the 'rational' policy-making process that 
March and Simon describe, and Cordingley assumes in 
i l e a's 16-19 framework. The question to senior ILEA 
staff in Spring 1984 (16) was why, with so much clear
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evidence of the educational need to rationalise 16-*- 
provision« had so little action been taken? The 
clear consensus of responses in 1984 was, first, that the 
perceptions of senior ILEA politicians were such that 
they gave high priority to the 11-18 school, including 
sixth forms, as an essential mechanism for opportunities 
for the whole of the 16+ age range; second, that the 
group of ILEA politicians who took office in 1981 had 
proved less wedded to the Spooner-type Weltanschauung. 
Further, the ILEA elected members in office until 1981 
were perceived to have been strongly influenced by the 
NUT who, until more recently, had espoused the 11-18 
school and opposed any 'break at 16's the NUT's own 
general standing had been weakened. (17)
The above evidence does not give any grounds for the 
identification of any continuum of rational policy-making 
but, rather, shows that a significant policy change was 
dependent on a change in political leadership, and on the 
difterence between the 'value assumptions' of the pre- 
1981 administration and those of the post-1981 leadership 
in ILEA.
Indeed, Cordingley's own account provides further
confirmation of the above policy-making perspective. She
notes how ILEA decided not to consider structural
reorganisation in the mid-1970s
"but in 1978 undertook a full review of the 
existing [16-19] offer ... [so that the] Tertiary 
Education Boards ... were established in September 
1983. (18)
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For the late 1970s, five years is a rather elongated 
period for any LEA review to be translated into new 
initiatives .... Indeed, from various interviews (19) it 
is deduced that, notwithstanding the clear evidence of 
the need for 16-19 rationalisation within ILEA, the 
pre-1981 leadership were perceived to be unwilling to 
countenance any questioning of the absolute right and 
propriety of the existence of the 11-18 school, 
inevitably large as a result of the perceived need for a 
sixth form.
The reference above to the perceptions of the views of 
the leading members is deliberate, and important. As 
stated earlier, policy-makers exclude what they perceive 
to be unacceptable to their political constituencies: 
this is as true a description of the behaviour of the 
local authority officer or civil servant as it is of that 
of the councillor or Secretary of State.
Cordingley describes the policy vaccuum between 1978 and 
1983 as a rational continuum. As stated above the 
characteristic of rationality is rightly ascribed to the 
implementation of ILEA's 16-19 policy. The earlier 
policy-making stages, however, were significantly 
affected by the perceptions of the policy-makers and, as 
all Interviewed for this study noted, it was the change 
in the perceptions of the policy-makers, as a result of 
the change in the identity of ILEA's senior politicians, 
that moved the Authority from an 11-18 policy to (at the
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very least) an open mind on the structure for 16-19 
provision. That process was certainly rational, but 
hardly 'rational' in the sense used by March and Simon.
In the late 1980s the perceived unwillingness of pre-1981 
ILEA leadership to entertain an alternative 16-t mode to 
the 11-18 school sixth form may appear surprising. But 
it should be appreciated that a large number of LEA 
politicians, both within ILEA and in all other parts of 
the country, had expended large Investments of energy in 
attempting to ensure that the secondary reorganisations 
consequent upon Circular 10/65 permitted the 
comprehensive to maintain a sufficient 'mass' of pre-16 
pupils to support a reasonable sixth form. Political 
Investment in the 11-18 school had been very high and, 
with the virtues of hindsight, it was unrealistic to 
expect that elected members who had 'lost blood' in the 
defence of secondary reorganisations for LEA 11-18 
schools could be readily sympathetic to 16-f 
reorganisations which entailed the dismembershlp of the 
schools whose continued existence they had fought to 
ensure in an earlier era.
(iii) Slater in, yet again, 1985 provided an ambitious 
analysis of the Institutional, government and curricular 
issues that have contributed to policy-making for 16-19 
education since 1944. (20) Slater's summary of events is 
broadly acceptable, and constitutes an excellent
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distillation of what has happened in 16-19 policy over 
the last four decades.
Where Slater fails to convince, however, is in his
re-interpretation of the issues according to the
decision-making model of disjointed incrementalism, again
presuming a policy—continuum. McNay (1986) in his review
of the volume in which Slater's analysis is published,
shares these misgivingst
"... and a valiant attempt is made to impose 
coherence on the emergence of a policy for 
16-19 provision by the use of disjointed 
incrementalism".(21)
Indeed, the late introduction of the model within 
Slater's essay - 16 pages on within a text of 20 pages - 
gives the reader an impression of an almost desperate 
search for some mechanism that could provide coherence. 
Perhaps that is the problem.
It is difficult either to endorse or to refute Slater's 
detailed exemplifications of disjointed incrementalism at 
work in 16-19 policy. This is due to the logical status 
of the model. Where the model itself is not falsifiable, 
where any event may be brought within a very incremental 
interpretation, then examples of the application of the 
model ought to be subject to scepticism.
The succession of Government policies for the 16-19 year 
olds had certainly been disjointed, and Slater's 
presumption is that that characteristic is a constituent
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of within one systematic strategy. However, this study 
indicates that government policy has been disjointed 
because no systematic strategy underpinned the policy­
making« had there been such an over-arching strategy, 
then the various sub-policies - maintenance grants for 
students, Burnham rewards, etc - would have acted 
together to form a coherent 16+ policy.
The work of the Macfarlane Committee describes an attempt 
to integrate the various strands affecting 16-19 
provision. This was undermined. Slater notes the late 
attempt by the schools lobby, led by junior Ministers, to 
modify the Committee’s recommendations, and how the 
Government's response to the Macfarlane Report 
contradicted its main thrust; nevertheless, he still 
clings to the presumption of a policy-continuum. (22)
A policy-continuum is precisely what those involved in 
16-19 provision were pressing for, and what the 
Government failed to deliver. Through Circular 4/82 the 
Government introduced a new criterion for LEA 
reorganisation of schools, that of protecting schools of 
■proven worth'. It appeared that the Secretary of State 
identified a school's 'proven worth' with its provision 
of sixth form opportunities. That Government policy was 
more recently reiterated by the issuing in August 1986 of 
a draft Circular, Providing for Quality« the Pattern of 
Organisation to Age 19 and, 9 months later, the final 
Circular 3/87. (23) This presented directly
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contradictory messages, pressing LEAs to both rationalise 
provision and to preserve provision that, on the 
Circular's own criteria, would have been judged unviable.
The messages continue to be mixed. The current proposals 
for open school admissions and schools opting out from 
the LEA system within Baker's Education Reform Bill, 
introduced in November 1987, will certainly inhibit any 
coherent LEA strategy for 16-19 education provision.
These most recent examples (at time of writing) may lead 
to one of two separate conclusions - either that the 
Government has significantly revised its 16-19 policy, 
since the current proposals would undermine LEA planning, 
or that the Government had not had a coherent 16-19 
policy. What the examples fail to illustrate is a 
progression of small incremental steps within a 
systematic strategy.
Further, the disjointed incrementalists' framework
minimises the responsibility of the analyst to explain
why the substantial shifts in policy have occurred. As
Hinds noted, the book containing Slater's essay
"does not deal with persons. And, therefore, 
not with the inter-relationships of the systems, 
roles and persons''^ (24) (Hinas' own emphasis)
Indeed, it is precisely that omission of attention to the
individual policy-makers, to the effects of their
relationships with each other and with the circumstances
in which they act, that minimises the explanatory power
of the established models for policy analysis.
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In sunmary, then, the principal franeworks for policy
analysis are flawed because their adherents claim greater
explanatory power than the three frameworks can support.
Ranson provides the following criterion for theoryi
"What we can expect from theory is the discovery of 
an underlying pattern which has previously been 
inaccessible to everyday experience and which 
therefore illuminates the relations of causal 
dependency between institutions, activities and 
events in ways which will allow us to explain why 
such and such has occurred. Theory exposes the 
social mechanisms which account for events". (25)
The essential problem for the three frameworks is that
they do not provide that 'illumination* or that 'exposure
of social mechanisms which account for events'. Taken
individually, the theories are too weak for more than
post-hoc rationalisation of trends which the analyst has
already perceived.
The systems, the rational, or the disjointed 
incrementalist theories cannot explain why, for example, 
the Macfarlane Committee consensus was rocked at such a 
late stage, nor why ILEA Councillors were not minded to 
act on the need for 16-19 re-organisation in the late 
1970s. Adherents of the theories note such significant 
human moves in the policy-making case studies they 
analyse, but their models are short of that explanatory 
or illuminatory power that Ranson rightly isolates as 
essential for theoretical models.
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Re-Entry of the Buean and Contingent into Policy 
Analyaie
The remainder of this chapter will describe Vickers' 
particular contribution to policy-analysis as the 
alternative perspective noted at the outset of the 
chapter, and illustrate his theory by reference to major 
issues from the two case studies. Vickers' model leads 
naturally to the distinctive contribution to policy­
making analysis which has developed from this research 
and is described in Chapter 12.
Vickers' theory of appreciative judgment (26) stands 
alone among contemporary policy analysis in accommodating 
the facets missing from the above frameworks described. 
Vickers' theory gives due priority to the importance of 
the contingent as a dimension of all policy-making, and 
to the influence of the normative judgments of the 
individual policy-makers.
Vickers acknowledges his debt to Simon's pioneering work 
on the applications of systems theory to administration, 
but the contrast he himself makes between Simon's work 
and his own (27) describes a difference of such an order 
of magnitude that Vickers' own theory could only be 
regarded as within the systems theory genre if the term 
'systems theory' is used at such a level of generality 
that it would no longer discriminate as between the 
'systems' framework and any other systematic analysis.
Vickers' distinctive contribution to the analysis of
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policy-making lies in his identification of the values of 
policy-makers' as critical facets in the process of 
policy-making. He describes 'appreciative' judgment', 
the faculty all politicians, administrators and managers 
use, as being composed of "inseparable constituents of 
appreciation" (28). For Vickers, the components of 
appreciation are 'reality judgment', the policy-maker's 
understanding of the facts that s/he has identified as 
relevant to the issue, and 'value judgment', the 
policy-maker's own normative set of attitudes about the 
issue in question.
This careful definition of 'reality judgment' provides 
one of the missing facets of the rational and disjointed 
incremental frameworks« Vickers does not claim that the 
policy-maker can be omniscient, even if s/he desired to 
be: Vickers is careful to define the 'reality judgment' 
so as to make explicit the fact that the matters 
considered in any policy review will be limited to what 
the policy-maker perceives as relevant.
The more significant contribution of Vickers' theory of 
'appreciative judgment', however, is the priority it 
gives to the policy-maker's own normative set of value 
and reality judgements. Both the late attack on the 
Macfarlane consensus and the perceptions of ILEA leaders 
in the late 1970s were significant for policies - those 
made and those not made. The Vickers' framework permits 
the various appropriate weight to be given to the value
221
judgments of individual policy-makers, equivalent to 
their actual impact on the decisions taken.
Vickers' theory has the separate virtue that it 
acknowledges the pre-eminence of the contingent. Human 
beings live in a four-dimensional world that is affected 
by the passage of time:
"Few would deny that time is a dimension of the 
space in which we objectively and subjectively 
liver but even fewer, I believe, have yet acquired 
the habit or drawn the conclusions of taking it 
sufficiently seriously". (29)
The effects of the dimension of time are too often
ignored by policy analysts. The Education Management
Information Exchange (EMIE) report on 16-19
reorganisations of the mid-1980s (30) demonstrated that a
very large number of LEAs had reviewed their 16-19
provision since the publication of the Macfarlane Report,
and that the Report had provided a welcome stimulus to
such a review. Those who criticised the Report as
impotent had forgotten that Macfarlane's major
recommendation was that LEAs should review their 16-19
provision, and that such reviews take time to come to any
fruition.
The above example relates to the lead time involved in 
implementation. That dimension of time also affects the 
policy-makers' appreciative judgements: it is possible 
that Alexander's original 1950 proposals for 
restructuring the Burnham (FE) Report might have proved
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acceptable if the Authorities' Panel had had more time to 
assimilate them.
Vickers' identification of the 'value judgment' of the 
policy-maker as one of the twin prime ingredients of 
policy-making certainly illuminates the two case studies 
on FE salary negotiations and structural review of 16-19 
education provision presented in Parts II and III 
respectively. Examples of value judgements affecting 
policy are provided below.
In the early post-war years, there was a general 
consensus within the education establishment on the need 
to raise the profile of technological education. The 
mechanism chosen for the schools' sector was to create 
selective technical schools equal in status to the 
grammar schools. This strategy failed since it ran 
directly counter to the fact that entry into the more 
prestigious employments depended on attendance at grammar 
schools. Where technical secondary schools were 
introduced, they quickly became second 'choice' to the 
grammar school.
The strategy did not take on board two critical facets.
It was part of the realities of the situation that the 
tripartite system of grammar, technical and modern 
schools could not prevent a culturally-determined ranking 
of the two types of selective schools; further, there 
were not three distinct types of pupils clearly
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denarcated by mutually-excluslve types of intelligence, 
as presumed by official Reports of the time. The values 
of the participants - parents as well as educational 
providers - still ranked 'grammar' as superior to 
'technical', and the tripartite strategy made no inroads 
into that prioritisation.
The strategy of raising the profile of technological 
education within the further education sector was 
somewhat simpler. The post-war consensus on how to raise 
the technological profile in FE was that staff teaching 
on the advanced courses should receive salaries 
comparable to those in universities. Thus Alexander's 
rationale for the content of the 1950-51 negotiations was 
certainly based on the commonality of educationists' - 
employers and employees - perception as to what would be 
acceptable to, as well as reflect, the prevailing 
cultural perceptions of potential students, parents and 
employers. Such a consensus would help to explain the 
[noted] lack of archival records of any consultations: 
there were none because 'all' - that is all who the 
policy-makers considered relevant - were agreed; that 
noted, the initial proposal on how to achieve the shared 
end was contentious and ought to have been the subject to 
Management Panel consideration somewhat earlier.
Similarly, Vickers' identification of the fundamental 
nature of the policy-makers' own value judgment is 
helpful in the analysis of the Macfarlane Committee's
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proceedings- Vickers notes how:
"Changes which would shake [the] conceptual 
framework are resisted with a vehemence 
proportionate to the extent of the threat". (31)
The Hacfarlane Committee's work directly threatened those
who had, over a long period of time, perceived that the
large secondary schools were necessary to provide the
base for reasonably-sized integrated sixth forms. As
noted earlier, much political energy had been expended on
secondary reorganisations for what was, essentially, a
defence of the 11-18 school with 'healthy' sixth form.
On a rational model of policy-making, the arguments for 
the break at 16, for sixth form or tertiary college, 
would have been sufficient to settle policy choices. 
However, the analysis of policy-making must include the 
perceptions of the policy-makers, and a number of these 
continued to give priority to 11-18 schools. The 
vehemence and strength of the late attack on the 
Macfarlane consensus becomes more comprehendable within 
Vickers' 'value judgments' category of policy-making 
facets and priorities.
Finally, Vickers’ commentary on the nature of the 'value 
judgment' accepts that:
"The value judgments of men and societies cannot 
be proved correct or incorrect: they can only be 
approved as right or condemned as wrong by the 
exercise of another's value Judgment". (32)
One of the criticisms of the 'rational' framework is that
it provides no scope for the identification of a rational
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judgment as right or wrong, as 'good' or 'better fit’.
The Vickers' framework does permit those issues to be 
raised since he incorporates normative judgements as 
essential components of the policy-analysis.
Further, Vickers provides a more subtle refinement of the
status of value judgments:
"We need not conclude that views on these matters 
are merely a matter of personal taste: the entire 
political dialogue of the world - that is, its 
endless debate about policy - would be palpably 
futile if this were so ... We have to assume ... 
an inner criterion, self-set and constantly reset 
by every exercise; as the value judgments of ...
[the policy-makers] ... were affected by the actual 
process of their appreciation ...". (33)
What Vickers is describing is the interaction between
value judgment and reality judgement, progressively
affecting the appreciative judgment of the policy-maker.
That interactive process is well exemplified by the
Macfarlane Committee's proceedings. The Report
recommended an essential need for each LEA to review its
16-19 provision, notwithstanding the late entry of a
powerful lobby who had very rational grounds for not
welcoming any disruption to the status quo through LEA
reviews.
That lobby had to take on board the development of the 
appreciative judgments of those involved for over a year 
in the Macfarlane Committee's work. It is significant 
that the subsequent Circulars 4/82 and 3/87, explicitly 
defending the existence of the 'proven worth’ schools 
with sixth forms, stemmed from a successor Secretary of
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State who had not been party to the Macfarlane policy­
making process.
In the case studies on the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and 
on the Macfarlane Reviews, the adoption of eventual 
policy depended on the value and reality judgments of key 
policy-makers and on the inter-action of those same 
individuals over time. Both cases were affected by the 
contingent, and the particular circumstances in which the 
negotiations and discussions took place affected the 
outcomes of both.
Vickers' model of policy-making analysis is more coherent 
with the results of the research than the systems, 
(modified) rational or disjointed incremental 
frameworks. However, the research has revealed new 
facets of policy-making - the importance of the 
characters of policy-makers (in addition to their value 
judgements), the 'covert agenda' and, as indicated above, 
the discrete strands of policy-making. These will be 
developed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 1 2 t THE HOMAN AND OOHTIH6EHT IN ACTION
This chapter highlights the significance for policy 
analysis of the impact of individuals on the policy 
processes in which they are involved, the power of 
particular and contingent on the same processes and, 
finally, the potency of values in policy-making, as 
revealed in the research.
Individuals in Policy-Making
The two case studies presented in Parts II and III 
demonstrate the importance of individual policy-makers' 
own value and reality judgments. They, additionally, 
illustrate the importance of policy-makers themselves. 
While Vickers' theory provides a role for the individual, 
it does not lay the weight on the effects that the 
characters of the policy-makers have on policy outcomes 
that this research indicates appropriate.
Policy—analysts differ on the relative importance of
'inevitable trends' and the role of the individual
policy-makers. Lukes provides an excellent discussion on
the issue, and resolves the tension between the
conflicting perceptions by concluding:
"... [policy-makers consist in] a set of 
(expanding and contracting} abilities faced with 
(expanding and contracting) opportunities". (34)
Lukes is close here to Vickers in acknowledging the
relationship between the potentialities of the specific
policy-makers, and the contingent factors of the
environment in which they operate. Indeed, Lukes'
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conclusion Integrates the facets of personality of 
policy-maker and his operating environment in an analysis 
that corresponds more closely than does Vickers to the 
realities of policy-making.
This research, however, indicates that greater weight 
needs to be placed on the effects of the characters of 
the policy-makers than Lukes' analysis would indicate. A 
'law of Cleopatra's nose' (35) needs to be acknowledged 
within the repertory of policy-analysts' tools.
The 1951 FE Report illustrates the Lukes' and Vickers' 
analyses and those developments arising from this 
research. Alexander's judgment on what should constitute 
the 1951 FE teachers' salary structure differed from that 
of Sir Graham Savage: both were well-regarded by the same 
influential constituencies - the LEAs and relevant 
teacher unions. However, those two respected. 
Influential, and experienced LEA negotiators disagreed on 
the terms of the new FE teachers' salary award because 
they had different perceptions of the effect of that 
Burnham settlement on FE provision.
Certainly there was agreement in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s that the best means of raising the profile of 
technological vis-à-vis academic education was to ensure 
that FE teachers of degree-equivalent technological 
studies enjoyed the same level of remuneration as did 
those teaching on university studies. Sir William
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Alexander faithfully reflected that perception.
At the same time. Sir Graham Savage's misgivings 
regarding the weighting towards higher technological 
studies were justified. The implementation of the 
original proposals would have deprived very many colleges 
any scope for remunerating responsibility. In the event. 
Sir Graham's misgivings contributed to the modification 
of the proposal that only teachers of advanced FE could 
gain higher remuneration, and with it, higher status. 
While the package that was finally negotiated did promise 
a very large differential for those working in advanced 
FE, it also gave LEAs some discretion to discriminate in 
favour of those teachers who had academic and 
administrative responsibilities for non-advanced FE 
students.
Thus, both Savage's and Alexander's separate frameworks 
for giving priority to technological studies in the 1950s 
were protected. The result bears the mark of a 
compromise. That is, while those teaching on higher 
level courses were most likely to gain the higher 
remuneration, this was not an inevitable outcome from the 
national negotiations in the Burnham (FE) Committee.
Some 30 years later the judgments of two Secretaries of 
State, Mark Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, differed quite 
markedly about the means of achieving identical ends. 
Although both were seized of the importance of raising
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the quality of educational provision, and by the need to 
take on board the significant decline in numbers of the 
16+ age group, Carlisle's name became linked with the 
Macfarlane pro-tertiary policy and Sir Keith's to 
preserving schools of 'proven worth'. The Department of 
Education and Science was rightly pressing for an 
increased age participation rate (APR), and APRS 
increased when sixth form and tertiary colleges were 
introduced. Some sort of 16-19 review was, in this 
context, inevitable.
When it came to the point of how to provide for the 16-19 
age group, however, the Secretaries of State, Mark 
Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, came to virtually opposite 
conclusions: Mark Carlisle had supported the Macfarlane 
Report's recommendations that all LEAs review their 16-19 
provision and the Report had included strong caveats 
about the educational viability of sixth forms. On the 
other hand, the Circulars published later under Sir Keith 
Joseph included a pre-disposition to look favourably on 
11-18 schools with sixth forms rather than moving to 
post-16 re-organisation.
While both Secretaries of State pursued virtually 
opposite implementation policies to achieve an identical 
aim - higher quality educational provision - their chosen 
instrument for implementation, putting pressure on Local 
Education Authorities, was identical. Both stressed 
choice for students, but one emphasised choice
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between courses, the other between institutions.
Under Mark Carlisle, the Macfarlane Report pressed LEAs 
to review their 16+ provision with a view to encouraging 
the maximum choice of courses. Under Sir Keith Joseph, 
LEAS were pressed to review their total provision, and 
were reminded that the Secretary of State would judge 
proposals for reorganisation of secondary education 
according to the priority afforded to the LEAs' 'schools 
of proven worth': the new criteria was choice between 
institutions. Since the Macfarlane Report had encouraged 
LEA reviews of 16+ education, and the draft Circular, 
"Providing for Quality", had positively discouraged the 
same, the Government's policy could be regarded as 
inconsistent.
The above paragraphs note the effects of the appreciative 
judgments of key policy-makers at national level. Such 
perceptions were, in turn, affected by those who were 
beneficiaries of the system under review. For example, 
during the 1950-51 negotiations ATTI acquiesced in the 
priority given to teaching on advanced technological 
studies, in spite of the fact that the Association had 
favoured a more neutral salary structure. Why? From 
interviews with FE teacher union officers, the answer 
seems to be, quite simply, that the Association perceived 
- probably accurately - that the employers would be 
prepared to pay relatively generous rates for a 
relatively small proportion of posts, and the settlement
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ensured that that small proportion would not be 
restricted by statute - ie by the Burnham Report - only 
to those teaching on advanced courses. Through their 
acceptance of the 1950-51 offer, the Association was then 
wedded to a structure which, at least nominally, ATTI 
deplored. The employers could fairly claim 
acceptabi1i ty.
The Macfarlane Review further demonstrates the
interactive layers of appreciation within the
policy-maleing process. Education's 1986 Digest,
"Tertiary Colleges" stated:
"The Macfarlane Report failed to understand, 
or accept, the realities of the situation 
either educationally or economically, but the 
'difficulties' [in tertiary reorganisation] 
were emphasised in the Report and these were the 
products of reactionary policies and ideas, 
stimulated by teachers uneasy about their personal 
futures and supported by the nostalgia of parents 
and local politicians". (36)
This contentious judgment has much in its favour,
namely, that politicians, national and local, gain their
perceptions on educational policy and reform from a wide
variety of constituences, one of which is the head of any
local 11-18 school. As emphasised earlier, heads of
local schools are not disinterested.
Bevan might argue that the real antagonism of 
headteachers to tertiary reorganisation was based on a 
fear of losing their control of the curriculum; (37) 
Austin could state:
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"What is at issue [is] the headteachers* traditional 
independence to establish a style and curriculum and 
whether that independence ever acts against the 
long-term interests of the pupils". (38)
Politicians might have 'appreciated* headteacher
opposition to tertiary as opposition from disinterested
professionals.
There is, of course, the concrete interest of 
headteachers in the additional weighted posts for 16+ 
pupils which directly benefits the head of the 11-18 
school. The evidence of this study, however, shows that 
opposition to tertiary reorganisation was based, much 
more fundamentally, on the Vickers' point (39) that 
threats to an existing conceptual framework are resisted 
with proportionate intensity.
Members of the Macfarlane Committee had been engaged for 
a year in the consideration of detailed papers and an 
interactive process that had modified attitudes held 
before the Macfarlane process. The late attempt to 
minimise the already guarded Committee support for sixth 
form and tertiary colleges came from outside the 
process. As the case study demonstrated, the consensus 
of the Macfarlane Group was broadly held, notwithstanding 
the existence of those Departmental tensions accurately 
reported by Ranson.
The consensus held at the political level. However, full 
consideration of major issues has been precluded by the 
limitations placed on the terms of reference (40). The
234
continuing lacic of governnent action to amend the Schools 
Regulations to permit part-time allocation for the 16+ 
students (41) provides an example.
It is the contention of this work that the influence of
individual key policy-makers has a greater impact on
policy-making than does that of the civil servants'
control of the agenda. As Fowler notest
"The Oakes Committee, for example, was part of 
the historic process - but it was my invention, 
not that of a civil servant". (42)
Since Fowler was the Minister responsible for Higher
Education when the Oakes Committee was established, he is
well-placed to adjudicate on the origins of that
Committee.
Contingency in Play
This section of the Chapter will demonstrate how factors 
outside the educational issues under consideration had 
quite significant effects for the final policies.
Reference has already been made to the need to recognise 
time as a dimension of policy-making. Time is a factor 
both of the process of policy-making and of the 
environment in which that policy can be implemented. The 
contrast between the extremely concentrated lead-time for 
the 1950-51 negotiations, and the Macfarlane process 
which permitted thorough consideration, albeit of only 
those issues which the civil servants permitted onto the 
agenda, demonstrates the need for time to accommodate new
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approaches: the forner policy was rocked and very nearly 
rejected by the employers' constituents; the latter 
survived a late# quite fundamental, attack.
Time, too, was a factor in LEAs' ability to initiate 16-f 
reorganisations so soon after secondary reorganisations. 
The 1978 Survey demonstrated that it was generally 
perceived that the secondary schools and then the general 
public could not accommodate another restructuring for 
some time.
That said, one LEA at least decided not to refrain from 
16+ reorganisation by the factor of "a partial 
reorganisation* merely because, comparatively recently, 
there had been
"a partial reorganisation just a few years earlier, 
whose effects were still being felt". (43)
That Authority thereby removed 2,500 surplus 16-19 places
from LEA provision. Thus one LEA decided not to be
inhibited by the propinquity of a recent reorganisation
of secondary education. However, the time lag between
1985 and the Macfarlane Report recommending 16-19 review,
and the large number of surplus places that had been
removed by the 1985 reorganisation, indicates that for
the LEA quoted the action was urgent: the Authority had
perhaps postponed its 16+ review until the point where
some such action was overdue.
The relationship between time and reality judgments is
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elegantly expressed by Newsam in his review of the
changes in ILEA's provision over the 1970s. He notes:
"Politically and educationally, the ILEA of the 
early 1970s was still deeply influenced by the 
vision embodied in the 1947 London School Plan 
and firmly committed to the 11-18 comprehensive 
school of at least eight forms of entry (240 
pupils) a year". (44)
There are echoes here of the Spooner stance: ILEA had a
commitment for a large 11-18 school as a means of
ensuring a reasonably-sized sixth form. A year later
Newsam evaluated the position:
"The London School Plan was a brilliantly 
conceived and executed document. That is why it 
caused such trouble later. There is nothing quite 
so difficult to work through as what J S Mill 
described as the 'tyranny of a received opinion*
... [on the 11-18 school]. Over the passage of 
time, the school itself came to be seen as that 
end [the desired educational end] rather than the 
means for achieving it". (45)
Newsam is describing here the power of a long-established
ideal which prevents the realities of the current, and
predictable future, situation being taken on board.
Time is not the only contingent constraint: the other 
three dimensions also impact on policy. Accommodation 
criteria — whether you could fit the, say, proposed 
middle school, into the available buildings - was a real 
factor in the shape of LEAs' particular proposals. The 
dominating effect of capital resources - buildings and 
their location - on educational policies was an factor 
reported by Hargreaves, (46) Brown (47) and Newsam. (48) 
The continuing constraint on public sector capital 
expenditure had an impact on the ability of ILEA, also.
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when it attempted to match provision to the needs of the 
1970s. (49) The availability of buildings is highly 
relevant to any review of education provision - 
tripartite, selective, comprehensive, 11-18, 11-16 - and, 
in fact, considerably limits an LEA's scope for radical 
reorganisation.
The scope for 16-19 policy review is limited, too, by
considerations that are outside that particular brief.
Tertiary reorganisations have been
"... ironically, more about [secondary] 
schooling and its problems than any other 
single issue". (50)
Tertiary colleges have been established either as a 
result of Circular 10/65's pressure for comprehensive 
secondary provision or, more recently, due to the 
predictable effects of demographic decline on sixth 
forms.
The Macfarlane Committee's brief was that of the 16-19
sector, rather than 11-19 sector, but even that
Committee's conclusions were much modified by the
presumed effects of a bréale at 16 on the integrity of the
11-18 school. As Slater noted
"the duplication of provision in schools and 
FE as regards the 16-19 was ignored ...". (51).
Slater's criticism is entirely fair. It is also,
perhaps, unrealistic. It is not humanly possible to look
in all directions simultaneously: similarly, it was
difficult for LEAS, when required under Circular 10/65 to
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reorganise their secondary education provision along 
comprehensive lines, to take into account at the same 
time those factors of the 1970s and 1980s post-16 
education context which were not predictable in the late 
1960s.
Any policy is considered within a group of policies to 
which it is subordinate, and within another group of 
policies for which it itself is the over-arching policy 
context. By and large, tertiary reorganisations have 
been consequent upon secondary (school) negotiations.
More recently, 16-19 provision has been - rightly - 
considered within the large framework of the LEA, and 
government, strategies for adult education and 
(re)tralnlng. This fascinating area unfortunately falls 
outside the period of this study.
(lii) Values in Policy-Making
This Chapter has already referred to examples of a lack 
of coherence in policy-making for the 16+ age group. In 
the critiques of Ranson, Cordingley and Slater of Chapter 
11 examples have been given of discrete strands of 
policy-making. This final section of Chapter 12 will 
examine certain sets of discrete strands of policy to 
make explicit the values that underlie certain policies.
However, first, it should be noted that the examples of 
'discrete strands of policy-making' observed in the 16+ 
policy area are too frequent to be of relevance only to
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the Macfarlane Review. Rather, it is suggested that the 
way in which the self-same policy-makers, faced by 
different briefs, propose policies for those discrete 
briefs that effectively counteract each other, is a 
universal law of policy-making.
For the Macfarlane Review, Department of Education and 
Science - and other Government Department - repre­
sentatives would have been as conscious of the 
implications of the 16-19 Review on other parts of this 
service as were their local Authority comparators. Both 
local and national governments for education were 
represented. Why, then, were these perspectives not 
included in those other concurrent areas, such as 
secondary examinations (GCE to GCSE), reform ,for policy 
review?
The answer lies in the categorisation of concepts. The 
record appears to demonstrate a tension between the 
liberal/academic tradition on the one hand and the 
vocational/technical tradition on the other. In fact, 
the same individuals - central and local politicians and 
Departmental and LEA officers - were considering a£ 
separate questions first, how to improve the quality of 
the former provision and, second, how to promote the 
latter. Both issues were addressed by TVEI 
(Extension) and the reform of secondary public 
examinations — that is, until the 1987 Government 
administration proposed City Technology Colleges and a
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national curriculuB. Again these later initiatives lie 
outside the study.
These examples raise general issues of policy analysis.
It appears, from the research, that the categorisation of 
policy activity is, first, limited by the policy-makers' 
categorisation of concepts; and, second, limited to the 
Government's Departmental structures, which 
categorisation has the effect of reducing the scope for 
intra- and inter-Departmental consideration of those 
issues whose implications stretch beyond the Government 
Department that is responsible for initiating new 
policy. The Macfarlane process would certainly reinforce 
both of the above assertions.
It would be reasonable to infer that, given the way in 
which the review of 16-19 education provision was 
handled, then other issues are likely to have been 
considered according to historic governmental structures, 
and that the categorisation of the issue will leave very 
wide scope for the emanation of discrete and sometimes 
contradictory policy strands both within and between 
existing government departments. The ability of any 
organisation to create coherent policies will depend on 
its ability to rethink its concepts and to re-group 
or re-classify its functions.
The earlier critique of disjointed incrementalism 
included a brief reference to the danger that the
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application of established models may obscure 
significant facets of a particular policy from the 
analyst. The problem of searching for an underlying 
coherence, coupled with a presumption that the purpose of 
a policy is necessarily explicit, could perhaps lead 
analysts down veritable blind alleys. It is clear that a 
recognition of the possibility of 'discrete strands of 
policy-making' will increase analysts' ability to resist 
assumptions of underlying and coherent strategies.
At the same time, the several strands of policy are worth 
analysis as potential keys to the - potentially several - 
values of a government. Further, the possibility that 
the policy or policies may be based, quite deliberately, 
upon a covert agenda should be entertained. Examples 
will be given below.
The concepts of discrete strands of policy-making, and of 
covert agenda, arose from the research which first 
thoroughly explored the material relating to both case 
studies and, only after that work had been completed, 
referred to the established models of policy-making. A 
reverse order of work might have predisposed a policy- 
analyst to unconsciously attempt to fit the data arising 
from the research, to a policy-making model which, 
because it has been noted in advance of the research, 
would have prejudiced the conceptual framework of the 
study.
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The above points are noted in the certain knowledge that 
it is not possible to encounter any new data with an open 
mind. This research was conceived with the aim of not 
presuming the tenets of the various established 
policy-making analyses and, insofar as it is possible to 
do, 'receiving' the information gained from interviews 
and archives, with an open mind. While the aim was not, 
logically-speaking, possible, it raised some interesting 
questions, as noted below.
The essential problem for this study was that all the 
established models fitted the facts of the two case 
studies. Indeed, that recognition led to the critiques 
in Chapter 11. Essentially, where a theory appears to 
fit the circumstances of a particular policy process, and 
where all of three competing theories fit equally well, 
then the theories may be regarded with some scepticism; 
if under no conditions any of the theories is falsi­
fiable, then each may be regarded as vacuous for the 
circumstances in question.
Both of the case studies could be 'explained' within a 
systems model, a (modified) rational model or a 
disjointed incremental model: none of the perspectives 
added to the data already accumulated by the Analyst; 
none of the alternative explanations acted to demarcate 
one from the others.
An alternative methodology was then deployed - to
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identify those aspects of each case study that, 
notwithstanding possession of all relevant data, 
were still problematic. The outstanding issues are 
noted in the final section of this chapter.
Outstanding Issues
The focus of the study into the 1950-51 FE Teachers’ 
salary negotiations was that of identifying the source 
and the purpose of the salary Report whose academically- 
skewed structure -still affects the FE provision of the 
1980s. However, the archives did not explain why either 
the Teachers' or Authorities’ Panels should have been 
prepared to consider, at no notice, such a radical change 
in the salary structures.
Extensive consultations on an early draft of the case 
study and interviews with those active in the early 1950s 
revealed a consensus of those within the Ministry, LEAs, 
FE colleges and professional associations towards 
discriminatory pay for higher level work. The final 
settlement managed to accommodate the need for 
responsibility allowances throughout FE and, at the same 
time, give differential rewards for those teaching on 
higher level courses. There was no problem for those in 
the service at the time. The new salary structure fitted 
the consensus within each of the negotiating groups that, 
as long as there was some scope for those teaching on 
non-advanced work to progress to the highest salaries, 
then it was right for those teaching on advanced work to
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gain higher chances of promotion. The concept of a pay 
structure undifferentiated by level of classes taught was 
not an issue for the FE world of the 1950s.
For the secondary schools, a high differential as between 
the salaries for grammar and secondary modern heads was 
maintained, covertly, via an amendment to the age 
weightings. The sectional interests of the grammar 
school lobby had succeeded in ensuring differentiation: 
at the same time the heads of the old elementary schools, 
some now heads of secondary modern schools, also gained. 
As with the later 1951 Burnham (FE) settlement, all stood 
to gain in real terms: the academically-skewed nature of 
the settlement was not in dispute; any dispute might 
remove the general gain.
From the vantage point of the 1980s, the post-war salary 
settlement for secondary heads introduces a new 
possibility - that if a hitherto unacceptable 
discrimination is described in 'acceptable' terms, then 
the previously 'unacceptable' may be accepted by the 
whole constituency. Hence the concept of a covert 
agenda.
The term 'covert agenda' does not describe only those 
cases where all constituencies accept new terminology for 
the hitherto unpalatable but also those cases where one 
party only - the cases below refer to the government - 
intentionally disguises new policies under a more 
acceptable terminology.
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The outstanding problems of the Macfarlane Review are 
less easily settled than those of the 1950-51 FE Burnham 
negotiations. Essentially, two issues remain on the 
agenda of this research - why the pressure from the most 
interested parties for schools and sixth form colleges to 
admit part-time students has not - yet - been acceded to, 
and why the issue of choice of 16-f institutions has risen 
to the top of the political agenda.
- part-Time Education for the 16-t
The issue of part-time education for the 16+ is the least 
explicable. As stated in an earlier chapter, the reasons 
why schools and sixth form colleges have continued to be 
prevented from - legally - admitting part-time students 
could be due to either the low priority of this issue to 
the government desk or because the proposal offended a 
cultural priority.
It would seem that the second alternative provides the 
answer. Recent governments have been relatively casual 
in adding new clauses to (any) bills if the government so 
wishes. In 1979 the Incoming Conservative administration 
repealed the previous Labour government's comprehensive 
legislation, almost as its first administrative act.
More recently, the 1987 Government added a clause 
prohibiting the promotion of homosexual education to a 
Local Government Bill, even while an Education Bill was 
in progress through the Commons. Where governments have 
wanted to act, the legislative conventions have not
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deterred, at least recently. Hence it may be deduced 
that Government does not consider that 11-18 schools or 
sixth form colleges ought to be allowed to admit 
part-time students.
Indeed, a late Government amendment (52) to the 1987 
Education Bill would have the effect of ensuring that 
sixth form colleges concentrate on general education and 
do not permit part-time students. That fact reinforces 
the above deduction that this Government at least is 
acting to reinforce the bifurcated cultures of post-16 
education provision - of school-as-community on the one 
hand and FE college-as-association on the other. That 
dichotomy shores up the academic skew of the maintained 
education service.
-  c h o ic e
The rise of the issue of choice to the top of the 
education agenda is similarly intriguing. In the process 
of investigating the context for the Macfarlane Review, 
the first reference to the concept of 'choice' as related 
to 16+ education provision was in the November 1979 
Report, "Local Authority Arrangements for the School 
Curriculum". Following Callaghan's Ruskin College Speech 
in 1976 the Departments of Education and Science and 
Welsh Office had issued Circular 14/77 which required 
LEAs to report on their curricula policies. The Report 
which summarised the responses includes the following 
statement :
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"... On the other hand, some authorities were 
of the opinion that any thorough-going division 
of functions ... between sixth forms and FE would 
eliminate the element of choice for pupils as to 
the settings in which they prefer to pursue post- 
sixteen studies ... This element of choice 
is seen by many as being in itself desirable". (53)
First-hand experience suggests that the above summary
could relate to (a number of) LEAs whose officers wished
to protect GCE provision within FE colleges.
When the implications of the demographic decline projects 
for the early 1980s were 'appreciated' (in Vickers' 
sense), there was some political pressure towards 
concentrating GCE studies into sixth forms and sixth form 
colleges. The argument used to protect the continuation 
of the FE option, the alternative provider of GCE 
studies, was that 16-19 full-time students should have a 
choice of venue or 'ethos'. More pragmatically, it was 
noted that since, under the 1944 Act, FE colleges needed 
to provide general education to the 19+, a provision 
denuded of a potential 16-19 full-time 'market' would 
make that provision uneconomic.
There is evidence that young people who have transferred 
to FE or to tertiary colleges would not have remained 
within the 11-18 environment. Angela Rumbold, Minister 
of State with responsibility for 16-19, noted that:
"The percentage of those taking 'A' levels in
FE in 1974 was 12%: today it has risen to
17.5%". (54)
She corroborated evidence offered by NFER in 1979 (55) 
and by the more recent TES report on tertiary colleges -
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that an increasing number of 16+ students were 
consciously opting for a 'more adult environment'. (56)
However, both surveys, one highly structured and the 
other a journalist sample, also revealed that 16+ 
students regarded the location of the course rather than 
the nature of the institution offering the course, as the 
prime consideration. Mrs Rumbold's figures are likely to 
be an under-estimate of the total number of 16+ students 
who would have moved into FE for their post-16 studies.
At the same time, as was noted in Part III, the 
desirability of offering a choice of institutions as 
providers of 16+ education was used to defend the 
continued existence of small sixth forms in single-sex 
11-18 school. In Surrey, for example, where a potential 
tertiary review for the Redhill/Reigate area was in 
progress in the early 1980s, there was particular 
opposition from a group within the Conservative- 
controlled Council. The opposition was based on an 
assumption that 'tertiary coleges' entailed a 
comprehensivisation of 16+ provision. (57)
By the early 1980s, support for tertiary colleges had 
become identified with the Labour and Liberal parties, 
and the Conservative party was noted for its defence of 
Grammar and 11—18 schools. This does not mean that the 
local political parties had such a conveniently 
categorised predisposition. Indeed, some of the earliest
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political protagonists of both sixth form and tertiary 
colleges were Conservative LEAs. However, in one 
Parliamentary constituency within one part of an LEA only 
those Conservatives who believed in a selective system of 
secondary education were adopted as official Party 
candidates; in another part of the same LEA no such Party 
line was required. (58).
The early pages of Terry's (1987) advocacy of the 
tertiary college provides an excellent source about the 
political reverberations of 'decapitating sixth forms' 
and of 16+ reviews, and new research data on the views of 
teaching staff. It contains a reasoned rebuttal of the 
concerns that activated the Macfarlane Committee members 
to refrain from a clear pro-tertiary policy. It also 
demonstrates, significantly, how little cognisance has 
been taken of research evidence, and how much the 
policies of a government, central or local, depend on the 
reality and value judgements of the leading policy 
makers. (59)
Thus, the late 1970s saw the 'choice of institutions for 
the 16+' argument used for two, almost contradictory, 
reasons - to defend the FE colleges' right to continue 
GCE provision alongside that of the sixth form and the 
sixth form college on the one hand, and to defend the 
continued existence of small sixth forms against 16+ 
reorganisations that would have otherwise led to the 
establishment of 16+ colleges on the other.
250
The above paragraphe indicate the way that 'choice' was 
used in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They do not 
explain why that value has risen to take priority over 
the two prime values of the Macfarlane Report, 
educational effectiveness and efficiency, as evidenced by 
the government's more recent exhortations to LBAs to 
rationalise their education provision while maximising 
choice of institution. (60)
In 1985 the National Foundation for Educational Research 
held a symposium on parental choice. Reference was made 
to the avowal, through the 1970s, of both major political 
parties that parents wanted choice. Yet it was later 
suggested that:
"... there seems little evidence that this 
was based on anything more than a small number 
of people arguing against being refused the 
specific schools they sought. [But] ... the 
attractive element for parents [of individual 
schools] is often relatively small school size 
or class size, but with unlimited choice, such 
schools and classes would become overfull and 
that attraction would soon disappear". (61)
If promotion of choice of institution is given priority
over educational effectiveness and efficiency, there is a
strong possibility that those qualities about a school
which parents are believed to want for their children,
would be undermined.
Why, then, was choice of institution such a high 
political priority for the 1970s and 1980s? Quite 
simply, choice was appearing on the central and local 
government agenda because the concept was deliberately
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placed there. It was one of a group of concepts which 
were to constitute the dominant ideology of one of the 
major political parties:
"In 1975, Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph 
set up the Centre for Policy Studies ... to 
create a conservative think tank to review 
strategy and ’think the unthinkable'. In 1980, 
Caroline Cox became chair of the Centre for 
Policy Studies Education Study Group and John 
Marks its secretary. The brief, recalls Baroness 
Cox was ’to translate ideas like diversity, choice, 
freedom and accountability into coherent political 
programmes* ... In December last year the Hiligate 
Group published ’Whose Schools?’ ... The key 
proposal of ’Whose Schools?’ was that ownership 
of the nation’s schools should be transferred 
from the LEAs to independent self-governing 
trusts. Schools would receive a fixed grant from 
the government for each pupil enrolled". (62)
The above has the merit of quoting directly the sources
of the new values.
An expression of the values of the Centre for Policy 
Studies is provided in Professor Scruton’s defence 
against the attack on the Hiligate Group, ’The Challenge 
of Choice’. Scruton’s article makes a number of 
assertions - the lack of accountability of Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate; the assumption that ’élites are a necessary 
outcome of education’; the belief that ’university 
teachers are in a better position than anyone to measure 
the actual level of knowledge achieved in school’, etc - 
but there can be found only one reference to choice, and 
that implicit -
"Our proposals do not necessarily involve the 
abolition of comprehensive schools ... We are in 
favour, not of state-controlled selection among 
pupils but natural selection among schools 
[Scruton’s emphasis]. Some schools will be better 
than others, and to these the better pupils will
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naturally tend to go. Only the bad schools would 
suffer, but they would suffer terminally". (63)
The categorical error inherent in the above was
identified by one of Scruton's criticst
"Schools do not suffer, people do, and I for one 
could not tolerate the plight of those last 
remaining pupils who would be condemned to an 
education in a school which was, to use Professor 
Scruton's words, suffering 'terminally'". (64)
The above criticism rightly concentrates on the central
point - that the education proposed by Scruton is one
where abstract, and humanly-conceived concepts, are
absolutes and where the concept of the school takes
priority over the education of the young people in it.
There are other issues here, but the main point to note
is that the title "Challenge of Choice", is used to
conceal a number of contentious issues. 'Choice*appears
to have a covert, and capacious, agenda.
All political parties believe in choice: however, the 
ways in which the concept may be expressed differ widely 
in the practicability, realism and desirability. As the 
1985 symposium on parental choice demonstrated, a too- 
high priority given to one acceptable value may minimise 
other, more desirable, values. Words like 'freedom', 
'choice', 'diversity' and 'accountability' all reflect 
values which are highly esteemed in most cultures and, 
particularly, in the British representative democracy 
whose characteristics include an antagonism to state 
control.
In that context, it is illuminating that the key proposal
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of the Hillgate Group’s radical manifesto was a move from 
local to national control. Baroness Cox listed the key 
ideas of the new Conservative strategy. What, however, 
if the chosen means of translation of those key ideas 
actually resulted in less freedom, less choice, less 
diversity, less accountability?
The provisions of the 1987 Education Reform Bill itself 
are heavily dependent on the Hillgate Group's 
philosophy. They have been criticised in the following 
terms:
"By appealing to 'variety' and 'choice'. Baker 
is utilising an old-established Tory ploy. In the 
past, this argument was used to legitimate the 
tripartite system, as well as to give support for 
voluntary (church) schools when these were under 
attack. Today it is used to legitimate a variety 
of types of levels of schools, subsidised from 
public funds in various, often hidden, ways (eg 
through the assisted places scheme), sometimes 
charging fees, and designed for intermediate social 
strata - professional, business and technocratic. 
[Why?] Fundamentally, the objective is, through 
downgrading and by-passing local authorities, to 
establish a whole mini system of quasi-independent 
schools between the prestigous 'public' schools on 
the one hand, and local systems of primary and 
secondary schools on the other". (65)
Simon is convinced that the covert agenda of the various
provisions of the 1987 Education Bill is that of
deliberately reducing the power of local government.
In this context of central versus local government 
control of local education provision, it is salutory to 
note the fears of an earlier era:
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"... that to place all education under a Government 
Department would deaden it until it became 
mechanical, that it would fall under the influence 
of party politics, and that the transcient 
politicians who were at the head of the Department 
would inevitably concede power to the permanent 
officials. (66)
While the reporter of the above concerns acknowledged 
that the then newly-created Board of Education had not, 
in practice, generated the feared abuses (67), very few 
of the current educational constituences of LEAs, 
teachers and professional associations could not echo the 
quoted fears when faced by the likely increase of 
Secretary of State's powers consequent upon the 
Hillgate-inspired 1987 Education Bill.
In a wider context than education, the following
evaluation of the current Government's agenda was made:
"The new Government set about narrowing power, 
not dispersing it. It put in hand a programme 
of radical change designed in each particular to 
curtail the opportunities for local authorities, 
school authorities, university authorities, health 
authorities or housing authorities to exercise any 
mediating power between Parliament, for which read 
the Prime Minister, and people. Elected dictator­
ship is like Presidential power without the 
Congress". (68)
The particular mechanisms with which the Government has 
chosen to promote choice, diversity, freedom and 
accountability would, in practice, serve to increase the 
powers of the state by, first, deliberately reducing the 
balancing powers of local government and, second, not 
effectively increasing the powers of the majority of 
parents and students over education provision.
The effects of the proposed legislation, it is predicted.
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would also promote an elitist education provision. (69) 
Both Spooner (70) and, it is interesting to note, Scruton 
(71) would concur with that analysis.
It is arguable that the explanation for the rise of 
choice as a prime criterion for education provision is 
that the currently-dominant group within the Conservative 
Party are deliberately using the acceptable terms of 
'choice' etc to re-introduce a differentiated provision 
which would be, tautologically, elitist.
The real criterion of a policy is what is achieved, not 
what is stated. A recent penetrating analysis of the 
British education system first questions the currently 
fashionable explanation - the so-called anti-industrial 
culture - for why the education system and, therefore, 
British managers were not performing on par with 
international comparators. It then notes that the 
same facets of 'anti-industrial culture' were also 
present in Japan and Germany, and observes that Japanese 
managers were:
"... less inclined than the British, at least, 
to treat people working at different levels as 
superior and inferior human beings of whom the 
lower orders cannot be trusted to exercise 
initiative productively and must be told precisely 
what to do, and how, and be watched closely while 
they are doing it". (72)
Professor Charles Handy's view - that the significant 
differences between UK managers on the one hand, and 
Japanese and US comparators on the other, probably lay in 
their education — is then noted. By comparison with
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British managers those in the US and Japan "tend to be
much more questioning and keen to learn about things both
central to and beyond their particular job". Handy had
agreed that this was probably related to UK (excepting
Scotland) general education which was "the sort of
education system that gets wanting to learn a bad name".
The author»Dixon, then concluded:
"It would not be unfair to describe that [the 
education] system as a device which, for every 
person it qualifies for anything, disqualifies 
about two from everything at a cost of £16bn a 
year. Above all, it is a system that concentrates 
overwhelmingly on preparing people for the sort of 
society that would appear to have little chance of 
economic well-being in the future". (73)
Dixon described an elitist workforce, trained in their
habits by the education that they experience. The
majority of those in management today would have been
educated under the post-war tripartite system.
There is a de facto relationship between a stratified 
education structure and the content of the education 
provided. The TVEI (Extension) scheme will entail that 
neighbouring schools and colleges will be working 
together in consortia to promote an integrated 
curriculum, including science, technology and design, for 
all 14-18 pupils and students. The proposals within the 
1987 Education Bill are widely believed (74) to act 
directly counter to the aims of the TVEI (Extension). 
Whilst the education world has welcomed the content of 
TVEI, it has opposed the implications of the Bill.
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It has not been possible to explain the tension of 
ideologies as between 'choice* and elitist education on 
the one hand and conprehensive (and egalitarian) on the 
other within the education context alone: it can be 
understood only within the larger canvas of social 
policies and attitudes. Reference has already been made 
to the establishment of the Centre for Policy Studies in 
1975. In a review of the Thatcher years, Robert Harris 
notes t
"Mrs Thatcher came to power nearly nine years ago, 
determined to change us all. Not merely the way we 
live, but the way we think. 'Economics is the 
method', she said in 1981, 'the object is to change 
the soul'". (75).
It would not be unfair to attribute directly to the Prime 
Minister the re-emergence of the erst-while dominant, but 
implicit, value of elitism to the top of the educational 
agenda.
Using the study's development of Vickers' theory of 
policy-making, this chapter has, first, described the 
importance of particular individuals to policy outcomes. 
It has noted the impact of the contingent - for 
educational policy, principally time and available 
accommodation - on the policy-making process. Finally, 
it has explored the implicit values of 16-19 provision by 
reference to the very recent policy issues consequent 
upon the Hillgate Group's publication and the current 
Education Bill. The conclusions of the research follow.
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CHAPTER 131 CCNfCUISIOirS
This chapter will note briefly the conclusions drawn fron 
the research, first about the influence of values in 
educational policy-making for the 16+ age group and, 
second, about principles of policy-making.
The period covered by the research extends from the 
mid-1940s to the mid-1980s. In that timespan, and from 
within the research, certain features of policy-making 
stand out.
First, policy-makers are motivated more by what is 
generally perceived, or appreciated, by other policy­
makers than by evidence, even when the evidence is easily 
available. Second, those perceptions, or 
'appreciations', are most influenced by the dominant 
values of the culture in which the policy-makers 
operate. Third, that values - personal and cultural - 
change very slowly, and that the policy conflicts between 
those with a high personal investment in the existing 
system and those with intentions for radical change, will 
be necessarily intense. The Vickers' theory of 
'appreciative judgement' provides a highly pertinent 
framework for these conclusions.
Further, the research has illustrated, to an extent 
beyond Vickers' own theory, the critical dimension of 
'time' and the potency of the individual, in the process 
of policy-making. Additionally, the research has
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introduced two facets to the analysis of policy-naking - 
the 'covert agenda', whereby new (and potentially 
unacceptable) policy is introduced in terminology 
acceptable to the relevant constituency, and the 
'discrete strands ...' principle whereby policies of the 
same government Department do not cohere.
Values Underlying 16-19 Provision
The research commenced with the suggestion that post- 
compulsory education provision was academically-skewed 
and sought to explore how far that might be a consequence 
of the Burnham Salary Reports for schoolteachers and FE 
teachers.
The lack of archival or documentary evidence of the 
influence of the Burnham Report in college or LEA records 
led to an investigation into the 1951 FE teachers' 
settlement that created the current salary structure for 
FE teachers. This was intended to complement researches 
into Burnham negotiations for schoolteachers (Saran, 
1985). The aim was to identify the values of policy­
makers: did the employer and employee representatives on 
the Burnham Committee intend the academic-skew that was a 
consequence of the higher weighting for advanced level 
work and, if so, why?
The evidence from the archives and interviews with 
leading members of past and present employee and employer 
Panels of the Burnham (FE) Committee has led to the firm
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conclusion that the majority on both sides of the 
negotiating table concurred with the continuing 
differential towards higher salaries for teaching on 
advanced, higher level and, usually, more academic course 
work.
The research revealed two reasons for the continuing 
acquiescence with the cultural norms. First, the 
majority of the negotiators shared, and perceived their 
constituents as sharing, those norms. Second, for both 
sides of the negotiating table the constraints of the 
particular, the contingent, were powerful in modifying 
cases of principle. For the employers, a relatively high 
salary for a relatively few employees was always more 
'realistic' within Treasury and ratepayers' limitations 
than a (more) radical review of the system that, almost 
certainly, would lead to a higher global salary 
settlement. For the employees, salary settlements which 
demonstrated a continuing concern for those members 
teaching on advanced courses was a means of preserving a 
near monopoly of the representation on Burnham and 
related negotiating fora.
The research also sought to determine how far separate 
salary settlements for teachers in schools and FE 
inhibited LEA review of 16-19 provision. The age- 
weighted salary structure for schools brought financial 
and resource benefits to schools with sixth forms. The 
the Macfarlane Committee had requested LEAs to identify
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barriers to 16-19 reorganisation: some LEA responses
had noted the Burnham Reports as barriers. The 16-19 
reorganisation proposals of those LEAs were examined and. 
In each case, those LEAs had made allowance for Burnham- 
related incentives by guaranteeing that 11-18 schools 
would be protected at the relevant Burnham levels should 
a plan to establish either sixth form or tertiary college 
be adopted. Thus, within at least those LElAs who were 
most sensitive to the implications of the salary 
differentials for 16-19 reorganisation, direct self- 
interest or sectional interests had been minimised. It 
is likely that this occurred in other LEAs whose 16-19 
reviews were not investigated.
However, while the sectional interests within 16-19 
reviews of educational provision may have been met by 
specific LEA accommodation, the promotional interests 
could not have been so easily modified. Part III 
demonstrated the weight and power of normative values 
over more practicable benefits.
Indeed, a further conclusion from the investigation into 
the effects of the Burnham Reports on post-16 provision 
is that statistical and objective evidence was less 
relevant to the outcome of LEA reviews than were the 
values of the policy-makers. The London and Home 
Counties Regional Advisory Council, acting for its 
constituent LEAs, had reported to Alexander details of 
problems in recruiting any FE staff. Similarly, the
262
Teachers' Panel formally presented a summary of a survey 
of PE principals. Neither of the arguments which rested 
on evidence appears to have affected the progress of the 
1950-51 FE Salary negotiations.
Similarly, the evidence about the effects of a break at 
16 and tertiary reorganisation schemes was available to 
the Macfarlane Committee through a number of members of 
the Officers' Groupi there is no archival indication that 
evidence of the actual effects of tertiary reorganisation 
ever dented the Committee's consideration of the issues.
The Committee, and the final Macfarlane Report, made much 
of the potential problems created by the decapitation of 
schools with sixth forms even though, in July 1979, the 
Secondary Heads Association had published a survey of 170 
heads of 11-16 schools (76) that showed that a majority 
were satisfied with the arrangements and considered that 
their schools were able to operate efficiently without 
sixth forms. Such evidence, from one of the leading 
sectional interests of the 16-19 Review, ought to have 
modified the Committee's considerations: it did not. 
Similarly, the evidence from the disinterested NFER 
publication. The Sixth Form and its Alternatives, was 
disregarded.
The conclusion that the Burnham Reports were not the 
primary cause of the academically-skewed nature of 
post-16 education provision is based on the lack of any
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evidence to support such a hypothesis, and the evidence 
of the interviews conducted for this research as well as 
participant observations.
The process of detailed investigation of the archives of 
Burnham (FE) Committees since the war, including those of 
the negotiations reported in Part II, have been 
'appreciated' in Vickers' sense of the term, against 
first-hand Burnham experience of 1978-81. Thus the 
premise on which the research was based has been 
demonstrated to be unjustified.
The conclusion is not, however, empty. While the 
original premise has been found wanting, the process of 
achieving that conclusion has highlighted some 
interesting aspects of educational policy-making.
First, that a premise which now appears unjustified was,
nevertheless, powerful in practitioners' appreciation of
the world in which they operated. Only one piece of
documentary evidence for the premise has been traced;
however, in the educational world of the early 1970s
(77), the belief that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19
review was a 'given'. Perhaps only the honesty of that
Head of an 11-18 school can demonstrate why:
"My defence of the sixth form will surely be 
influenced by my agonised experience of the 
Burnham Triennial Review of salary points. Every 
sixth form student adds 8 points ... every 12 
year old ... 2 points ... Crude yes, non-educational 
- perhaps. However, until Burnham manages to reform 
its system ... it is unlikely that many heads or
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Governing Bodies of comprehensive schools will leap 
with alacrity when a break at 16 Is proposed". (78)
Those CEOs who reported to the Macfarlane Committee that
the Burnham Reports Inhibited 16-19 reorganisation were
accurately expressing that common belief.
So the first Illuminating feature of the failure to 
demonstrate that the Burnham Reports Inhibited 16-19 
review Is the exemplification of the power of 'received' 
wisdom In the administrative and political process. The 
earlier comments on the lack of cognisance taken of 
available evidence are pertinent here. Policy-makers are 
motivated more by what Is generally perceived, or 
appreciated, by other policy-makers than by statistical 
or factual evidence, even when It Is easily available.
The second conclusion of the failure to demonstrate that 
the Burnham Reports either created the academically- 
skewed nature of post-16 education or Inhibited 16-19 
review Is more critical for an understanding of the 
source of the values underpinning 16+ provision. Simply, 
the Burnham Reports have faithfully reflected the 
dominant values of the culture.
It Is Important here to emphasise that the culture 
referred to Is not that of a free-standing educational 
world. That world Is a part of the national - or, 
rather, English - culture. Here, a number of strands are 
pertinent. In Part IV, Professor Handy's recognition 
that his criticisms of the educational system did not -
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necessarily - extend to Scotland is worth noting. 
Sinilarly, Sir Joseph Pope's comments should be 
considered:
"Sir Joseph Pope, who as professor of mechanical 
engineering at Nottingham University in the 1950s 
designed a miniature engine test-bed for the 
applied science laboratory at Ealing Grammar 
School, has also recorded his exasperation with 
the conservatism of the educational system, 
[author's emphasisJ "The educational system is 
such a tightly-closed loop, which we've got to 
break'". (79)
It is the conservatism of the English culture that has 
led to a continuously-reinforced academically-skewed 
culture.
The separate onslaughts on the anti-industrial bias of 
the English culture of Correlli Barnett and Martin Wiener 
have frequently been linked. They have asserted that 
the English education system has reinforced that 
bias. (80) However, the investigations into post- 
compulsory provision since the war leads to the 
conclusion that the source of the 'anti-industrial' 
culture does not lie within the public or LEA-maintained 
schools or even universities alone. Rather, the 
educational system reflects a general culture which is 
hierarchical and elitist.
The education system has certainly expressed the cultural 
norms of English society. The source of the social 
values cannot be easily laid at the door of the education 
system, but one component of that society. However, the 
reflected values act to reinforce. The test of any
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educational reform has appeared to be its ability to 
ensure Oxbridge entrance« since there are a limited 
number of Oxbridge places, the conservatism of the 
culture reinforces the elitism of the provision.
However, the length of the period covered by this study 
makes it possible to identify a significant shift in the 
priorities of central government. While the policies 
implicit in the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and 1980 
Macfarlane Report may not have disturbed the cultural 
support for elitist provision, the intentions of both 
policies were - if anything - opposed to such support.
The statutory basis for current provision, the 1944 Act, 
was based very largely on a consensus. By contrast, the 
1987 Education Bill eschews consensus. Further, the 
Government has deliberately set out to strengthen some of 
the elitist facets of the education system. Independent 
providers have been encouraged so that, by implication, 
the LEA-maintained sector is perceived as defective. (81) 
The diversion of support from public to private provision 
is a feature of the current Government's overall social 
strategy.
Principles of Policy-Making
Two principles of policy-making have been amply 
exemplified in the research, the priority of the values 
of the policy-makers over the available evidence; and the 
power of received wisdom that is shared by other 
influential policy-makers. Whilst these two principles
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are based on the research into the values underlying the 
post-war post-16 education system, it would seem 
reasonable to infer that they may have more general 
applicability.
There are four other principles which can be identified 
from the research:
the interaction of an individual's reality and 
value judgements with those of colleagues to 
create a consensus;
the 'Cleopatra's nose' (82) analysis of 
policy-malcing whereby the particular 
attributes of policy-makers significantly 
affect the outcomes;
discrete strands of policy-making; and 
the covert agenda.
These points are considered in turn.
First, Vickers' theory of appreciative judgement provides 
a better instrument of policy analysis than do the 
didactic tablets of systems theory, rational or 
disjointed incrementalism. However, Vickers' theory does 
not provide the role of individual policy-makers' with 
the weight that this research demonstrates is 
appropriate.
The 'Cleopatra's nose' theory of history permits a high 
variability of outcomes dependent on the nature of the 
particular individuals concerned. The evidence from two
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case studies demonstrate that the particular appreciative 
judgements of the policy-makers helped to create one 
outcome and not others which, on the face of It, would 
have been equally predictable. Alexander and Savage, 
Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, all present examples where 
the particular policy-makers redirected policy-outcomes.
Third, so far as significant initiatives are concerned, 
the policy process is likely to be affected by the 
'discrete strands of policy-making' principle so that 
continuums of policy are difficult to identify, possibly 
or even usually because they do not exist.
Fourth, any policy may be based on 'covert agenda', where 
a new and potentially contentious policy is disguised by 
more acceptable and uncontentious terminology. Analysts 
should start investigations by examining the outcomes of 
the policy-decisions, and judge how far these, rather 
than the rhetoric surrounding policy, were intended and 
are indications of the real purpose behind the 
introduction of the policy.
It is readily acknowledged that the above do not 
constitute the conclusions anticipated at the outset of 
this study. The research has demonstrated that the 
Burnham Reports have acted as but one constituent of the 
cluster of factors operating on the shape of post- 
compulsory education provision. More significantly, the
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APPENDIX I
TBB FB TEACHERS' SAUUtlES 8TRIICTORE
Throughout the period covered by the research, 1944-1987, FE 
teachers' salaries were determined by the Burnham (FE) 
Committee, composed of representatives of the local 
authorities and the teachers' associations - and, latterly, 
of the Secretary of State. The following paragraphs are 
based on the 1983 Burnham (FE) Report, and still describe 
the essential constituents of the FE teachers' salary 
structure.
Vocational FE courses are classified according to a table 
originally developed in 1967, which reads as followsi
Definition of Categories of work
"I (i) Taught courses or research programmes, or
combinations of the two, leading to a higher 
degree.
(ii) Courses leading to qualifications agreed to be of 
post-graduate standard, where a first degree or 
equivalent qualification in an appropriate 
discipline would normally be a pre-requisite for a 
student taking the course. (VThere an extra period 
of time is required to bring students up to entry 
requirements of a post-graduate course, such a 
'bridging course' will normally be graded Category 
II/III.)
II/III Courses above Ordinary National Certificate 
standard and leading directly to degrees of 
Universities of the United Kingdom or degrees of 
the Council for National Academic Awards; and 
courses with entry standards equivalent to one or 
two 'A' levels and which lead directly to 
qualifications which satisfy the academic criteria 
accepted for graduate status for salary purposes or 
study of an equivalent standard but not necessarily 
leading to the qualifications mentioned.
(i)
IV study or courses above the Ordinary level of the 
General Certificate of Education or comparable level 
leading directly to the ordinary national 
certificate or courses or parts of courses of a 
comparable standard.
V Courses other than those described above."
The Grading of Courses list classifies the vast majority of 
vocational FE courses according to the five groupings.
Using the above classification and the Grading of Courses 
List (which allocates different years of certain courses to 
different categories, as agreed by the Grading of Courses 
Working Party), the LEA calculates the unit totals of 
colleges and departments by first calculating the number of 
student hours in each category of work and then dividing the 
total by the following divisors:
Category of Work
I for each 100 student hours count 1 unit
II/III for each 300 student hours count 1 unit
IV & V for each 600 student hours count 1 unit.
When the unit total for the college has been calculated, its
group is fixed by the following table:
Unit Total Group of College
Up to 250 1
251 - 500 2
501 - 1000 3
1001 - 1750 4
1751 - 2750 5
2751 3750 6
3751 - 5000 7
5001 - 6500 8
6501 - 8500 9
8501 - 11000 10
11001 - 13500 11
Over 13500 12
When the department's unit total has been established, its 
grade is fixed by the following table:
(ii)
Unit Total Grade of Department
76 - 140 I
141 - 250 II
251 - 400 III
401 - 600 IV
601 - 900 V
Over 900 VI
The Principals, Vice-Principals and Heads of Departments' 
salaries are paid according to the group or grade of their 
college or department.
The FE Teachers' Salary Report currently relates the college 
establishment to a range of proportions of (promoted) posts 
according to the volume of courses within each of the 
categories of work. This relationship is described as the 
'Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work' (POP/COW) table. 
The current proportions are as follows:
Proportion of Posts
Category Grade 
of Work
I Principal Lecturer
Senior Lecturer 
and Lecturer Grade 
II
II/III Principal Lecturer 
Senior Lecturer & 
Lecturer Grade II
IV Senior Lecturer 
Lecturer Grade II 
Lecturer Grade I
V Senior Lecturer 
Lecturer Grade II 
Lecturer Grade I
Estabs of 
FE
%
20-30
70-80
10-25
75-90
Coll.of Educ. 
(Technical)
%
35-40
60-65
25-35
65-75
%
0- 5 
40-70 
30-60
0- 5 
15-35 
70-85
Thus, where a college offers, almost exclusively. Category 
IV or V work, there will be relatively few Senior Lecturer 
posts and very few Principal Lecturer posts (at least, 
through the statutory Burnham provisions).
(iii)
It should be noted that the level of students taught does 
not determine the grade of the individual teacher except in 
the case of the 'Houghton SL* where Lecturer IIs teaching 
more than 50% of advanced level work move onto the Senior 
Lecturers' salary range.
The substantial work includes many references to the 
Burnham-generated difference as between colleges with 
predominantly advanced work and those with predominantly 
non-advanced work. The difference is best exemplified by 
comparison between two colleges which have broadly similar 
volumes of student enrolments operating within the same LEA 
policies. Their November 1985 enrolments are reproduced 
below with the full-time equivalent [FTE] computations in 
parentheses t
Category of Students College X College Y
Full-Time 1295 (1295) 1154 (1154)
Short Full-Time 213 [191.7] 23 [20.7]
Sandwich 266 [239.4] 315 [283.5]
Block Release 171 [68.4] 155 (62)
PTDR(l) 652 [260.8] 1977 (790.8)PTD+ER(2) 1845 [738] 804 (321.6)
PTD(3) 259 [103.6] 365 (146)PTD+E(4) 142 (56.8) - ( - )
Evening Only 373 [74.6] 1187 (237.4)
Distance Learning 25 (5) - ( - )
Total 5241 (3033.3) 5980 (3016)
(1) Part-Time Day Release
(2) Part-Time Day + Evening :Release
(3) Part-Time Day (not release)
(4) Part-Time Day + Evening (not release).
VRiile College Y has a higher volume of students than College 
X, the position is reversed as far as the FTE count is 
concerned. However, the student loading on each college is 
broadly comparable.
(iv)
The position changes quite radically when the divisors of 
the 'Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work' (POP/COW) 
table are used on the student hours in accordance with the 
level of work grading of their courses. It produces the 
following relativities of staffing: College X College Y
Principal Lecturer 47 7
Senior Lecturer 4 9
Senior Lecturer/Lecturer I I *  192 33
Lecturer II 89
Lecturer I 15 93
Total 324 231
* 'Houghton SLs', ie those who have progressed through to 
the Senior Lecturer grade by virtue of the proportion 
of Category II/III work they teach.
There are striking disparities in two related areas. First,
College X has virtually half as many staff again as College
Y. Second, there is a significantly higher number, and
proportion of, promoted posts in College X than in College
Y. That is, quite simply, a direct result of the weightings
of the Burnham Report [whose simple application is currently
mitigated by ensuring that Grade III Departments should have
one Senior Lecturer, Grade IV and V Departments two, and
Grade VI Departments three Senior Lecturers "where the
standards of work in the Departments would not otherwise
justify such appointments"].
The first disparity, of size of establishment, deserves 
commentary. The conditions of service agreement provides 
for promoted posts to have progressively reduced 
'class-contact' hours (ie 20-22 for Lecturer Is, 18-20 for 
Lecturer IIs, 17-20 for Senior Lecturers and 15-18 for 
Principal Lecturers. Hence a college with a high proportion
(v)
of advanced work will need more staff than one with little 
advanced work to cover the same number of teaching hours. 
Further, advanced further education is paid from a national 
'AFE Pool' composed of contributions from all LEAs. Until 
1979 the AFE Pool was calculated according to the teaching 
costs of AFE work. The LEAs forwarded their individual 
bills, and the total was split between the LEAs for 
payment. This open-ended system of funding AFE has now 
ceased: however, it provides an explanation of the tendency 
for colleges with high proportions of AFE work to have 
larger establishments.
A second example of the incentives and disincentives of the 
FE system is provided by College Z. In the pre-capped AFE 
Pool period. College Z claimed that 33% of its work was 
advanced. Certainly a third of the teaching hours available 
to the College were employed on Category II/III work. When 
the National Advisory Body for HE introduced a unit funding 
based on FTE student count for its allocations from a 
'closed' AFE Pool, the proportion of College Z's teaching 
time devoted to AFE work dropped initially to 30% and then, 
with a net increase in Category IV and V students, down to 
25%. With a nice irony, the Burnham Report then penalised 
College Z since the reduction in its proportion of Category 
Il/lII work entailed a reduced entitlement to promoted 
posts: a real increase in student numbers occasioned a 
reduction of a number of Senior Lectureships. Of course, 
the LEA was free to exceed the statutory minimum of POP/COW 
and College Z was not required to sack or down-grade any 
members of staff.
(vi)
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t e sting n c g a t i v c s: docs n c  b u r m a m  (re) icpofs imcibxt w e  
ICSPOtiSIVCNESS OP 1 »  re SYSTOtS?
Kathryn Burrows,
Research Student,
City of London Polytechnic*
TVC CONTEXT OF T»C QUESTION
A cxurlous fact about current IE provision is that courses for a 
large section of the 16-«- population are provided by the IE service 
on connisslon from a training agency rather than being self-generated*
One possible explanation of the 1<v ;k of non-coenlssioned FE provision 
for the operative, the umruallfled and uneoployed is that the Kumham 
Report governing the salaries of individual PE teachers is biassed 
towards the development of advanced further education (AIE) courses* 
An incentive towards the provision of one type of course necessarily 
acts, particularly within a fixed quant» of resources, as a dis­
incentive towards the provision of other types*
The contrast between the current social and economic need for noo- 
aclvanced vocational courses and the various wci^tlngs of the Aumham 
Report towards advanced work would appear to si^jport the hypothesis
of my research which Is, that the Report governing the salaries of 
' (1)FE tethers h-»’^ positively accoituated 'academic skew' This
paper will arst provide come cultural evidence of 'academic skew*; 
it will then describe the historical roots of the weightings for 
advanced work; and, finally, it will note one significant problem in 
testing that hypothesis*
The rccaimefyl.itiono of mijor educ.itional reports or Acts which 
Government dxxjscs to implement provide one cxprossl«! of social 
values* I refer below to the 1944 Education Act and the 1959 Crowther 
Report since both contained recommendations for both the schools and 
FE sectors*
The 1944 Act represented a charter for education for all. It 
included provicionr. for the education of those of compilcory school
( 1)
age, for 15^10 year olds In enploywnt, and for all over cofl|iuIaocy 
school'leaving age. Ihe * first principles* of post-var reconstruction 
were listed by Ransbotton, Butler's predecessor, as early as May 1941 
and later reported by Ihe Tlsies (1949) ast
(a) raising the (school) leaving age to 15;
(b) establishiaent of day continuation schools for lS-18; and
(c) refora and exp^^nsion of secondary education of a type 
suitable for every child.
Gosdm (1976) noted that Butler's priorities, as conveyed to 
Churchill, ran:
(a) inchtstrial and technical training, and the linking of schools 
more closely td.th raployswnt}
(b) settlevaent with the churches about the dual syston; and
(c) the ftiture of the public schools.
Zt is slTiificant that the one stajor point feoturlng in both 'short 
lists* that, in the event, was rwt tackled was the 'day continution 
school'. Those reforas relating to Aill^tlsie schooling were 
inplciaented and those relating to non-advanced FE were not. That 
there w<ns limitation on resources is not doubted: the choice taken 
between options, however, is si{pd.ficant.
Similarly, the Ctowther Report for 15-18 year olds reconmended the 
raising of the school leaving age to 16, and the enactatent of the 
1944 provisions for country colleges. Both recoffncndations were 
accepted: the foracr was enacted but not the latter.
It might be possible to demonstrate that the weightings towards 
full-time advanced courses in the Bumh<im fE Reports do no more than 
reflect the cultural priorities of their period. Cuthbert (1980) 
would disagree: reviewing Locke's (197») history of Woolwich 
Polytechnic, Cuthbert argues that the 'academic drift* rationale 
provides a necessary, but not sufiicient, explanation for the 
tendency to discard part-time and lower level work; in Cuthbert's 
view it is the Bumhan Report which is the 'skewing* factor.
Similarly, Eric Robinson (1979) has stated: "I wmxrccssfully tried 
to persuade Crosland that It was not sufficient to urge the
(ii)
polytechnics to retain sub^degree and part-tijae education: positive 
incentives had to be offered to then to do so and these have been 
lacking'*, suggesting that the incentives of the Bumhan Reports 
positively favour ftill-ti»e adv.^nced work.
n C  ICIGHTING OF THE BURNHAM (FE) REPORT TOWARDS ADVANCED COURSES 
Constituents of the Bu m h w  (FE) Report
Birch and Latcham (1979) .irgue that the provision of the Burnham (FE) 
Report produce undesirable incentives in the FE system. Fbr example, 
the hi^er the level of work, the greater the number of points and the 
higher the salaries of principils, vice prlncipils and heads of 
deportment. Fbr example, six *0* or *A' level students, or three 
undergraduate-equivalents, count the same as one postgraduate 
towards a department's and a college's unit total of points.
The above weighting towards advanced work is compounded by the 
proportions of (graded) posts table inAilch Burnham prescribes "to 
secure an appropriate relativity between the standardsof work and 
the posts of the various categories of staff in the establishment of 
the colleges". In all colleges, t)jc proportion of graded posts 
result from a high proportion - or not - of AFE work, and it is 
difficult to devise i ceasonible promotion structure in a college not 
ioing a significant proportion of AFE.
The foregoing paragraph docs not relate to the salary of the
(2)individual lecturer. Lord Alcxmdcr's Comcntarics emphasised a 
principle held by both Panels of the Burnham Comittec: that the 
level of an indlvidUvil lecturer's teaching load did not detcnxinc 
that Individual's grade or salary. However, since Houghton and the 
1975 Report, a Lecturer Grade II with 50% or more of Category I or 
II/lIl teaching can be transferred to the Senior Lecturer (SL) sc.jIc . 
The 'relativity of St .ndards of work and posts* means that tN> 
'Houghton SL* has reduced the scope for promotion open to the 
lecturer not te<>chlng more than 50% ATE courses; further, there is 
yet jnothcr incentive in the FE system to increase the volume of 
■ idvunced level work.
(ill)
Before turning to the hlctorlcal roots of the above complexities, 
it is worth noting that the fact that awuiy of the rewr:)cds of the re 
system go to r.tiiff Involved in Are docs not, of^^tscl£, dotnnstrate 
that the Bumh ira provisicxis h<Tvr acted as an incentive towards Are 
provision In any specific cases. It could be that the postulated 
•skewing* effects of the Eiucnhtm (re) Report (can) operate only where 
there is, already, a (significant?) proportion of Are work.
The Historical Roots of the Bumhctii (re) Report Varl-ibles
While the principle of a relativity between proportions of promoted 
posts and volume of odvanced work was first expressed in the 1959 
Report, the differentiation as between level of courses existed pre­
war. The 192? ftrmham (Technical) Report explicitly limited the st<)tus 
of 'dep.irt»cnt* to those groups of classes including 'a substantial 
■imount of higher work*.
Following agreement between the two Panels of the Dumhom (Prlsviry 
and Secondary) Consnittce on the Report to operate after the war, the 
Authorities Panel (AP) attempted to devise a coherent sal<iry structure 
for the rag bag of institutions whose only coemon denominator was their 
not being schools. Initially it w s proposed that scales bcxvidly 
similar to those for schools be adopted. The Authorities Panel 
offered Senior Assistant (SA) posts to cover both the schools'
Special Responsibility Allowances (SRAs) 'ind the f<-x;t that univorsity- 
eguivalent work wis provided by technical establishments.
The Authorities Panel and the Te->chers Panel (TP) for the Burnham 
(Technical) Connittee differed on one b<islc asrumfitlon. The 
Authorities Panel considered th it most work of technical Institutions 
was of school standard >/iilst the Teachers* P«inel argut-d th-it >n 
uncrodlted amount of 'university level* work existed. Addition illy, 
the Teachers* Panel had argued for a higher proportion of Special 
Respcwisibility Allowances within the technical sector than in schools 
because the high proportion of |»rt-tl0e staff entailed heavy 
adralnlstratlve bxurdons for full-time technical staff.
The 1940 Burnham (Technical) Report contained provisions for both 
Senior Assist'ints and Special Responsibility Allowances. The doxible 
advantage was a consequence of the Teachers Panel tapping two, 
separate, instincts of the Authorities Panel: that those doing
(iv)
university>«qulvalent woxic should be psld coaiperable salaries .md, 
that full-time staff In technical Institutions should be fairly 
conpensoted for their heavy administrative loads* Ihe final 194$ 
agreement contained within it the seeds of the 1951 system: it gave 
extra salary for extra responsibility (as In schools) and extra 
salary for university-equivalent work: both throu^ the same 
mechanism, the ' proportion of posts' table*
Following the 1945 settlement both P.anels had received complaints 
that the negotiated percentages of Special Responsibility Allowances - 
20% of rr staff (5% more than for schools) - were too rigid, and the 
1948 Report pemiltted 20%-27^of FT teaching posts to have Special 
Responsibility Allow>mces* Even then, the variability of provision 
was so high th't some L£A areas ml^t have exclusively Senior 
Assistants and holders of Special Responsibility Allowances as their 
full-time FE st' if and others none at all* However, after the Burnham 
(Technical) Report had awarded two different sets of rewards v4jerc 
only one had bcu;: offered, the ICAs curbed any attempt of exploit 
the double advan: .ge by the 'pn portion of posts' table. From 
Assistant, Assi:. :ant with Spec! 1 Responsibility Allowance and 
Senior Assistant come the 1951 terms of 'Assistant Grade A',
•Assist int Grade- B', 'Lecturer' and 'Senior Lecturer', the incidence 
of the latter tv>o gro-les to be determined by the volume of 
university-equivalent work. A new section of the Burnham (Technical) 
Report defined (course) work as belonging to one of three categories; 
viork of university, advance) and r.ct:ool standard* The following 
guide to an <)pproprlato relativity between the standards of work and 
posts of various categories w.ic given to L£As:
Senior Lecturers - work of university standard 
Lecturers - ¿idvaixred work and/or work of university standard 
Assistants Grade B - work of school standard <ind/or actvancod work 
Assistants Gr-adc A - work of school standard
Subsequent Rc(X)rts have cemented the 'proportion of posts' policy 
Into the re structure: the roots of the complex 'proportions of posts' 
t itle of the Appendix to the FE Report w.»s the result of an attempt 
to fuse Into one career ctr\icturc two very separate values:
'rospon.-.ibility' and Icvi’l of course work*
(V)
>C1KXX)L06ICAL APPROAOCS
Any exaniin-ition of whether and, If so, how the Burnham Report
provisions h<Tve accentuated 'acadendc skew* must disentangle the 
effects of the Burnham Report from those of the following conconltant 
factors:
Ihe APE Pool, the fact that, until very recently, the 
funding for the AFC Pool was *opcn-eodcd' wiy have 
provided a strong Incentive to develop 'hl^^r* rather 
than lower-level coxirses as the controls for the former 
were certainly less direct than was the annual estlAite 
for non-advanced work by the maintaining 1£A*
Conditions of Service Agreements, Birch and Latcham 
(1979) argue convincingly th.->t the conditions of service 
differential for class^ontact hours for different grades 
of lecturer provides a strong incentive for the promotion 
of advanced work*
Ibndjto^^wacds. Handatory awards for students 
accepted onto degree-level courses and the Robbins' 
expansion of higher education places In the 1960s miy 
have distorted both provision and student demand*
Soclo^^ttitudes* Ihe earlier discussion, above, provides 
some educational expressions of cultural priorities.
Course Control* The separation of the functions of the 
authorisation of courses from those of the funding of 
courses may have contributed to 'academic skew'*
One central problem of the research Is how the effects of the abwe 
five factors on the m  service c>in be disentangled from those of the 
Bumh<ia (FE) Report* Given this problem, the methodology should 
perhaps be concerned with examining whether and. If so, how the 
Burnham (FC) Report does Inhibit the responsiveness of the Fi: 
system rather than investigating whether and. If so, how far the 
Report promotes 'acodcmlc skew’.
Notes
X devised the term 'academic skew' since '>icadenic drift' w^ is 
too clearly conventionally associated with HE development ind, 
anyway, contained connotations of p>asolvlty* 'Academic skew' 
conveys the sense of a positive force, and one with unintended 
• conscjquencos •
(Vi)
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A.2 Interviews and Other Feedback
Between 1980 and 1985, a total of thirty-seven (mostly 
leading) Further Education policy-makers were 
interviewed, several of them more than once. Interviews 
lasted from one to three hours, were open-ended and 
usually conducted in the non-directive conversational 
style. Careful advanced preparation, drawing on archival 
and other data, ensured that major relevant policy issues 
were raised with each respondent, for comment. A major 
aim of the interviews was for the researcher to gain 
insights into respondents' views on the management of the 
FE system and the intentions of negotiators. Many of 
those interviewed expressed great interest in the 
research, and in consequence subsequently commented on 
the researcher's draft papers. Extensive written and/or 
oral feedback on such papers was received from a 
considerable number of policy-makers with first-hand 
experience of the particular aspects of FE policy being 
researched.
Interviews (* also commented on draft chapters)
Lord Alexander of Potterhill, ex-Secretary, AEC and of 
Management Panel, Burnham - 18 December 1984.
John Baillie,* NATFHE Executive Member and Principal of 
Southwark - 14 January 1981.
Dennis Bennett, Secretary, London and SE RAC and of
Standing Conference of RACs (SCRAC) - 17 July 1984.
John Bevan, Ex-ILEA FE Officer, Past President NATFHE,
then Secretary of NAB - 14 January 1981 and 17 June 
1981.
(ii)
Derek Birch,* Deputy Director, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff 
College - 7 March 1981.
Ted (Sir Edward) Britton,* Ex-General Secretary ATTI 
(NATFHE'e predecessor) and NUT - 3 April 1980.
George Brosan, then Director of HELP, previously FE 
Officer for Middlesex - 22 December 1980 and 
16 March 1981.
Peter Calvert, FE Officer, ILEA - 20 January 1984.
Phillipa Cordingly, ILEA Officer for 16-19 - 19 May 1984.
Peter Dawson, General Secretary, NATFHE - 
12 and 14 February 1980.
E W Dennis, FE Officer, London Borough of Sutton - 
31 January 1980 and 16 February 1981.
Tom Driver, Ex-General Secretary, ATTI in 1970s - 
7 April 1980.
Bill Easton,* Treasurer, NATFHE and Principal of 
Southgate College - 8 May 1980.
Jean Finlayson, Report Editor, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff 
College - 11 October 1983.
Gerry Fowler,* Director, NELP; previously Minister of 
State for HE - 21 February 1983.
Alun Gronow, then LACSAB Secretariat dealing with Burnham 
for Management Panel - 6 January 1981.
Bert Harrison, Principal, Epsom School of Art - 
12 December 1982
Joan Hooker, Senior Lecturer at Kingsway-Princeton
College and ex-Regional Union Officer - 8 August 
1985.
Fred Janes,* Principal, Yeovil College - 
3 September 1981
Neil McClelland, Divisional Education Officer, Division 
10, ILEA - 13 April 1984.
J D S  McDougall, Senior FE Officer, ILEA - 
20 January 1984.
David Mallen, Schools Officer, ILEA - 29 May 1984.
Jack Mansell, Ex-HOD, Paddington College, prominent in
ATTI/NATFHE, then Director, FEU - 19 September 1980 
and 7 January 1981.
(iii)
P D Merridale,* Chairman of ACC and Hampshire Education 
Committee and Member of Macfarlane Members' Group - 
14 July 1986.
Wilf Newbold,* FE Officer, ILEA - 20 January 1984.
David Parkes, Staff Tutor, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College
- 11 October 1983.
Eric Robinson,* then Principal, Bradford College, now 
Director, Lancashire Polytechnic. Prominent in 
ATTI/NATFHE - 20 January 1981.
David Sample, then PL in Devon FE College - 
13 and 14 June 1981.
Dr Seeley, General Secretary, ATTI, late 1950s/early 
1960s - 20 June 1984.
John Sellars,* Chief Executive at BTEC - 8 July 1981.
Peter Sloman,* then LEA Officer, Newham LEA, previously 
Education Officer at AMA; before that, DES 
representative on Burnham negotiations - April 1981.
David Triesman, Chairman, NATFHE's Salaries Sub-Committee
- 18 December 1984.
Caroline Turney, Deputy Divisional Education Officer, 
Division 10, ILEA, FE Officer - 13 April 1984.
John Twining,* Director of Guildford Education Services, 
previously Deputy-Director, City and Guilds London 
Institute - 21 March 1983.
Frank Walton,* ex-LACSAB Secretariat dealing with Burnham 
for Management Panel (jointly with Lord Alexander of 
AEG) - 11 June 1984.
Derek Weitzel,* Negotiating Secretary, NATFHE - 
25 March 1980.
Gordon Wheeler, Director, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College
- 11 October 1983.
In addition to the above interviews, written comments 
were received on early drafts of parts of the thesis from 
the following:
Rodney Battey, Staff Inspector (FE), Surrey 
County Council
Bob Challis, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College.
Richard Clark, CEO, Hampshire County Council.
Gordon Cunningham, Education Officer, ACC.
Bryan Field, Principal, Southampton Technical College.
(iv)
John Hanson, Vice-Principal, Southanpton Institute of HE.
Bill Harris, formerly Assistant to Lord Alexander,
AEC/Burnham Management Panel, now Staffing Officer, 
LEA Bexley.
David Hibbert, Principal, Spelthorne AEI.
R D Holgate, Vice-Principal, W R Tusón College,
Lancashire (previously FE Officer, Lancashire).
Joan Hooker, then Senior Lecturer, Kingsway-Princeton
College and previously ATTl/NATFHE Regional Officer. 
Jack Latcham, Associate Staff Tutor, Coombe lx>dge,
FE Staff College.
Geoffrey Melling, Principal of Coombe Lodge, FE 
Staff College.
David Owen, previously Staff Inspector (FE), Surrey 
County Council.
Peter Sloman, Education Officer, AMA.
Jack Sturgess, FE Officer, Hampshire County Council
Michael Watts, FE Officer, Surrey County Council.
David Whitbread, Under-Secretary (Education), ACC.
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